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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA (CHASE) AND NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL EFIN KDEM PHUM PARM PINR SNAR IR EUN
SUBJECT: EU REACHES COMPROMISE ON UNSCR 1737 IMPLEMENTATION 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 2659 
 
     ¶B. BRUSSELS 119 
 
Classified By: POLMINCOUNS LAURENCE WOHLERS FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (E) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
¶1. (C/NF) After protracted negotiations, the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council reached agreement 
January 18 on a draft text on EU's implementation of UNSCR 
¶1737.  The draft must still be considered by the foreign 
ministers' General Affairs Council (GAERC) on Jan 22, and 
then be fleshed out with legal and implementation details. 
However, the EU appears on track to having a comprehensive 
implementation agreement over the next month. According to 
various PSC sources, the agreement was a compromise which 
allowed both sides of the debate to claim a victory of 
principle.  On the one hand, it satisfied  UK/French 
requirement that the EU be able to go beyond the UNSCR 
resolution. It also reportedly includes provisions to include 
the full Nuclear Suppliers Group list for dual use technology 
and suggests at least implicitly that the EU will go beyond 
the UNSCR in casting a wider net on travel and visa bans.  On 
the other, the Italy/Spain coalition successfully insisted 
that the text remain firmly in the context of the UN 
criteria.  In addition, a paragraph expressing concern about 
Iran's support for terrorism was stripped from the final 
text.  Sources emphasized that the UNSCR discussion was 
defined narrowly in part because a broader, experts-level 
discussion of EU policy towards Iran will be pursued by the 
German presidency in February.  END SUMMARY 
 
THE COMPROMISE 
-------------- 
¶2.  (C/NF) According to various PSC contacts, the Jan 18 PSC 
discussion on UNSCR 1737 was much longer than expected.  The 
UK, supported (but quietly) by the French, the Danes and 
unexpectedly strongly by the Belgians, pushed for a robust 
implementation close to the original EU-3 position.  Italy 
and Spain, led the opposing camp, reportedly arguing for the 
"principle" that the EU must respect the "multi-lateral" UN 
resolution.  As EU president, Germany maintained studied 
neutrality (but one PSC source complained that the drafting 
session was drawn out because the German rep was on a tight 
leash and constantly conferring with Berlin). 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  The ultimate compromise was that EU sanctions 
would be "based on the criteria" of 1737, but would 
implicitly be able to go beyond it -- as one source put it, 
"there will be a wide interpretation of 1737".  Although 
critical legal drafting remains to be done, the key decisions 
included an agreement that the full Nuclear Suppliers Group 
list will be used for preventing imports/exports of dual use 
technology, and that the EU will go beyond the UN list of 
names for the visa/travel bans.  Not considered was any 
action against banks, one source noting that banks were not 
mentioned in the UNSCR and that the PSC agreement was 
specifically focused on UNSCR implementation. Absent too was 
any expression of concern about Iranian support for terrorism 
or role in the region:  the Spanish/Italians expressed 
concern about the impact of a confrontational approach on 
Iran and argued that Iran's actions should be part of a 
planned experts discussion of Iranian policy scheduled for 
February. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
¶4.  (C/NF) Sources agreed that considerable work remains to 
be completed over the next month.  First, foreign ministers 
must formally ratify the PSC draft in Monday's GAERC.  Then, 
action will move to the External Relations (RELEX) 
Commission, whose experts will need to flesh out legal 
requirements.  In parallel, the PSC is scheduled next week to 
consider the addition of names to the UN's 1737 Annex (our 
contacts were unsure whether new names would have to be 
considered individually or in a block).  This would set the 
stage for the adoption of binding implementing regulations in 
matters in which the Commission has competence (e.g., trade), 
possibly as early as the February 4 GAERC, but might well 
take a couple additional weeks. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  Although there was apparently little overt 
discussion in the PSC of the impact of the UNSCR on European 
business, a French permrep contact conceded that there were 
concerns, noting that the question is complicated for Europe, 
unlike the US which has not been in business with Iran for 
last 25 years.  The same contact hastened to add, however, 
that it is time for Europe to share some of the burden that 
 
BRUSSELS 00000189  002 OF 003 
 
 
US companies have shouldered for so long vis a vis Iran.  The 
French indicated that EU members could be receptive to the 
(U.S.) argument that measures beyond 1737 could be explicitly 
designed to prevent proliferation financing rather than 
punish the Iranian people or European business.  Comment: 
Prevention could be an effective angle from which Treasury 
Deputy Secretary Kimmit could discuss U.S. measures and 
encourage parallel European measures, including, inter alia, 
designations, end of export credits.  End Comment 
 
POLITICAL DIALOGUES 
------------------- 
¶6.  (C/NF)  Sources noted that the UNSCR decision should be 
seen in the context of the more comprehensive discussion of 
Iran in February, first by member state experts and then 
presumably by foreign ministers at the February GAERC.  That 
discussion will reportedly include the resumption of three 
now-moribund dialogues with Iran on: political issues 
(including the regional situation, human rights and 
counter-narcotics). It will also look at ways to increase the 
impact of the European civil society programming in Iran, 
both at the bilateral and EU level. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  According to contacts in the Council Secretariat 
and the UK Permrep, the EU-3 will try to use the human rights 
dialogue to lure Mediterranean (esp. Italy, Greece, Spain) 
and Nordic members into a broader policy debate on Iran that 
would address Iran's support for terror and destabilizing 
actions in the region.  While the EU is expected to reaffirm 
its commitment to the human rights dialogue with Tehran, 
member states are ambivalent about simultaneously raising the 
counter-narcotics dialogue.  Some have expressed concerns 
that Iran could try to link the two dialogues.  Conducting 
"business as usual" on counter-narcotics or political issues 
could also dilute pressure on Tehran over its non-compliance 
on the nuclear file.  As a complement to resurrecting EU-Iran 
dialogues,  the EU-3 and the Council Secretariat were also 
encouraging the EU to launch a more comprehensive discussion 
of Iran in its schedule of regular bilateral dialogues with 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Russia, Euromed and 
other concerned parties. 
 
Broadcasting 
----------------- 
¶8. (C)   European Commission officials and German and UK 
Permrep contact stated that the EU is supportive of 
increasing international Farsi-language broadcasting into 
Iran.  They want to know more about U.S. programming and 
plans in this regard (Ref A).  At the same time, the EU 
machinery itself has little know-how and may look to member 
states to take the lead.  Indeed, the Commission has no 
standing functional expertise in third country broadcasting. 
Any EU-funded country-specific broadcasting initiatives are 
normally vetted by an ad hoc panel comprised of outside 
experts, EU regional assistance specialists and policymakers. 
 According to a UK contact (strictly protect), the 
Netherlands, and Czech Republic have expressed particular 
interest in broadcasting.  The British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) is planning to send a delegation to 
Brussels in late February or early March to drum up support 
for EU-sponsored broadcasting from senior policy officials in 
DG Relex and the Council Secretariat, as well as likeminded 
Members of European Parliament.  (COMMENT:  In advance of 
this UK initiative, Washington may wish to explore with HMG 
the possibility of low-key bilateral consultations between 
technical and policy experts that could be expanded to 
include potential EU (or other regional) providers of 
funding, content, and transmission facilities. END COMMENT) 
 
Civil Society Programming 
--------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU)   The EU currently has no formal coordination 
mechanism related to exchange information on civil society 
and other assistance programming.  EU member states with 
representation in Tehran coordinate their bilateral efforts 
informally.  The need to  increase the impact of the European 
civil society programming in Iran, both at the bilateral and 
EU level is widely recognized.  According to Commission 
sources, the EU may consider the creation of a new internal 
consultative mechanism. 
 
Internal EU Intelligence Sharing Difficulties 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶10. (C/NF)  A likeminded EU member state contact noted that 
the EU Situation Center had difficulty disseminating evidence 
to the 27 member states of Iran's support for terror and 
destabilizing regional behavior because of EU national 
governments' justifiable concerns about safeguarding 
 
BRUSSELS 00000189  003 OF 003 
 
 
intelligence information.  As an unintended consequence, 
likeminded member states could not deploy intelligence to 
full effect in persuading skeptical EU member states 
representatives of the need for tough sanctions against Iran. 
 Comment:  We may wish to consider a USG briefing of EU 
member states' Political and Security Committee Ambassadors. 
We conducted a similar exercise with the EU regarding the 
China Arms embargo in which U.S. briefers traveled to 
Brussels to present specific and detailed information.  That 
sharing of information proved to be pivotal in bringing about 
a policy reversal within the EU.  In the case of the arms 
embargo, the information was shared with a small number of 
named individuals because of releasability constraints. In 
order to influence a decision by consensus on a matter of 
Common Foreign and Security policy, we will need to engage 
all member states.  Such an information exchange should 
become easier once the US-EU Security of Information 
Agreement is signed early this year (ref b). 
 
GRAY 
.