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FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: DISPARATE ALEVI GROUPS AGREE TURKISH GOVERNMENT 
HASN'T DELIVERED BUT SEE NO ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
 
REF: 05 ISTANBUL 1297 
 
Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Alevi groups representing different 
religious ideologies shared with us views about their beliefs 
and disputes with the Government of Turkey.  The  Ehl-i-Beyt 
and Cem Foundations continue to seek legal recognition of 
their faith and proportional support from the Government, as 
well as equitable representation in mandatory religion 
courses.  Their very different approaches to resolving these 
issues are reflective of their beliefs, in general.  Both 
organizations are disappointed with the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) but see no credible alternative. 
Alevis, consequently, likely will have little influence as a 
community during this year's parliamentary elections.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Alevi Fragmentation: Historical Context 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Generally speaking, Alevis are a religious group 
who like Shia Muslims are followers of the Prophet Mohammed's 
son in-law Ali but in most other respects have significantly 
different beliefs and practices.  The Alevi Community in 
Turkey is far from cohesive and there is widespread 
disagreement both over what it means to be Alevi as well as 
the size of the community.  Alevi "Cem" (pronounced "Jem") 
Foundation Chairman Izzetin Dogan claims there are over 25 
million Alevis (approximately 35% of the Turkish population), 
while the Government asserts there are closer to 7 million 
(less than 10% of the population).  As in most cases, the 
truth likely lies somewhere in between and academics assess 
the community to stand at approximately 19 million members 
(27% of the population).  Alevi religious identity differs as 
well, with many considering themselves to be Alevi-only, some 
Alevi-Muslim and others simply Muslim. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Fermani Altun, President of the Alevi World 
"Ehl-i-Beyt" Foundation, told us his organization is unique 
because it does not recognize differences between sects in 
Islam.  In fact, the 10-year old Foundation includes a small 
proportion of Sunnis among its 150 different associations in 
80 countries, including the United States.  Altun described 
Ehl-i-Beyt's main goal as, "bring(ing) everyone together 
under an umbrella of common dialogue" and stressed the 
Foundation supports women's rights and rejects a strict 
adherence to Sharia Law, as well as "the militant practice of 
Islam." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Namik Sofuoglu, Cem Foundation board member and 
head of its legal committee, explained that Alevism was the 
dominant interpretation of Islam in Anatolia under the 
Ottoman Empire until the early 16th century.  The shift in 
favor of Sunni Islam occurred after the Ottomans conquered 
Egypt and transferred the caliphate and thousands of Sunni 
lecturers to Istanbul.  According to Sofuoglu, Alevis have 
been in dispute with the State ever since and for centuries 
were forced to practice their faith in secrecy in small rural 
villages.  He explained that economic growth in the 1950s 
encouraged many Alevis to move to the cities where they found 
safety in numbers and began to express their religious views 
more openly.  Sofuoglu attributes today's divisions within 
the Alevi community to the legacy of having to practice their 
faith secretly in separate communities for centuries. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Alevi Disputes: Political Context 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Despite these divisions, Alevis agree on several 
points of contention with the Government.  Altun suggested 
there was no real secularism in Turkey, arguing that the 
State's involvement in religious affairs had led to 
discrimination; either the State should not be involved at 
all or it should address all religions and treat them 
equally.  Similarly, Sofuoglu lamented that the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs' (Diyanet) original role as coordinator 
of religious affairs had evolved into one of directing 
religious services.  He asserted that the Diyanet's public 
services budget of over USD 1 billion went only for the 
benefit of Sunnis.  Despite representing a quarter of the 
population, he argued, Alevis receive no government support 
for building, maintaining or operating cem evis (places of 
gathering/worship). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Alevis also oppose the required religion courses in 
 
ISTANBUL 00000015  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
secondary schools.  Altun, for example, stated that religious 
education should be left to religious groups outside of the 
school system as the current courses reflect a Sunni bias. 
Press widely reported this week the Government's release of 
the new religion course curriculum, which was expected to 
include additional information about Alevism, and stated that 
new textbooks do not make any reference to Alevism by name. 
Altun, who had previous knowledge of the changes, called them 
inadequate.  Not only was the information "very basic" but in 
some cases it was wrong or even insulting, he claimed.  The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is currently hearing a 
case brought by Alevi parents who object to their son 
attending Sunni-focused religion courses.  Christians, Jews 
and other non-Muslims are not required to attend these 
courses.  The vast majority of Turks are Sunni Muslim.  Shia 
Muslims and Alevis are required to attend.  Though Altun and 
Sofuoglu would rather see Turkey resolve its own problems, 
they feel an ECHR decision in the Alevi child's favor could 
establish an important precedent.  At the same time, both 
Altun and Sofuoglu were fervent in their support for Turkey's 
EU accession.  "The EU is consistent with Ehl-i-Beyt's 
philosophy of brotherhood," said Altun.  He believed the 
associated reform process will help resolve Alevi issues. 
Sofuoglu told us the Cem Foundation "unconditionally supports 
EU accession." 
 
¶7.  (C) Alevis are also united in their disappointment with 
the Islamist AKP government.  Altun explained that, because 
Ehl-i-Beyt is open to everyone, the Foundation has a dialogue 
with AKP--indeed, at least one AKP card-carrying Foundation 
member was present at our meeting--but that any allegiance to 
the party was a result of good personal relations with party 
members and not due to Alevi identity.  The current 
administration, said Altun, has "good talk but no action" and 
has proven to be just as indifferent to its problems as its 
predecessors. 
 
¶8.  (C) Meanwhile, Sofuoglu recounted that, prior to its 2002 
election victory, the AKP had presented itself to Alevis as a 
proponent of religious freedom; unfortunately, all contact 
stopped after the election.  Frustrated, the Cem Foundation 
submitted two petitions to the Government in June 2005 
(reftel).  The first, delivered to the Prime Minister's 
office, requested that Alevi worship services be treated as 
public services and consequently granted the same type of 
support that Sunnis enjoy, including a proportionate 
distribution of Diyanet funding.  The second petition, 
directed to the Ministry of Education, requested that 
religion courses in secondary schools "give enough space to 
Alevi principles."  Sofuoglu said the Government responded to 
both petitions by claiming it was acting in accordance with 
the Constitution.  As a result, the Foundation filed cases 
against both the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of 
Education.  Regarding the latter, Sofuoglu told us a hearing 
is scheduled on February 21 at the 10th Administrative Court 
in Ankara.  No hearing has yet been scheduled regarding the 
case against the Prime Ministry. 
 
¶9.  (C) Despite widespread Alevi disappointment with 
perceived AKP inaction, our interlocutors suggest no other 
party is positioned to capitalize and earn consensus support 
from the community during this year's parliamentary 
elections.  Altun stated that the Alevis' traditional 
political allegiance to leftist parties is no longer 
predictable because of significant changes that occurred in 
Turkish domestic politics during the 1990s.  He explained 
that the traditional divisions between left and right don't 
exist anymore and that Alevis vote for whichever party is 
most representative of their general interests.  Sofuoglu 
told us that for the first time a party -- the Motherland 
Party (ANAP) -- is planning to include support for Alevis in 
its political platform; he cautioned, however, that ANAP 
sincerity would be gauged by the number of Alevi candidates 
represented in its tickets. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment: Though the Cem and Ehl-i-Beyt Foundations 
share similar complaints against the Government, their 
strategies for resolving related disputes are notably 
different.  Ehl-i-Beyt, with its big tent approach to 
membership, takes an equally collaborative approach to 
conflict resolution, stressing the importance of educated 
dialogue.  With that goal in mind, the Foundation is opening 
an Istanbul-based Academy in April where students can learn 
about Alevi history and faith.  The Cem Foundation on the 
other hand, feels it has no choice but to pursue resolutions 
through the courts and is considering a class action law suit 
against the government should the latter not comply with an 
awaited ruling in the Alevis' favor in the suit against the 
Ministry of Education.  In the event the court rules against 
 
ISTANBUL 00000015  003 OF 003 
 
 
it, the Foundation is likely to take the case to the ECHR. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment (continued): Speaking off the record, 
Sofuoglu suggested the AKP is pressuring the courts to delay 
a hearing on the Cem Foundation's case against the Prime 
Ministry until after this year's parliamentary elections. 
Sofuoglu assesses that the AKP believes a hearing, no matter 
the outcome, will have negative ramifications on AKP's 
election performance.  Either the Government will lose the 
case with its culpability affirmed publicly or it will win, 
resulting in increased Alevi public pressure, i.e. referral 
of the case to the ECHR or a lawsuit for damages.  Sofuoglu 
may be correct in stating that AKP has nothing to gain from a 
decision but he is likely too optimistic in believing the 
public at large is so sympathetic to Alevi issues that the 
court decision could affect the outcome of the election.  In 
addition, despite this week's headlines regarding numerous 
political parties' courting the Alevi vote, the fragmentation 
within the community and the lack of genuine commitment by 
any party to resolve associated issues means Alevis are not 
likely to rally behind any one particular party ticket.  End 
Comment. 
JONES