VZCZCXRO2513
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0311/01 0301416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301416Z JAN 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, AND S/CRS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 
TAGS: EUN MCAP PREL
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN UNION OPERATIONS CENTER COMES ON LINE 
 
REF: A. 05 BRUSSELS 01197 B. 05 BRUSSELS 01164 C. 04 
 
     BRUSSELS 04937 D. 04 BRUSSELS 04686 
 
Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief, Jeremy Brenner, for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary.  The European Union Operations Center was 
declared operational January 1, 2007. It is designed to plan 
and run an autonomous military operation of approximately 
2000 personnel. In practice, the Ops Center will also be used 
to run civilian and integrated crisis response missions.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Members of the USEU pol-mil team were invited to tour 
the newly-completed EU Operations Center on January 11 in 
conjunction with announcement of its full operational 
capability. Lt. Colonel Patrick Geysen (protect), the head of 
the small permanent staff of the operations center and Roland 
Zinzius (protect), Deputy Director of the Civ-Mil Cell gave 
details about the capabilities of the Ops Center and likely 
next steps in developing European Union crisis response 
planning. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to the terms of reference for the 
Operations Center, it will be capable of planning and running 
a military operation on the scale of the ARTEMIS operation in 
Bunia, DRC in 2003. In practice, this means a mission of 
approximately 2000 personnel, which, not coincidentally, is 
the size of the EU Battlegroups also declared fully 
operational on January 1 2007. Because the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) takes a "holistic" view of crisis 
response, the civ-mil cell, of which the Ops Center is a 
component part, includes civilian experts in police, rule of 
law, civil protection, civil administration, and 
representatives from the European Commission which is 
responsible for humanitarian assistance, and development aid. 
 EU doctrine is that the military capabilities under ESDP are 
designed "to make the other instruments more effective." 
Battlegroups are being advertised to the UN and others as a 
"bridging force" designed to conduct the full range of 
Petersberg peacekeeping tasks, then handing off to a larger 
follow-on force. In the event of a deployment, a Battlegroup 
is supposed to be capable of tasks ranging from providing 
logistical support or a "safe and secure environment" for 
civilian teams to separating warring factions by force. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) According to Geysen, the European Union Operations 
Center was declared fully operational on January 1.  This 
date is a full year behind the original schedule (refs A-D), 
and there was very little public fanfare regarding its 
completion.  USEU was invited to tour the facility even 
before Member State representatives on the Political and 
Security Committee had seen it, highlighting the political 
sensitivities that remain within the EU concerning the 
purpose of the Ops Center, the circumstances under which it 
might be employed, and U.S. attitudes towards the development 
of EU crisis response capabilities. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Geysen and other members of the EU Military Staff 
have argued to us on many occasions that the construction of 
the Operations Center facility was driven by a desire to 
avoid duplication and waste within the EU. Geysen pointed 
specifically to the 5 million Euro satellite communications 
link constructed for the Ops Center, saying that such a link 
would have to be duplicated at each of the current and 
proposed National HQs made available for EU autonomous 
operations. This satellite link will permit the Ops Center to 
be in permanent contact with all of the ESDP missions - 
civilian and military - now deployed.  Geysen went on to say 
that one of the lessons learned from the ESDP mission to the 
DRC completed in November 2006 was that the training and 
travel required to bring operational staff to the 
Multinational HQ was both disruptive and expensive. The 
German OHQ at Potsdam which planned and ran the DRC operation 
was far from the political decisionmakers, and from those EU 
Military Staff experts who created the initial Crisis 
Management Concept and Initiating Military Directive. He also 
said that the need to coordinate with civilian crisis 
management elements who might already be on the ground argued 
for an Ops Center in Brussels with civilian representation. 
 
BRUSSELS 00000311  002 OF 002 
 
 
There is currently discussion within the EU on establishing a 
civilian "OHQ" which would need to be fully integrated with 
any military OHQ. 
 
¶6.  (C) Geysen is a member of the "core staff" of the 
Operations Center. This staff, consisting primarily of 
"housekeepers" who maintain the communications and computer 
equipment until the Ops Center is activated by a decision of 
the European Council, is responsible for standing up the 
center and bringing in the augmented staff from the EU 
Military Staff and seconded national experts from capitals. 
Geysen explained that there is now a database of trained 
national experts who would be called upon in case of 
activation of the Ops Center. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Ops Center and the augmentation system will be 
exercised in June during MILEX 07 in Sweden. The scenario for 
the exercise will postulate a request from the UNSC for the 
deployment of an Integrated Police Unit and "bridging force" 
to respond to an emerging crisis in Africa. One of the goals 
of the exercise will be to ensure effective linkages with 
civilian crisis management elements, either on the ground or 
with planners in Brussels. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ops Center itself consists of 64 work stations 
with computer and communications links. A video wall will be 
installed shortly. The Ops Center is designed to provide 24 
hour watch capability as well as operational control over 
deployed missions.  Civilian missions are currently run by a 
small staff within the Civilian Crisis Management directorate 
in the Council Secretariat. Cell phones and email are the 
primary means of communication. Within the Ops Center spaces 
there are empty offices designated for augmentees from the 
Military Staff and Member State capitals.  Geysen suggested 
that in the event of a Battlegroup deployment, the lead 
nation would be given additional identified staff slots which 
would otherwise be filled by EU Military Staff officers. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) Comment: The civ-mil cell staff was clearly proud 
of their newly-completed facility. That it exists at all is 
seen as a major achievement given that it is the product of 
the hard-fought political compromise that defused the 2003 
Trevuren OHQ controversy. In the minds of the professionals 
manning the Ops Center, it is only a matter of (short) time 
before the political leadership will want to "take their new 
Ferrari out of the garage." By NATO or US standards, it seems 
more like a basic model Renault than a Ferrari, and there is 
some question whether they will have the staff to run 24-hour 
operations. Still, given the political necessity of 
justifying the resources represented by both the Battlegroups 
and the Ops Center, we anticipate they will be used. Such a 
deployment, if channeled and orchestrated carefully, could 
help refine an additional - if limited -- resource for rapid 
international response to crises. To the extent that the Ops 
Center can focus and run the disparate elements of EU crisis 
intervention tools, thereby ensuring European engagement, 
this new capability, could prove useful, especially in 
theaters where no other international security actor is 
readily able to intervene. 
 
GRAY 
.