VZCZCXRO4549
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0059/01 0101643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101643Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6631
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA, CA AND L 
DOJ FOR OIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016 
TAGS: PTER KHLS CVPR PGOV GM
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING: BILATERAL 
WORKING GROUP MEETS 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 3456 
     ¶B. BERLIN 3435 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta 
 for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  The three main results of the first 
meeting of the U.S.-German Working Group on Counterterrorism 
Information-Sharing were: (1) the U.S. will provide Germany 
with a draft bilateral agreement on enhanced biometric 
data-sharing in January; (2) the U.S. invited a German 
delegation to visit the Terrorist Screening Center, National 
Targeting Center, and National Counterterrorism Center in 
January or February; and (3) the U.S. agreed in principle to 
the German proposal for more information exchange between the 
FBI and their German counterparts on terrorist groups in 
Iraq, in part in order to lay the foundation for more 
biographic data exchange.  The two sides agreed the Working 
Group would meet again January 23-24 on the margins of the 
U.S.-EU High Level Group on Justice and Home Affairs.  A 
subsequent March or April meeting would be in DC and a text 
could be ready for ministers to sign by summer.  The possible 
bilateral agreement would use as a model Germany's "Pruem" 
agreements with some of its EU neighbors.  The Pruem 
agreements enable, among other things, instant hit/no hit 
access to another state's fingerprint and DNA data.  End 
Summary. 
 
U.S.-GERMAN AGREEMENT MODELED ON PRUEM 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Head of the German Delegation for the first meeting of 
the U.S./German Working Group on Counterterrorism Information 
Sharing, which took place December 12 in Berlin, was Interior 
Ministry (MOI) Office Director for Police Information 
Systems, the BKA Law, and Data Privacy in Security Affairs 
Andreas Schultz.  He explained Germany's principal goal was 
to facilitate information sharing with the U.S. under 
existing German law.  German data privacy rules, as well as 
specific laws such as that governing the German Federal 
Office of Criminal Investigations (the "BKA"), prevented 
broad or batch sharing of data without a legal foundation. 
Schultz recalled that the Pruem convention core model is a 
hit/no hit system followed by data exchange on specific hits, 
and noted that pilot exchanges begun between Germany and 
Austria revealed 2300 DNA hits.  Now officials on both sides 
have to initiate legal assistance requests to exchange 
detailed information.  Initial bilateral fingerprint 
exchanges would begin in spring 2007, Schultz said.  Given 
the success of the Pruem model and the Bundestag's agreement 
to it, Germany could enter into a similar agreement with the 
U.S., Schultz said.  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Paul 
Rosenzweig said there was great U.S. interest in reciprocal 
DNA and fingerprint data sharing; Department of Justice 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz agreed. 
Schultz said Interior Minister Schaeuble would be pleased to 
hear this news. 
 
¶3. (C) Schultz clarified that Pruem envisions DNA data 
sharing for crime investigation and fingerprint data sharing 
for crime investigation and prevention.  Pruem did not 
envision such data sharing for border entry controls, he 
said.  Rosenzweig referred to DHS Assistant Secretary Baker's 
December 7 letter to MOI Director General Krause and 
clarified the U.S. sought te use of fingerprint data for 
border controls inspecial cases only, not routinely. 
Rosenzweig pointed out Pruem envisioned batch automated 
sharing of DNA data, but not fingerprints, and asked why. 
Schultz explained the German DNA database (of 500,000) was 
smaller and better automated than the fingerprint database 
(of 3 million). 
 
¶4. (C) Both Swartz and Rosenzweig raised the prospect of 
expedited data sharing after a DNA or fingerprint hit; 
Schultz responded Pruem did not address post-hit data sharing 
in great detail.  The Ministry of Justice representative on 
the German delegation referred to the ongoing ratification 
process of the bilateral and U.S.-EU agreements on mutual 
legal assistance and extradition as additional/alternative 
data sharing vehicles. 
 
HSPD-6 
------ 
 
¶5. (C) Schultz referred to the November 8 Homeland Security 
 
BERLIN 00000059  002 OF 003 
 
 
Presidential Directive 6 delegation (ref B) and said Germany 
did not have a counterpart due to the constitutional 
separation of law enforcement and security services.  The new 
Counterterrorism Database draft law, however, will address 
this issue and create a national database upon approval by 
the Bundestag.  The new law specifically banned sharing 
information from the database with foreign governments, 
Schultz said, but could permit continued sharing of 
information with the individual German agencies who own the 
underlying data.  Rosenzweig asked for access to the German 
lists of those banned from entry ("Einreiseverbotliste") and 
those who pose a threat ("Gefaehrderliste").  Swartz 
mentioned Pruem's article 16 ("Supply of information in order 
to prevent terrorist offenses") as a way for both sides to 
voluntarily provide information about small groups of 
individuals.  Schultz said data sharing pursuant to Article 
16 could include DNA and fingerprints, but Article 16 was for 
individuals, not groups or batches.  Swartz highlighted the 
benefit to Germany if it provided the U.S. with information 
about a small group of individuals; then U.S. could inform 
Germany if U.S. agencies learned of their movements or 
actions. 
 
¶6. (C) After Schultz mentioned German data privacy concerns, 
Department of State Office of Consular Affairs Chief of the 
Office of Policy and Public Outreach Alcy Frelick said the 
U.S. wanted to learn more about German data privacy needs, 
and wanted Germany to be comfortable with U.S. procedures. 
She invited a German delegation to Washington to visit the 
Terrorist Screening Center, National Targeting Center, and 
National Counterterrorism Center in January or February 2007 
to see for themselves U.S. attention to data privacy 
concerns.  Schultz said he agreed Germany did not know enough 
about the subject and accepted the offer.  He called the 
precedent of the sharing of the U.S. Terrorist Screening 
Database during the 2006 Soccer World Cup a "special 
exception" based on Germany's overarching need to do all it 
could to provide security for the games. 
 
 
GERMANY REQUESTS INFORMATION ABOUT IRAQ JIHADISTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (C) Schultz lauded existing bilateral cooperation between 
the Legat/FBI and the BKA, but said it could be further 
improved by intensifying discussion about Iraq.  Steffen 
Russ, BKA Office Director for Police and State Security, 
circulated a proposal which sought to deepen information 
sharing about the structures, financing, recruiting, travel, 
and the goals of different terrorist and insurgent groups. 
After some discussion about the need for such a new project, 
Schultz clarified that under German law it was difficult to 
share biographic and other personal information without a 
specific basis.  Establishing a BKA-Legat experts' group on 
Iraqi terrorist groups would establish the sort of legal 
foundation Germany needs.  Swartz said if the exchange were 
mutually beneficial, the U.S. had no objection. 
 
DRAFT TEXT / DATA PRIVACY 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Schultz offered to table a draft text focusing on DNA, 
fingerprints, Article 16, and data privacy.  Swartz said the 
U.S. could also draft a text and try to table it in time for 
the January US-EU JHA meeting; Schultz agreed.  Department of 
Justice Office of the Deputy Attorney General Chief Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Officer Jane Horvath pointed out the U.S. 
would be unable to comply with Pruem's Article 34 ("Level of 
data protection").  Schultz replied that Germany could not 
agree to a level of data protection lower than the EU data 
privacy rules and referred to Article 35 ("Purpose") and the 
principle that the owner of the data could refuse its 
transmission to third countries.  Embassy Berlin 
representative pointed out that upon further review in 
Washington, U.S. agencies might determine to seek inclusion 
of other Pruem provisions other than those already mentioned; 
Rosenzweig and Swartz agreed.  Schultz responded Germany 
understood U.S. priorities to be those articulated in A/S 
Baker's letter. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶9. (C) Summing up the meeting, Rosenzweig described the U.S. 
agreement to table a draft in January, the U.S. invitation 
for a German delegation to the TSC, the U.S. agreement in 
 
BERLIN 00000059  003 OF 003 
 
 
principle to discuss Iraqi terrorism, the U.S. pledge to 
continue discussions in Washington in March/April, and the 
U.S. desire to have a text ready for Ministers to sign during 
early summer EU or G-8 meetings.  Schultz agreed the proposal 
was ambitious but agreed. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by the delegation subsequent 
to their return to Washington. 
TIMKEN JR