VZCZCXRO8168
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0001/01 0031650
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 031650Z JAN 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0046
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0043
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0039

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; PARIS FOR WALLER; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU 
FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/3/2027 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR PTER
SUBJECT: FORMER IRGC GENERAL DISMAYED WITH POLITICIZATION OF IRGC 
(C-NE6-02079) 
 
REF: RPO DUBAI 0015 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000001  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary: A longtime Iranian-American contact introduced 
IRPO Director to a former IRGC general, with whom he claimed a 
long acquaintance.  While the former general's motivations for 
agreeing to such a meeting were not clear, he did not use this 
initial meeting in any way to offer himself as a conduit to the 
Iranian government or to solicit much information about US 
intentions regarding Iran.  Instead, he presented his views of 
the current power structure in Iran, the conflicting factions, 
Al Qaida, Iraq, and the IRGC's economic role.  (His views on 
US-Iran relations to be reported septel.)  He was disdainful of 
President Ahmadinejad and other sources of power in Iran and 
conveyed the impression that he was disappointed in how the IRGC 
had veered off course.  His disappointment in the present state 
of affairs did not, however, convey a lack of loyalty to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  End summary 
 
2.(S/NF) In a December 18 meeting, a long-time Iranian-American 
contact introduced IRPO Director to a former IRGC general who 
left the IRGC in the mid 1990s and left government about eight 
years ago.  (Note: all the information in this report is sourced 
either to the contact or to the Iranian-American and cannot be 
independently confirmed.  Endnote)  According to the former 
official, he quit university to join the IRGC at the beginning 
of the Iran-Iraq war.  After the war ended, he stayed in the 
IRGC another five years working in budget and planning offices. 
He attained a bachelors degree in philosophy, and a masters in 
urban planning.  He claims to have always been politically 
independent and said he became a general on his own merits 
through his work and beliefs, not through political 
affiliations.  He said he left the IRGC because he was being 
pressured to join a political faction.  After leaving the IRGC, 
he went to the Ministry of Ershad where he said he was in charge 
of embassy cultural officers.  Since leaving government eight 
years ago, he went into business and continues to live in Iran. 
 
Ahmadinejad: intelligent - to a degree 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) The former general claimed to have known President 
Ahmadinejad while in the IRGC.  He described Ahmadinejad as very 
tough, with no fear, and intelligent "to a degree."  In his 
view, however, Ahmadinejad serves as merely an extension of 
Supreme Leader Khamenei - not a creator of strategy, only an 
implementer.  (Note: The Iranian-American in an earlier 
conversation with IRPO Director claimed the former general had 
told him that even in the days when Ahmadinejad was in the IRGC, 
he was pressing the issue of what should be done about the 
coming of the 12th imam. Endnote)  The former general said that 
some of Ahmadinejad's beliefs run counter to Khomeini's, such as 
pro-Hojjatiyeh views, now accepted by Khamenei. 
 
Power circles 
------------- 
 
4.(S/NF) The former general described various power circles 
around the president.  He was dismissive of Ayatollah 
Mesbah-Yazdi but said the ideology of the Hojjatiyeh founder, 
the late Sheikh Mahmoud Halabi, lives on, and the Hojjatiyeh 
remain influential.  In addition, he said, prior to 
Ahmadinejad's election, a politicized group within the IRGC was 
quite influential.  When Ahmadinejad took office, this group 
left the IRGC and went into government.  He also named Interior 
Ministry Security Deputy, Brigadier General Mohammad Baqr 
Zolqadr, and former Intelligence Minister Hojatoleslam Mohammad 
Reyshahri, now the Supreme Leader's representative for Hajj 
affairs, as powerful individuals. 
 
5.(S/NF) The source claimed to know Zolqadr from the IRGC and 
said he is now in change of security for Tehran.  The former 
general said he left IRGC when Zolqadr tried to pressure him to 
join political factions.  He claimed Zolqadr is not popular 
within the IRGC.  He contrasted Zolqadr with the "real" 
Revolutionary Guard, the real believers.  These figures are 
popular with the Iranian people, who regard them as war heroes, 
he said, just like Americans regard WWII heroes.  The 
Iranian-American called Zolqadr "crazy," and said he is close to 
IRGC Commander Safavi and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen 
Rezaie, also former IRGC. 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000001  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.(S/NF) According to the former general, Reyshahri gained 
significant economic power through the food export business and 
is now trying to replace Rafsanjani as both a political and 
economic power in Iran, though he prefers to remain behind the 
scenes.  Although Reyshahri is no longer in the IRGC or the 
intelligence ministry, he uses his friends in those 
institutions, and reportedly gets influence and income through 
companies controlled by the Qods force and the intelligence 
ministry. 
 
7.(S/NF) The former general did not think Tehran Mayor Qalibaf 
had deep support in the IRGC, calling him a "fad" of the moment. 
 However, he thinks the Supreme Leader takes Qalibaf and 
Larijani seriously.  On the other hand, he thought that Rezaie 
still has a lot of influence, but he is waiting for a political 
opportunity in the future.  He believes Rezaie is stronger than 
Ahmadinejad. 
 
Iran's relations with Al-Qaida, Iraq 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.(S/NF) When asked about his views of Iran's relationship with 
Al-Qaida, the former general said only that during the days of 
fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, some of the fighters were 
trained in Iran and perhaps some links to Iranian elements were 
retained. 
 
9.(S/NF) When IRPO Director raised the issue of Iran's support 
inside Iraq causing deaths of US soldiers and the potential 
clash that this support could cause, he said only that if it is 
true that Iran is giving such support, it is the result of one 
faction.  This faction would see such actions as defending Iran 
on Iraqi soil, so as to deter an attack on Iran itself. 
However, he said, other factions in Iran want reestablishment of 
relations with the US.  (Note: this conversation took place 
before the December 21 capture by US forces in Iraq of Iranian 
IRGC members.  Endnote)  The former general called Iraq a lost 
cause and said even Iran cannot help the situation. 
Nonetheless, he recommended quiet exchanges through intelligence 
services.  He predicted the consequences of the present 
situation to be very dangerous. 
 
Economic Role of IRGC 
--------------------- 
 
10.(S/NF) In line with reftel, the former general said that the 
evolution of the IRGC's economic arm was a natural one. 
Although Prime Minister Bazargan formed the IRGC, the government 
did not initially fund it.  For the first three months, funding 
came from the bazaaris, until the war with Iraq broke out. 
During the war, the government funded the IRGC generously but 
then cut its budget after the war ended.  The organization 
looked for ways to generate its own income, although he said 
some inside the organization opposed this strategy.  At the same 
time, then President Rafsanjani turned to IRGC engineers, who 
had gained a lot of experience in the war at creative 
problem-solving, to help rebuild the country.  IRGC began to 
form companies.  Eventually, this trend led to negative 
political ramifications, according to the former general.  Now 
the IRGC can generate its own budget, reducing the government's 
influence over the organization.  President Khatami tried to 
control it through the budget, but opposing factions found ways 
to direct business towards the IRGC.  The former general 
maintained, in contrast to views in reftel, that the quality of 
work performed by IRGC companies is superior to other companies. 
 That said, he decried both personal gain of wealth and 
accruement of political power that have accompanied IRGC 
business activity.  He also acknowledged the damage done to 
competitiveness in bidding for contracts. 
 
11.(S/NF) Comment: This was our first meeting with this contact 
and a rare chance to examine views of a former IRGC official, 
albeit one who has been out of the organization for over a 
decade.  In this meeting, he did not try to offer himself as a 
conduit to the Iranian government in any way.  Nor did he seem 
to be on any kind of expedition to try to collect intelligence. 
He appeared to simply want to express his views of the current 
situation and to give advice.  His view of factions within the 
IRGC mirrors comments of others, but given his background, 
appear more credible.  His disappointment in the present state 
of affairs did not, however, appear to convey a lack of loyalty 
to the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Although his current access to 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000001  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
information is unknown, he claims to have ongoing contacts with 
some influential figures, including Mohammad Reza Khatami, the 
former deputy Majles speaker and brother of the president, 
making him a worthwhile interlocutor. 
BURNS