VZCZCXRO7971
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0011/01 0031344
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031344Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5995
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT FORE 
M ALSO FOR DENNY OFFUTT 
NEA/EX FOR NED ALFORD AND MICHALENE KACZMAREK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL AMGT PGOV ASEC CMGT QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY FORE'S JANUARY 
17-19 VISIT TO DOHA 
 
Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D. 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome you to Qatar. The 
Government of Qatar remains a key ally of the U.S. in the war 
on terror and supports a significant U.S. military presence 
in the country. Qatar's Amir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani, took power from his father in 1995 and embarked on a 
program of political reform and economic development. Sheikha 
Mozah bint Nasser al-Missnad, his consort, has made equally 
important strides in leading social change. Qatar's relations 
with Iran are outwardly cordial but like other Arab Gulf 
states, Qatar is concerned about the activities of its large 
neighbor across the waters and by the proximity of the site 
for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Qatar's economy is 
growing at a record pace thanks to both oil and gas 
production. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
U.S.-QATARI MILITARY RELATIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (S) Bilateral military relations between the U.S. and 
Qatar are excellent and the GOQ continues to demonstrate 
unwavering support for U.S. military operations. Currently 
Qatar hosts approximately 8,000 U.S. forces based at Camp 
al-Sayliyah and al-Udeid Air Base. Some 100 U.S. and 
Coalition fighter and support aircraft operate from al-Udeid 
and represent the largest Air Expeditionary Wing in the 
CENTCOM AOR. Qatar also hosts both the USCENTCOM Forward 
Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center for 
theater-wide command and control. Al-Udeid Air Base itself 
continues to undergo a surge of both GOQ and U.S. funded 
construction to support U.S. operational and logistical 
requirements. 
 
------------------------- 
REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Qatar has adopted an increasingly assertive foreign 
policy. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia is strained as a 
result of anti-Saud programming on Al-Jazeera and a history 
of border issues, but primarily Qatar strives to emerge from 
the Kingdom's "sphere of influence" in the Gulf.  The result 
is often policies that antagonize Riyadh.  Qatar's effort to 
mediate between Fatah and Hamas on a Palestinian unity 
government, its continued relationship with Syrian president 
Bashar al-Asad, Hamas leader (and PA Prime Minister) Ismail 
Haniyah, and others, as well as Qatar's efforts to involve 
itself in the August 2006 ceasefire between Israel and 
Lebanon, has annoyed many regional governments - and often 
the U.S. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶4. (C) Qatari regional diplomacy seeks to keep lines open to 
all neighbors, of which Iran is the largest. Qatar has played 
the Iran issue this way since the beginning of 2006, with the 
Amir meeting the Iranian president in Tehran May 2. There 
have been other senior-level bilateral visits. The policy 
resulted in Qatar's 14 to 1 consensus-breaking UN Security 
Council vote on Resolution 1696 in July. Qatar made amends 
(of sorts) when it joined consensus on Resolution 1736 in 
December. Nevertheless, Qatar is uncomfortable with having to 
say or do anything publicly that might be seen as 
antagonizing Iran. The two countries share the North Field 
(South Pars to the Iranians), the largest non-associated gas 
field in the world and the source of much of Qatar's future 
prosperity. 
 
¶5. (C) In private, Qatari officials are concerned about the 
role of Iran in the region and about its nuclear weapons 
ambitions and agree with our analysis of Iran's revolutionary 
motivations and goals. They note Iran's active support for 
subversive elements in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and eastern 
Saudi Arabia, as well as Iraq. But Qatari officials believe 
that Iran's nuclear program is nearly unstoppable. Qatar is 
likely to continue trying to balance its U.S. military 
cooperation - its ultimate strategic defense - with 
diplomatic efforts that seek to avoid antagonizing Iran. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶6. (S) Qatar has been a pillar of support for our efforts in 
 
DOHA 00000011  002 OF 003 
 
 
Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to fly unimpeded combat 
missions out of al-Udeid Air Base. The Amir shares our view 
that restoration of order and a successful democratic 
transition are of paramount importance not only to Iraq but 
to the region. However, there is some feeling that Qatar's 
efforts over the past three years are not fully appreciated 
in Washington and this may drive Qatar's resistance to follow 
through on some of our priorities for Iraq, including 
comprehensive debt forgiveness. While the Foreign Minister 
has expressed concerns about civil war in Iraq, he has stated 
publicly that the coalition needs to stay in the country to 
establish wider security. The GOQ also points to the 
importance of establishing a power structure in Baghdad that 
is fully inclusive of the Sunni bloc. The GOQ is not prepared 
to open an embassy in Baghdad until the security situation 
improves dramatically. 
 
------------------- 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Qataris are halfway through their term on the UN 
Security Council. They have not always behaved responsibly. 
Under Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, Qatar has 
staked out an independent path on Iran and Syria, which has 
had troublesome consequences on the Council. Qatar sees 
itself as holding the Arab/Muslim "seat," and it sometimes 
gives interests of this region a priority over global 
security issues. On Iran's nuclear program, we have described 
how building and maintaining an international consensus is 
vital. They have unfortunately also voted against our wishes 
(and often against the broad international consensus) on 
other issues, including Sudan and Burma. 
 
--------------------------- 
Qatari Media and Al Jazeera 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) The Qatari constitution, which came into force in 
2005, states that "Freedom of expression and scientific 
research is assured according to the conditions and 
circumstances to be stipulated by the law." Also Article 48 
stated, "Press freedom, printing and publishing is assured in 
accordance with the law." 
 
¶9. (U) Since the lifting of the Qatari censorship law in 
October 1995 and the concurrent discontinuation of government 
subsidies, there has been little direct censorship of the 
media. Only sexually explicit materials or certain religious 
tracts are censored on a regular basis. Self-censorship is 
still the norm, however, and it is understood that criticism 
of the Amir, the ruling family, and Islam will not be 
tolerated. 
 
¶10. (C) Though their coverage of Qatar itself is minimal, Al 
Jazeera is by far Qatar's most prominent media outlet and the 
bane of many governments in the region. With an 
Arabic-speaking audience of around 50 million viewers, Al 
Jazeera is now ten years old. In November it launched an 
English-language edition and has ambitions to compete with 
the major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide. 
 
¶11. (U) Since early last year, the USG has seen a bumpy 
downward trend in inflammatory anti-Western bias and 
inaccuracy in al- Jazeera's content. Al-Jazeera has increased 
its use of U.S. government sources, limited its use of 
inflammatory terminology, and devoted more time to stories of 
interest in the region other than the U.S. role in Iraq. 
However, al-Jazeera's track record remains far from 
acceptable. Unprofessional, biased, and inaccurate propaganda 
continues to appear on its newscasts, talk shows, and 
website. The USG also views with concern Al Jazeera's 
practice of airing terrorist-provided video tapes. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL REFORM 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir 
after he assumed power in 1995, could take a significant step 
forward this year if the government holds first-time 
elections for its national legislature. Qatar has gone slow, 
seeking to establish an institution that reflects local 
social and political norms. The current sticking points are 
who will be able to vote (a fraction of Qatar's 186,000 
citizens) and who may stand for office. Qatari women will 
have the right to vote and will be encouraged by the 
government to run. Elections for the country's third 
 
DOHA 00000011  003 OF 003 
 
 
municipal council have already been scheduled for April, 
¶2007. One woman was elected to the council in 2003. 
 
------- 
ECONOMY 
------- 
 
¶13. (U) At USD 61,540, Qatar's per capita income is ranked 
fifth in the world and ahead of the U.S. The country's vast 
wealth has resulted from the successful development of its 
natural gas resources over the past 10 years with plans for 
even greater expansion over the next decade. Qatar Petroleum 
is maximizing use of Qatar's natural resources to diversify 
the economy and provide business and employment opportunities 
to Qataris. Qatar is extremely friendly to U.S. energy 
companies: Since 1999, there has been USD 60 billion in 
foreign investment in Qatar's energy sector with the majority 
- about USD 40 billion - coming from the U.S. firms, 
including Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Anadarko, and Occidental. 
Qatar plans to invest USD 70 billion in the natural gas 
sector over the next seven years. 
 
¶14. (U) The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves are at 27 
billion barrels. Qatar's daily average production is 
currently estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current 
production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 60 
years, depending on estimates. Qatar's goal is to increase 
overall production capacity to over one million bpd by 2006. 
Occidental and Anadarko are the two U.S. companies operating 
in this sector. 
 
¶15. (U) The majority of Qatar's current energy development is 
focused on natural gas. Qatar's North Field contains 15.3% of 
world natural gas reserves, third behind Russia and Iran. It 
is the largest non-associated gas field in the world, and is 
expected to support planned production for over 200 years. 
 
-------------------- 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework 
agreement with the U.S. in March 2004, but progress toward a 
Free Trade Agreement is moving slowly at best. Achieving a 
FTA will require Qatar to remove such obstacles as mandatory 
majority Qatari ownership of most businesses, the government 
telecom monopoly, restrictions on foreign investment in the 
financial services sector, labor issues, and transparency in 
government procurement. 
 
-------------- 
Education City 
-------------- 
 
¶17. (U) Education City is located on a 2500-acre campus on 
the outskirts of Doha. It is managed by Qatar Foundation, the 
umbrella organization chaired by Sheikha Mozah, the Amir's 
consort. Education City is home to five U.S. college branch 
campuses, with some 800 students currently enrolled. The 
majority (roughly 60%) are Qatari; others come from around 
the region and some from further beyond, including Bosnia and 
the US. About two-thirds of the students are women, since the 
Education City campuses allow them to live at home with their 
families. 
 
¶18. (U) Five U.S. branch campuses are currently represented 
at Education City: Virginia Commonwealth University (fashion 
design, interior design, graphic design); Weill Cornell 
Medical College (medicine); Carnegie-Mellon University 
(business, computer science); Texas A&M University 
(engineering); and Georgetown University's School of Foreign 
Service. 
 
¶19. (U) The Foundation is currently recruiting a school of 
communications (journalism), with five U.S. universities on 
the short list: The University of Missouri, the University of 
Florida, Boston University, Northwestern, and the University 
of Indiana. Options for the future include a graduate school 
in business; a law school (Cambridge University); an Islamic 
Research Center; and possibly the Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard to teach public administration. Sheikha 
Mozah has also asked for a branch campus of the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point to improve the professionalism of Arab 
military officers and to teach them how to operate under 
civilian control in a democracy. 
RATNEY