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O 301541Z JAN 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA (CHASE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID EFIN EUN ETRD PARM IR IZ NK
SUBJECT: DEPSEC KIMMITT VISIT: MEETING WITH HIGH REP SOLANA 
ON IRAN AND IRAQ COMPACT 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR C. BOYDEN GRAY FOR REASONS 1.5 (D) AND (E). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.(C)  On January 23, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert 
Kimmitt and Ambassador Gray discussed Iran sanctions and the 
Iraq Compact with High Rep Solana and his senior policy 
advisor Robert Cooper.  As in his meetings with other senior 
EU officials (reported septels), Kimmitt underscored U.S. 
expectations that the EU would put in place quickly binding 
an EU regulation together with a common position which would 
enable Member States to act together to implement fully UNSC 
sanctions against Iran.  He also expressed appreciation for 
the GAERC's preliminary conclusion to implement UNSCR 1737 
"to ban transactions with and freeze the assets of 
individuals and entities covered by the criteria in UNSCR 
1737."  Kimmitt pressed Solana to address the EU's lack of 
progress in implementing UNSC sanctions against North Korea. 
Solana confirmed that the January 22 GAERC conclusions 
signaled the EU "may go beyond" the 1737 annex of designated 
entities, in order to comply with the spirit as well as the 
letter of the resolution. Solana and Cooper said they 
intended to pursue with the Council a step-by-step approach: 
implementing regulations would incorporate the list of 
designees contained in the Annex to UNSCR 1737, and an 
ad-hoc, fact-based mechanism would be created for Member 
States to update and expand the designations.  If additional 
designations were to be the next step after the approval of 
the regulations, Kimmitt said he could agree to Cooper's 
suggestion that the United States temporarily lower its 
profile vis-a-vis the EU on immediate expansion of the 
designation list.  Solana welcomed U.S.-suggested next steps 
on completion of the Iraq Compact. END SUMMARY 
 
2.(U)  In a cordial and informal forty-five minute meeting 
January 23, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt, 
accompanied by USEU Ambassador Gray, USEU Treasury Attach 
Matthews and USEU poloff (notetaker) met with Javier Solana, 
European Council High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy to discuss implementation of UNSC-mandated 
Iran sanctions and completion of the Iraq Compact.  The High 
Rep was joined by Director General for External Relations and 
CFSP Robert Cooper, Special Counselor in the High Rep's 
Private Office Steve Everts, Transatlantic Affairs Desk 
Officer Christiane Hoehn, and, Iran Desk Officer Jonas 
Jonsson. 
 
Iraq Compact Timeline 
--------------------- 
3.(C)  Deputy Secretary Kimmitt said that the new UNSYG Ban 
Ki-Moon had made completion of the Iraq Compact an immediate 
priority objective and might raise the issue in his meeting 
with Solana the following day.  He relayed the USG's 
suggestion that the SYG convene the Compact Preparatory Group 
(PG) plus Permreps from non-PG countries for a ministerial 
meeting in New York in February with a view toward holding a 
signing conference in March.  He indicated that the document 
itself was complete and noted that the Ambassador would 
provide Solana with a copy.  Solana welcomed this news. 
 
Iran designation process - EU accent on Unanimity and 
Objectivity 
-------------------------------------- 
4.(C) Depsec Kimmitt praised the January 22 GAERC conclusions 
on Iran and noted the exceptional importance of the 
statement's section calling on member states to "ban 
transactions with and freeze the assets of individuals and 
entities covered by the criteria in UNSCR 1737."  Solana 
confirmed unequivocally that the January 22 GAERC conclusions 
signaled that the EU "may go beyond" the 1737 annex of 
designated entities list, in order to comply with the spirit 
as well as the letter of the resolution.  Solana indicated 
that the strength of the new conclusions had exceeded his 
expectations, and he complimented the German Presidency on 
its superb handling of this statement. 
 
5.(C/NF) Director General Cooper noted that on January 25, 
the Council (RELEX Counselors) would commence work on the 
draft implementation proposal.  Cooper himself had briefed 
PSC Ambassadors on a proposal which would include the 1737 
Annex list as a baseline for designations by the EU. 
Although the details had yet to be determined, he expected EU 
Member States to support his proposal to approve the current 
1737 annex list as well as an ad hoc mechanism to identify 
and designate entities and individuals in addition to those 
already named in resolution.  He stressed that the 
designation process had to be based on Member State unanimity 
 
BRUSSELS 00000318  002 OF 003 
 
 
and objective fact-based evidence.  This would help win over 
skeptical EU Member States as well as ensure standards of 
evidence that could hold up under any potential court 
challenge.  Solana underscored that the EU must avoid 
repetition of the embarrassing political and legal setback it 
suffered when the European Court of Justice overturned the 
EU's designation in the so-calle 
d "MKO" case. 
 
Information Sharing 
------------------- 
6.(C/NF) The Deputy Secretary welcomed these developments. 
He noted that an anomaly exists in UNSCR 1737 whereby the CEO 
of a bank had been designated, but the bank itself had not 
been designated.  The Deputy Secretary offered to provide the 
EU with information on potential designees, to facilitate the 
EU's fact-based process.  The Deputy Secretary asked what 
kind of information would be useful if the idea was to make 
designations that could be defended in courts, noted that EU 
courts do not have processes in place to handle confidential 
information.  Cooper noted that open source information was 
more useful with respect to defense in potential court 
challenges but that classified intelligence could be helpful 
as well. (Note: the EU currently lacks safeguards in judicial 
proceedings for classified information akin to those 
contained in the U.S. Classified Information Procedures Act). 
 Cooper also recommended that information sharing 
arrangements should be contemplated after the February 12, 
2007 GAERC during which presumably the EU legal framework for 
implementing USNCR 1737 would be agreed. 
 
EU Process - The North Korea Experience 
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C/NF) Kimmitt underscored that the United States had 
placed a great deal of emphasis on multilateral cooperation 
to resolve both the Iran and DPRK proliferation issues, 
including close consultations with Member States who would 
have to implement sanctions.  Depsec Kimmitt stressed the 
importance of putting into place quickly the necessary 
authorities for Member States to take action.  The United 
States was disappointed that the EU had not yet created the 
legal framework required for Member States to implement 
UNSCRs 1695 and 1718 on North Korea, despite the fact that EU 
Member States had been directly responsible for drafting the 
United Nations texts. 
 
8.(C/NF)  Kimmitt noted that a deepening nexus of cooperation 
between Iran and North Korea existed.  Furthermore, the bite 
of financial sanctions in Northeast Asia was driving the 
North Korea to explore prospects for financial intermediation 
in Europe.  There was also evidence that Ahmedinejad was 
feeling greater pressure from above and below for Iran's 
deepening economic woes which were seen to be linked at least 
indirectly to his confrontational stance on WMD. 
 
Internal EU Problems 
-------------------- 
¶9. (C) In response, Solana noted that the EU had 27 different 
national processes for implementing U.N. Security Council 
resolutions.  Kimmitt took the point, adding that this was 
part of the reason why the Council's conclusions on Iran the 
previous day were encouraging.  By focusing on "transactions 
with" individuals and entities covered by the UN sanctions in 
addition to freezing the assets of the named individuals, the 
EU was putting into place a legal framework to go beyond the 
limited list in the UNSCR Annex.  He observed that no 
transactions occur without banks, so the language opens the 
possibility to focusing on financial institutions in the 
spirit of UNSCR 1737.  Disrupting financial intermediation 
channels (NOTE:  examples include currency transactions; 
letters of credit; equity-based financing) for individuals 
and entities that fit the criteria of UNSCR 1737 can be more 
effective than asset freezes in targeting illicit 
proliferation activities. 
 
¶10. (C) Although some Member States were involved in the 
drafting of UNSCRs involving sanctions, Cooper asserted that 
the EU itself had not been adequately consulted by the United 
Nations.  Moreover, the delay in crafting an EU-wide legal 
framework (a political common position and an implementing 
regulation) to implement the relevant UNSCRs on North Korea 
was directly related to a dispute between Spain and the UK 
over the sovereign authority over banks in Gibraltar.  Solana 
asked the Deputy Secretary whether the USG could help break 
the impasse. 
 
A Request for Patience 
 
BRUSSELS 00000318  003 OF 003 
 
 
---------------------- 
¶11. (C/NF) Kimmitt highlighted problems with the incomplete 
nature of the UNSCR 1737 Annex.  For example, due to Russia's 
last minute insistence and EU acquiescence, the Annex listed 
the head of a major Iranian missile manufacturer, but not the 
company itself.  It was not acceptable for the Russians to be 
able to limit the EU's ability to take action against that 
company, as well as its leadership.  Solana and Cooper 
readily acknowledged that the EU needed to go where the facts 
took it and have the ability to take action.  At the same 
time, they stressed a step-by-step approach in which the EU 
would begin by laying a foundation of strong implementing 
regulations to be put into place by the next GAERC meeting in 
February.  Once the foundation was in place, Cooper the EU 
would have the ability to take broader actions, including 
acting against additional designees. 
 
¶12.  (C/NF) As the internal EU technical drafting process 
unfolded over the next few weeks, Cooper asked the United 
States to take this staged approach into account.  Kimmitt 
agreed that the USG could consider "lowering our profile" 
while legal texts were prepared.  Finally, Cooper defended 
the text of UNSCR 1737 as a "strong one" and noted that the 
UN path "should not be abandoned" because he believed that 
there was more to be squeezed out of the Russians in that 
venue. 
 
13.(U)  This cable has been cleared by Deputy Secretary 
Kimmitt. 
 
GRAY 
.