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INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7334
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8552
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 4620
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9860
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000032 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO
SUBJECT: STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN 
CONFLICT 

REF: BOGOTA 8793 

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 

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Summary 
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¶1.  (U)  Rural land development is a source of conflict in 
Colombia; repeated land reform efforts have been 
unsuccessful.  A proposed new law aimed at facilitating rural 
development and promoting land distribution has led to 
complaints by human rights groups that it could legalize 
illegal land seizures by paramilitary and other illegal armed 
groups.  Some studies estimate that paramilitary and 
narcotics traffickers may control at least 10 per cent of 
Colombia's land. End Summary 

-------------------------- 
Centuries of Land Conflict 
-------------------------- 

¶2.  (U)  Armed conflict and land disputes are historically 
intertwined in Colombia.  Jesuit academic Father Fernan
Gonzalez explains that Colombia did not follow the common 
latifundia pattern in which enormous colonial land grants 
were later distributed to peasants through agrarian reforms. 
Rather, Colombia's peasants colonized frontier areas and 
developed unclaimed land.  As their land acquired value, 
rural elites would use political power and violence to seize 
it.  This forced campesinos to move to more remote areas 
where the cycle would continue.  Gonzalez said two factors 
explain why this pattern has continued for decades:  large 
areas without strong state presence and the absence of 
serious agrarian reform that provided campesinos with clear 
land title.  Despite the increasingly urbanized nature of 
Colombia society, Gonzalez said the land issue remains key
since almost 15 million Colombians continue to live in rural 
areas. 

--------------- 
Failed Policies 
--------------- 

¶3.  (U)  Colombia's land reform efforts over the past forty 
years have had little success.  The Instituto Nacional 
Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA) isthemost
ambitious program to date.  INCORA's goal is to promote 
reform, largely through subsidizing the sale of land by 
wealthy landowners to cooperatives.  The cooperatives are 
supposed to develop the land and increase productivity.  The 
World Bank and USAID criticize the program because: (1) 
projects are generally chosen without legally required 
technical and economic analyses, (2) the program has not 
implemented an efficient process for developing resettlement 
projects, (3) the program distorts land values because owners 
factor the subsidy into their asking price, and (4) if 
cooperatives cannot productively use land, legal restrictions 
placed on program beneficiaries make it very difficult for 
them to resell it. 

------------------------------------ 
A New Proposal with Problems 
------------------------------------ 

¶4.  (C)  The GOC is considering a new, comprehensive, rural 
development law.  Luis Orozco, deputy director for social 
issues of Colombia's land titling agency, the Instituto
Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural ("INCODER"), told us the bill 
would harmonize a large number of existing laws, accelerate 
distribution of land to disadvantaged groups, and encourage 
productive land use.  He said it would also help integrate 
Colombia's rural economy into the global economy.  The 
proposal passed two Senate readings in 2006. Two House 
readings, which are not expected until mid-2007, are required 
before it would become law. 

¶5.  (C)  The bill would also increase INCODER's power at 
INCORA's expense by giving it a monopoly on developing, 
approving, and implementing resettlement projects.  INCODER 
contends these enhanced powers would enable it to more 
effectively promote rural development.  Critics argue this is 
politically problematic, because INCODER is widely accused of 

corruption.  Its officials are reportedly involved in 
land-for-votes schemes, and the media recently linked Luis 
Ortiz, INCODER's former director, to paramilitaries.  Human 
rights groups and many rural residents claim the organization 
works with paramilitaries to facilitate land seizures, but we 
cannot substantiate or disprove these charges.  Ministry of 
Agriculture counselor Lorena Garnica, who helped draft the 
bill, told us it would reduce the possibility of corruption 
by making INCODER more transparent and clarifying its 
responsibilities. 

¶6.  (C)  The bill's most controversial provision, which would 
have made it easier to acquire legal ownership through 
"adverse possession," was deleted in the Senate after heated 
debate.  Orozco, Garnica, and bill sponsor Senator Manuel 
Guillermo Mora told us the provision's purpose was to help 
disadvantaged groups obtain title to land they already 
occupy.  In contrast, the left wing Polo Democratico party 
and human rights groups such as the Colombian Commission of 
Jurists claimed the provision would help paramilitaries 
legalize land seizures and forced "purchases" from indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian groups.  Garnica said opposition to the 
provision was politically motivated.  She explained that 
existing law already permits adverse possession in the same 
circumstances, and that land reserves for indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian groups are constitutionally protected from 
adverse possession.  Moreover, indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
lands cannot legally be sold.  Still, the Polo party was 
successful in having the provision dropped during the second 
Senate reading.

¶7.  (C)  Other provisions of the bill were also removed.  For 
example, it was supposed to facilitate INCODER's capacity to 
fast-track reallocation of confiscated narco-properties to 
campesinos.  While the government can already do this, the 
authority is not extensively used because the current law is 
complex, time consuming, and makes government officials 
personally liable if courts later overturn confiscations. 
The bill would have made confiscation and reallocation more 
efficient.  This provision was stricken by the Senate, 
apparently at the request of INCODER, to minimize potential 
liability for itself and employees. 

---------------------------------- 
Illegal Armed Groups and Narcotics 
---------------------------------- 

¶8.  (U)  The World Bank reported that Colombia's land 
inequality sharply increased in the past 20 years.  This is 
mainly due to large narco-purchases and forced "sales" to 
illegal armed groups.  A 2005 analysis by the UNDP reports 
that there are 4 to 5 million hectares of "narco-landholding" 
spread throughout Colombia that could be subject to 
confiscation.  This constitutes between 4 and 5 per cent of 
Colombia's total land area.  There has been widespread 
criticism that the government has confiscated only a minute 
fraction of the land it could:  over the past fifteen years, 
less than 150,000 hectares have been seized by the government 
and virtually none sold. 

¶9.  (C)  Paramilitary "purchases" are significant, especially 
in the rural, north coast region.  Paramilitary leader Jorge 
40's recently confiscated computer reportedly contains 
information on "purchases" of between 2.5 and 6 million 
hectares in the region (reftel).  Other paramilitary leaders 
have acquired land on the Pacific Coast. There are claims 
that paramilitaries are displacing Afro-Colombian communities 
to develop lucrative palm oil plantations.  The USG checks 
all recipients of assistance carefully to ensure that no USG 
funding directly or indirectly assists those who 
illegitimately acquired land.  Assistance has been refused to 
some palm oil farmers on these grounds. 

¶10.  (U)  In addition to "purchased" land, paramilitaries, 
drug lords, and the FARC all repeat the centuries old pattern 
of seizing land from campesinos or taking control of it and 
forcingcampesinos to work for them.  Between two and three 
million peasants are estimated to have been violently 
displaced by illicit armed groups seeking to control 
territory and/or narco-cultivation in the past decade.  This 
"counter agrarian reform," as political scientist Francisco 
Leal Buitrago describes it, has largely taken place in rural 
areas where state presence is weak and land title ambiguous. 
FARC seizures have generally been concentrated in the south 

and east of the country. 

------- 
Comment 
------- 

¶11.  (U)  Any redistribution of land held by drug lords or 
narco-terrorists is complicated by poorly defined land title 
and fear of retribution.  Colombia's rural areas lack good 
cadastral surveys.  Tradition establishes boundaries, and 
rural residents "know" which family owns what land.  Without 
adequate plats defining land boundaries, title is ambiguous 
and the perception of land inequality is reinforced. 
Returning illicitly acquired land to original owners is 
difficult, since they never had clear legal title. 
Additionally, campesinos fear that if they accept land from 
the government, then the previous "owners" will seek revenge 
and try to retake the land. Lastly, failure to clearly 
demarcate land held by indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities undermines their ability to enforce the legal 
protections afforded them by the Constitution.  End Comment 
WOOD 

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