VZCZCXRO8174
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0002/01 0031702
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 031702Z JAN 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0049
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0046
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0042

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE, PARIS FOR WALLER, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD, BAKU 
FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/3/2027 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: FORMER IRGC GENERAL ON US-IRAN RELATIONS 
 
REF: RPO DUBAI 0001 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000002  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary: A longtime Iranian-American contact introduced 
IRPO Director to a former IRGC general, with whom he claimed a 
long acquaintance.  Like many other contacts, he claims many in 
Iran support rapprochement and believes other countries are 
working to keep US and Iran apart, to serve their own interests. 
 His comments, however, about a weakened top hierarchy of the 
IRGC and a disgruntled but influential sector of the IRGC in 
teaching institutions were interesting.  He only spoke 
tangentially on the nuclear issue, essentially viewing it as a 
facet of US-Iran bilateral relations.  His views of the IRGC and 
Iranian power circles are reported septel.  End summary 
 
US-Iran relations 
----------------- 
 
2.(S/NF) In a December 28 meeting, a former IRGC general called 
the US a strong friend and a strong enemy.  He claimed that the 
lack of ties between the American and Iranian people is an 
unnatural state of affairs, but that the longer the status quo 
drags on in Iran, the more it becomes rooted.  He acknowledged 
the need for a change in Iran -- an apparent allusion to changes 
in policy direction, not regime change.  He believed that a 
complicating factor on both sides was the increasing number of 
new offices -- at high levels -- in military and intelligence 
organizations that focus on confronting the other country.  In 
his view, these new structures are creating negative forces 
directing both countries towards conflict.  To counter this, he 
suggested creating new offices in the State Department and MFA, 
as well as in the NGO sector, to focus on ways to reestablish 
ties. 
 
Blaming others 
-------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) Like the majority of Iranians we encounter, the former 
official claimed other countries are deliberating acerbating 
US-Iranian relations.  He said individuals in France, Germany, 
Russia, China, Arab countries, as well as in Iran, benefit 
politically and economically from the lack of US-Iran ties.  He 
blamed the EU-3 for the lack of agreement over the nuclear issue 
last summer, in particular France, pointing to deals between 
Iran and Peugeot and Total as evidence of its perfidy. 
 
4.(S/NF) He, like many Iranians, maintains that the UK still 
controls Iran.  When asked how, he said through the clerics, but 
indirectly.  He said his father, a cleric, had told him that the 
UK pays off advisors to clerics and that often the clerics do 
not even know that they are being manipulated.  When these 
clerics enter government, they bring these co-optees with them. 
Separately, he claimed that for the past 10 years, both the UK 
and Israel have influence inside the IRGC.  Furthermore, he was 
very mistrustful of Russia as an ally for Iran. 
 
How to change direction 
----------------------- 
 
5.(S/NF) The former general, though out of the IRGC more than 10 
years, felt the IRGC could play a positive role in changing 
Iran's direction.  He maintained that the organization is not as 
monolithic as it appears and claimed there had been a recent 
change in character within the organization.  He claimed that 
when a politicized group left the IRGC to follow Ahmadinejad 
into government, these people chose as their replacements 
officers they could control.  As a result, these officers are 
weaker, with less influence. 
 
6.(S/NF) While not proposing any particular course of action or 
role for himself in this meeting, he maintained that a powerful, 
but untapped, force for influence in Iran are the IRGC officials 
who became disgruntled over the direction of the IRGC and 
distanced themselves by taking teaching positions at IRGC's Imam 
Hossein University and at other institutions.  He said they are 
unhappy with the direction that Ahmadinejad is taking the 
country but so far have not asserted themselves.  Nonetheless, 
he said, they remain very influential and are well-respected, 
and as such, they could play a future role.  (Note: the source 
said he serves as a consultant - NFI - to Tehran University. 
Endnote) 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000002  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
7.(S/NF) He maintained that such people were concerned about the 
prospect of a war and see no benefit for Iran from a conflict 
with the US, but out of loyalty would fight if confrontation 
happened.  He maintained that when the US approaches Iran in a 
threatening manner, it reinforces negative trends inside the 
country and works contrary to US goals.  The former general said 
Iranians are very sensitive about specific issues, such as 
national dignity and religion.  He advised against the US trying 
to choose a future leader for Iran, saying the Iranians would 
destroy anyone they viewed as a puppet of foreign governments. 
He claimed, for instance, that President Clinton made a mistake 
when he voiced his support for student demonstrators, saying 
this outside support damaged them in the eyes of Iranians. 
 
8.(S/NF) When asked his view of the influence of the Iranian 
diaspora, he looked at the issue from the point of view of 
influence through economic investment and used it to object to 
US  sanctions.  He said that if the economy in Iran sinks, 
Iranians outside could influence the course of events through 
investment in Iran.  However, he said, sanctions tie their 
hands.  He also repeated a common warning that Iranians will say 
one thing, think one thing, and do another.  This, he said, is a 
reason for frequent political surprises in Iran, such as 
Khatami's 1997 defeat of presumed presidential winner 
Nadeq-Nouri. 
 
9.(S/NF) In the conversation, the Iranian-American, a long-time 
supporter of Rafsanjani, predicted that the most practical path 
to change in Iran is if Rafsanjani becomes Supreme Leader.  He 
claimed some outside Iran predict an IRGC-led coup, installing a 
military strongman to run the country, but he doubted it would 
occur. 
 
10.(S/NF) Comment: This was our first meeting with this contact 
and a rare chance to examine views of a former IRGC official, 
albeit one who has been out of the organization for over a 
decade.  While his criticism of sanctions, of third country 
interference and of any attempt by the US to choose a future 
leader are predictable, his comments about a weakened IRGC 
hierarchy was interesting, particularly if eventually the former 
IRGC officials still yielding influence from their positions in 
the administration get pushed out.  His view of a disgruntled 
but influential sector of the IRGC in teaching institutions was 
also noteworthy.  In this meeting, he did not try to offer 
himself as a conduit to the Iranian government in any way.  Nor 
did he seem to be on any kind of expedition to try to collect 
intelligence.  Although his motivation for agreeing to a meeting 
with IRPO is unclear, he appeared to simply want to express his 
views of the current situation and to give advice.  At several 
points, he said he wanted to think further on issues, implying 
readiness to meet again. 
BURNS