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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA (FAUCHER), L-LEI (PROPP), L-EUR 
(OLSON), DS/SI/IS (MASCIANA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017 
TAGS: EUN PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON US -EU GENERAL 
SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT HELD IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER 
4-7 
 
REF: A. 03 USEU 00555 B. 04 USEU 00516 C. 04 STATE 
     034277 D. 05 USEU 02918 
 
Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 ( 
b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary. The first round of negotiations on a US-EU 
General Security of Information Agreement took place in 
Brussels the week of December 4, 2006.  The agreement would 
create a legal framework under which classified information 
could be exchanged between the US and the European Union. 
End summary. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
First Round of Negotiations 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) A U.S. delegation including representatives from 
State, DoD and other agencies completed the first round of 
discussions with the EU on a General Security of Information 
Agreement (GSOIA), December 4-7 in Brussels.  The 
negotiations began with  briefings by EU security officials 
(Commission and Council Secretariat) on EU law and policy on 
the protection of EU Classified Information.  The respective 
Council and Commission offices of security gave a detailed 
briefing on the extensive regulations governing access to, 
and protection of, EU classified information.  State's DS/IS 
made a similar presentation covering U.S. law and policy on 
the protection and exchange of U.S. classified information. 
The week-long session also involved inspections of several 
Council Secretariat and Commission facilities and registries 
where EU Classified information is handled, including the 
Council Secretariat's Joint Situation center, an intelligence 
fusion cell, where information provided by Member State 
services is synthesized into finished intelligence analysis 
for senior EU policymakers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Limited EU Production of Classified Materials 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) From the discussions, it became clear that as a 
by-product of the NATO-EU Security Agreement, the EU has 
imported whole cloth the NATO Classified Information regime. 
This background informed all EU approaches during the 
subsequent negotiations on the text.  The EU's classification 
system has four tiers: EU Restricted; Confidential; Secret; 
and Top Secret.  Other than "EU Restricted" information, the 
EU actually produces very few pieces of its own classified 
information (perhaps in the hundreds on an annual basis).  In 
addition, very few EU staff members actually handle the 
information that is produced (approximately 200).  There is a 
strict system of access controls, need to know, vetting by 
Member State agencies, and accountability in place.  There is 
no broadly available desktop classified LAN system such as we 
have at State, although there are a number of similar systems 
under development. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Remaining Areas for Resolution 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) Negotiations on the text of the agreement went 
well and point to  likely completion during the first quarter 
of 2007, possibly in time to be signed prior to the 
anticipated late-April U.S.-EU Summit in Washington. 
Following is a summary of the few remaining areas to be 
resolved: 
 
--  Scope of the Agreement.  There was some discussion during 
the negotiations whether the agreement would apply to all 
classified information exchanges between the U.S. and EU, as 
the EU wishes to be the case.  The current text does not say 
"all"; it simply says that it shall apply to classified 
information provided or exchanged between the Parties, 
preserving U.S. flexibility on this point.  Other Articles 
 
BRUSSELS 00000119  002 OF 003 
 
 
preserve existing arrangements between the Parties.  The EU 
thus understands that the scope of this Agreement is not 
all-inclusive. The Agreement would be binding on the USG, the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Secretary 
General/High Representative. 
 
-- Equivalence.   The EU has a category of classified 
information called "restreint" (or "EU Restricted") which has 
no U.S. equivalent but which, if provided to the U.S. under 
this agreement "shall be protected(in a manner at least 
equivalent to that afforded to it by the releasing Party." 
"Restreint" means "restricted" and under U.S. law and 
practice would be treated as foreign government confidential 
information, albeit with modified handling.  We must confirm 
that the proposed text will not present unanticipated 
problems. 
 
-- Limitation on future agreements.  The U.S. pressed the EU 
to delete a clause stating that this agreement shall not 
preclude the Parties from concluding other future Agreements 
relating to the provision of classified information "provided 
they do not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement". 
This is standard EU verbiage, and they were surprised by our 
request to delete.  We pointed out that it was restrictive in 
character, and future U.S. agreements with third countries 
need not necessarily meet the baseline of a U.S.-EU 
Agreement. 
 
-- Technical arrangements.  The U.S. agreed in principle to a 
two-tier structure consisting of a binding international 
agreement and a subsidiary set of security arrangements 
governing some of the more detailed technical aspects.  The 
EU provided a draft of the latter only at the end of the 
round which we have not yet reviewed or commented upon.  The 
EU claimed it needed the flexibility of this structure so 
that the technical detail can be amended over time without 
the need for iterative approval by the (inter-governmental) 
EU Council.  On the EU side the security arrangements would 
be entered into by the EU Council and Commission Security 
Offices.  We deferred a decision on who the party to the 
security arrangements would be for the U.S., and what the 
relationship would be between that party and the party to the 
international agreement itself.  The EU does not regard the 
implementing arrangement as binding as a matter of 
international law. 
 
--  Implementation.  A key issue upon conclusion of the 
agreement will be coordinating implementation.  The EU has a 
registry system in place at the Commission and Council 
Secretariat to register and distribute all EU Classified 
 
SIPDIS 
information via a series of sub-registries to all those 
determined to have a need to know.  They seek a similar 
arrangement with the U.S.   The USG will have to decide which 
Agency should have the lead, and whether we should institute 
a registry system similar to the system DoD instituted for 
the handling of NATO classified information.  If the registry 
is housed within State, it must be determined who will run 
this system.  In order to conclude this agreement, a decision 
on our approach will need to be taken prior to the arrival of 
the EU delegation to conduct its security site survey and 
negotiate any outstanding questions.  The EU has proposed 
late January or early February for such a visit. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Background on the US-EU Security Agreement 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  As part of the development of the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and a European Security 
Strategy, the EU Council Secretariat was charged in 2003 with 
negotiating a series of  information-sharing agreements with 
partners and potential partners. The proposal for an 
agreement whereby the USG and the European Union could share 
classified information was first made in a letter from EU 
HR/SG Javier Solana in February 2003 (ref a).  Then-Secretary 
Powell responded that the EU should begin discussions with 
USEU to consider such an agreement (ref c). 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00000119  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  The proposal gained momentum in 2004, with S/CRS 
and the National Intelligence Council seeking to share 
classified watch and warning lists as part of a consultative 
process on emerging threats.  The EU maintains its own 
classified watch list and an agreement allowing the exchange 
of such information was recognized as key to meaningful 
discussion and policy coordination with respect to failed and 
failing states and other threats (ref d). 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  Additional impetus came from the recognized 
inability to inject US policy perspectives on particular 
issues, most notably the China Arms Embargo. In the absence 
of an agreement allowing access to classified information, it 
proved very difficult to explain the US rationale for its 
concerns over developments within the Chinese military.  The 
conclusion of this agreement will permit US views to be 
injected into EU policy deliberations on a range of issues 
such as arms sales to Venezuela, developments in DPRK, events 
in the Middle East - including situational awareness in 
regions where the EU has deployed personnel, Africa, and 
others where we share a common policy goal with Europe. We 
have often found ourselves at a serious disadvantage in 
policy discussions due to the inability to share sensitive 
information, and many within the Council Secretariat are 
equally frustrated by their inability to share with us. 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  The proposed agreement will not pertain to the 
exchange of operational military intelligence, which will 
continue to be shared via existing NATO-EU channels. It is 
not envisioned that raw intelligence data will be exchanged 
through this channel, but rather "finished" analysis, 
diplomatic reporting and policy papers.  Under the proposed 
agreement, there will be no/no obligation to share classified 
information by either side.  Access to internal EU planning 
documents - currently not possible - will give US 
policymakers greater insight into EU thinking, especially in 
the area of stabilization and crisis management missions. 
 
Gray 
.