VZCZCXRO1113
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHCP #0063/01 0180845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180845Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3143
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COPENHAGEN 000063 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ANSLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV IZ DA
SUBJECT: DANES IN IRAQ: EDGING TOWARD THE EXIT? 
 
REF: ANSLEY-KAISER 01/09/07 TELCON 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Cain, for reasons 1.4 b,d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Recognizing growing domestic opposition, 
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has signaled that 
Denmark hopes to join the British in scaling down its Iraq 
deployment by mid-2007, provided that Iraq forces can take 
over security responsibilities there.  At the same time, the 
Danish government insists that it remains committed to 
supporting Iraq and the Coalition, and privately indicates an 
openness to extending its Iraq mission beyond the current 
mandate ending June 30.  Rasmussen was proud to be one of the 
world leaders the President called before his January 10 
speech.  Although debate on this issue will not begin 
publicly until late spring, Danish policymakers are 
considering their options now.  We will need to move quickly 
to convey clearly to the Danes our interests regarding a 
follow-on mission.  Despite the increased pressure to 
withdraw, we have a chance to persuade the Danes to stay in 
Iraq, if we begin this conversation soon.  End summary. 
 
Danish Public Opinion Hardens on Iraq 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In Denmark, public concern over the course of the 
war in Iraq has grown in the past year, emboldening critics 
within the domestic political opposition.  Roughly a third of 
Danes surveyed maintain that Denmark's engagement was the 
right decision, down from nearly fifty percent a year ago, 
and almost sixty percent of Danes now favor withdrawal, 
although less than 40 percent want an immediate pull-out. 
This decline in public support continues even despite 
relatively low numbers of Danish casualties (seven soldiers 
as of mid-January).  Danish papers that traditionally support 
the Iraq deployment have been running more negative 
editorials on the conduct of the war than in months past. 
 
¶3. (C) As Danish public concern grows, the opposition Social 
Democrats have stepped up their attacks on the Rasmussen 
government on Iraq, demanding an immediate withdrawal.  In 
recent months, as the Social Democrats have pulled to a rough 
parity in the polls with the governing Liberals, these 
attacks have become increasingly sharp.  Among the 
now-standard opposition charges are that Rasmussen has 
"blindly" followed President Bush and led Denmark into a 
foreign policy quagmire.  The opposition is gaining ground 
mostly on domestic issues, but the attacks on Iraq are 
beginning to draw blood. 
 
"President Bush and I Share the Same Vision for Iraq" 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (C) PM Rasmussen and his team continue to shrug off these 
criticisms -- as well as any suggestions that Danish public 
regard for the U.S. could diminish as a result -- but they 
certainly feel the pressure.  Anders Fogh Rasmussen is a 
determined man, and not one to yield easily to such attacks, 
especially with elections not likely for another two years. 
However, we have seen a distinct shift in the last few weeks 
in the PM's tone on Iraq.  In his New Year's address, 
Rasmussen expressed hope that 2007 will be the year when 
Iraqis will take over responsibility for their security and 
allow Britain and Denmark to reduce their forces in southern 
Iraq.  Without retreating from his commitment to assist the 
Iraqis in "building a better life," the prime minister 
nevertheless began to speak frequently of the prospects for 
reducing the Danish troop presence.  Danish government 
officials are emphasizing the progress in Iraq's southern 
provinces, where Danish forces are operating. 
 
¶5. (C) Indeed, the principal reaction of the Danish 
government to President Bush's speech and our new Iraq policy 
-- beyond a cautious endorsement of the decision to surge -- 
has been to highlight the differences between the security 
situations in Baghdad and in southern Iraq.  The Americans 
may well need to add more troops, runs the Danish 
government's reassuring line, but we and the British do not. 
Rasmussen used his January 9 telephone conversation with the 
President to commQicate directly his desire to reduce the 
Danish troop presence as soon as conditions allow.  Defense 
Secretary Gates's remarks at a NATO ministerial January 14 
 
SIPDIS 
acknowledging a possible UK/Danish drawdown were headlined, 
"U.S. Prepared to Accept Danish Withdrawals," in the local 
press. 
 
¶6. (C) Privately, Danish foreign ministry and military 
officials are optimistic that the final two provinces under 
their and U.K. control could be turned over to the Iraqis in 
the spring (forecasts differ among March, May and June).  The 
Danes have not yet determined what level of reduction from 
 
COPENHAGEN 00000063  002 OF 003 
 
 
the current battalion (about 440 troops) would be possible, 
other than that it would be "proportional" to any British 
reduction and make sense in terms of the mission.  For their 
part, the Danish military remains enthusiastic about the Iraq 
deployment, emphasizing to us the value of the experience for 
their forces and their desire to maintain a robust overseas 
presence.  In their planning, they are calculating continued 
troop rotations in Iraq beyond the expiration of the mandate. 
 
Danish Iraq Deployment After June? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Danish officials tell us that it remains "too early" 
to say whether the government will seek extension of 
parliament's Iraq deployment mandate when it expires at the 
end of June.  With a resurgent opposition hammering the 
government over the unpopular war, it seems the Danes might 
take advantage of the mandate expiration to put an end to 
their engagement.  However, few here -- including among 
left-leaning analysts -- are prepared to dismiss the 
possibility of a deployment extension. 
 
¶8. (C) MFA security officials note that some sort of new 
parliamentary mandate will be needed, if only to cover the 
NATO training mission (some 20 Danish soldiers), which enjoys 
broad support in parliament -- including from the Social 
Democrats.  Security for implementation of Denmark's 
remaining assistance projects (an additional 9 million USD 
was recently authorized by parliament) will also need to be 
addressed.  Beyond that, Danish officials insist, any future 
Danish military mission will be shaped by as-yet-undetermined 
requirements and the need to secure backing in parliament. 
The Danish force, which officials hope will be reduced by 
June in any case, could be redirected toward training of 
Iraqi security forces, or could even serve as an 
over-the-horizon force -- the MFA's senior security policy 
director cautions that a post-June Danish mission might not 
even include "boots on the ground" in the traditional sense. 
 
¶9. (C) There's no hope to bring the Social Democrats into a 
consensus vote on staying in Iraq, and the government fears 
other supporters may fade as well.  The populist, right-wing 
Danish People's Party has long supported the Iraq deployments 
but is concerned about the worsening public mood.  The 
current minority government needs the DPP's votes to extend 
the mandate.  The head of parliament's foreign policy 
committee told us this week that they are close to reaching a 
preliminary agreement for the DPP's support, although 
questions about the very nature of the mission remain 
unsettled. 
 
Clear Talk Key to Getting Danes to Stay in Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶10. (C) Keeping Danish troops deployed in Iraq beyond June 
will require clear messages from us (coordinated with the 
British) about our needs and expectations, the earlier the 
better.  The Danes are not sure about what we are looking for 
from them after the current mission ends.  Prime Minister 
Rasmussen reiterated last week that he "shares President 
Bush's vision for a free and democratic Iraq," and MFA 
officials assure us that they understand the importance of 
Denmark's remaining "in the Coalition."  The exact nature of 
Denmark's continued engagement in Iraq, however, is less 
clear.  Although public and parliamentary debate about a 
follow-on mission is not likely to begin before April, we 
should begin to engage the Danes now if we have any interest 
in shaping that mission. 
 
¶11. (C) The weeks ahead offer many opportunities for 
consultation with the Danes on the way forward, including 
foreign and defense ministerials at which bilateral meetings 
or pull-asides could be arranged.  Per reftelcon, the good 
relationship between NSA Stephen Hadley and Danish 
NSA-equivalent Bo Lidegaard could be a useful conduit for 
discussion, as could Danish Deputy FM Ulrik Federspiel's 
February 14-16 meetings in Washington.  We recommend 
strongly, and have requested, an early meeting between 
Defense Secretary Gates and Danish Defense Minister Soren 
Gade (a stalwart ally and a good friend) on this and other 
issues, and we would welcome an early visit by a USG 
interagency Iraq team to Denmark.  At a working level, we 
know that there are a number of fora, including the "Basrah 
Quint" meetings between us and Southern Iraq troop 
contributors. Finally, we at post are prepared to engage the 
Danes at the highest levels to shape and deliver any message 
regarding our expectations of Denmark in Iraq. 
 
¶12. (C) We have an opportunity to persuade the Danish 
government to extend their mission in Iraq, at least in 
principle, but making that case will become increasingly 
 
COPENHAGEN 00000063  003 OF 003 
 
 
difficult over time.  If we are going to ask the Danes to 
stay in Iraq beyond the summer, then we need to do it soon. 
CAIN