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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2027 
TAGS: PTER PREL KCRM LE SY
SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR THE TRIBUNAL 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  As the Christmas-New Year and 'Eid al-Adha holidays 
come to an end, the Lebanese seem no closer to completing the 
approval process for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  None 
of the options available to the GOL guarantee success; most 
ideas are unrealistic.  Within GOL circles, there is growing 
support for a proposal that a petition signed by 70 Members 
of Parliament accompany a GOL request to the UNSC to approve 
the tribunal documents.  The petition is designed to show 
that Lebanon's parliament would have readily approved the 
documents officially, had the chamber been permitted to meet. 
 While we defer to others about potential UNSC reactions, 
this is probably the best option locally.  We believe that, 
if the GOL proceeds in this direction, the GOL should also 
proceed with two additional steps in parallel:  first, GOL 
and March 14 representatives should continue to try to corner 
March 8-Aoun representatives into a dialogue on the specific 
concerns regarding the tribunal.  (This is to show that March 
14 forces are open to discussion and desire the broadest 
possible support for the tribunal; we don't expect the others 
to respond.)  Second, the GOL -- before more cabinet 
ministers are killed or resign -- should ask the UN now to 
extend the UNIIIC (Brammertz Commission) for another year 
beyond its June expiration, in case the tribunal is not yet 
ready to take charge of the case by then.  A new cabinet, 
such as the 19-10-1 formulation proposed by Amr Moussa, would 
not have the strength to push through a request for extension 
of the UNIIIC.  Minister of Justice Charles Rizk also mused 
about a secret trip to Damascus to solicit Syrian views on 
textual changes to the tribunal documents, but we believe 
that Rizk's Lebanese colleagues will successfully dissuade 
him of this idea.  End summary and comment. 
 
TRIBUNAL DOCUMENTS THEORETICALLY 
BEFORE PARLIAMENT, AWAITING SIGNATURE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Over the past week, we have met with a large number 
of GOL officials and MPs to discuss the options available 
regarding the two pending and intrinsically connected 
tribunal documents, the "Agreement Between the United Nations 
and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon" and the "Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon."  Both documents were approved by the 
cabinet on November 13 (two days after the five Shia 
ministers resigned and a few hours after the sixth minister, 
Yacoub Sarraf, also quit) and then re-approved on December 
12, when the cabinet overrode President Lahoud's rejection of 
the documents.  According to Minister of Justice Charles 
Rizk, who met with the Ambassador on 12/30, the cabinet will 
authorize signing of the documents as soon as an authorized 
copy is prepared in Arabic.  (The current Arabic text is 
"full of sloppy mistakes," Rizk claimed.) 
 
¶3.  (C)  Constitutionally, Lebanon's parliament should ratify 
the two documents.  But Lebanon's parliament went out of its 
regular session on December 31 and does not reconvene until 
mid-March.  While Article 33 of Lebanon's constitution sets 
forth ways by which an extraordinary session is summoned 
(including a call by the majority of the members, which March 
14 enjoys), Parliament Speaker Berri is threatening that Shia 
and Aounist MPs will resign from the parliament if he is 
forced to call for a session.  Among the pro-Syrian-Aounist 
protesters, of course, there are those who argue that even 
the cabinet approval of the tribunal documents must be 
repeated before a new cabinet, since, in their 
interpretation, Siniora's cabinet because illegitimate with 
the Shia resignations. 
 
SEVEN POSSIBLE APPROACHES (NONE IDEAL) 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S)  Based on our talks with Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, Acting Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Tariq Mitri, Minister of Communications 
Marwan Hamadeh, Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad, MP 
Saad Hariri, MP Walid Jumblatt, MP Boutros Harb, and former 
MP Nassib Lahoud, we believe that GOL/March 14 forces have 
several options available as they try to move the tribunal 
forward.  None of the following are ideal: 
 
--  Postpone completion of the approval process for the 
tribunal documents, pending improvement in the domestic 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  002 OF 005 
 
 
political climate,  While some March 14 members believe that 
pushing the tribunal documents so hard right now unwisely 
provokes the Syrians into "destroying Lebanon," most reject 
an indefinite postponement as, essentially, a reward for 
Syrian bad behavior.  People recognize that postponing the 
tribunal documents could lead to indefinite delay, or at 
least delay until the cabinet has been forcibly altered to be 
more favorably inclined towards Syrian interests, at which 
point the documents could be changed beyond recognition, in 
order to gut the tribunal's potential effectiveness. 
 
--  Engage the March 8-Aoun representatives to address the 
specific concerns about the tribunal documents.  In the 
abstract, this is an attractive option that, if successful, 
would lead to a broader acceptance of the tribunal locally. 
Some speculate that two changes in the texts would address 
most of the pro-Syrians' concerns -- Article 2 in the statute 
regarding superior-subordinate relationship (especially point 
b, "the crimes concerned activities that were within the 
effective responsibility and control of the superior"), and 
the language in both the agreement and the statute regarding 
linkages between the Hariri assassinations and other crimes. 
Some argue that relatively easy fixes could address these 
concerns, such as by listing specifically the crimes that 
could be linked (to address alleged fears that the tribunal 
could end up trying any case, no matter how marginal the 
connection to Hariri's assassination).  But most people are 
suspicious -- rightly, we believe -- that March 8-Aounist 
representatives are not really interested in adjusting the 
documents, hoping instead to jettison the tribunal 
altogether.  So we do not believe that this option would lead 
to constructive discussion, as March 8-Aounist 
representatives are unlikely to offer specific points of 
concern.  (Amr Moussa's proposal for a six-person commission 
to examine the tribunal falls under this option and assumes a 
good faith on all parts to come up with technical fixes -- 
good faith we suspect is lacking among March 8-Aounist 
forces.) 
 
--  Renegotiate the two texts with the UN to remove those 
parts (multi-year commitment and financial obligations) that 
trigger the need for parliamentary approval, so that the 
cabinet approval alone is sufficient.  Minister of Justice 
Rizk, once an advocate of this approach, now opposes it, 
based on the advice of Judge Choukri Sadr, one of the judges 
who worked with UN/OLA on the texts.  The problem, Rizk 
explained, is that reopening negotiations permit President 
Emile Lahoud to enter the process, per Article 52 of the 
constitution (which gives the President the right to 
"negotiate and ratify international treaties in agreement 
with the Prime Minister").  By presiding over a cabinet 
meeting that unanimously authorized Rizk to negotiate the 
tribunal drafts, Lahoud thus willingly gave his Article 52 
authority to Rizk for the original drafts.  But Rizk is 
convinced that Lahoud -- backed by Hizballah, Michel Aoun, 
and other pro-Syrians -- would no doubt seize the reopening 
of the drafts to reassert his Article 52 authority.  They 
would claim that those who oppose Lahoud's Article 52 
authority are intentionally trying to undermine the authority 
of the Christian office of the presidency.  (We agree with 
Rizk's analysis.)  The preceding option, about trying to 
elicit the specific concerns of the March 8-Aounist 
representatives about the tribunal, could also lead to the 
Article 52 problem.  But, if Hizballah signed onto specific 
textual changes, Lahoud probably would as well. 
 
--  Force the parliament to meet under Deputy Speaker Farid 
Makkari (a member of Hariri's Mustaqbal bloc).  Under this 
scenario, if Berri continues to balk at opening a special 
session of parliament despite a majority-backed demand for 
such a session, the 70 March 14 MPs -- enough to make a 
quorum -- would simply occupy the parliament building, with 
Makkari presiding and declaring the extraordinary session 
open.  The more radical March 14 members, including 
(intermittently) Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh, talk 
favorably about forcing action in this way.  Others see this 
is an unnecessary provocation of the Shia (who are camped out 
in their sit-in only a few steps away and could easily be 
mobilized to storm or besiege the parliament).  The skeptics 
note that Christian concerns prevented a March 14 storming of 
the Baabda Presidential Palace in spring 2005, and Sunni 
concerns have (so far) prevented the March 8-Aounist 
demonstrators from carrying out their threat to storm the 
Grand Serail seat of the Prime Minister.  The Shia would be 
equally outraged by a March 14 frontal attack on the 
parliament, seen by virtue of the Shia speakership as a Shia 
institution in the same way Baabda is seen as a Christian 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  003 OF 005 
 
 
institution and the Grand Serail a Sunni stronghold. 
 
--  Rely on UN Security Council members to approve the 
tribunal unilaterally, under Chapter VII.  Wistful as many 
Lebanese are about the possibility of having this decision 
taken out of Lebanon's hands, most people understand that 
this option is unrealistic and likely to provoke unhelpful 
Russian and Chinese reactions.  They are also aware that 
renegotiating the current texts to turn the tribunal into a 
Chapter VII-created institution will require months. 
 
--  Have PM Siniora send a letter to the UNSC asking for 
Chapter VII action.  This is a slight improvement on the 
above, as at least the UNSC would have some justification for 
acting unilaterally. 
 
--  Send a petition signed by 70 members of Lebanon's 
parliament along with Siniora's letter asking for the UNSC to 
approve the tribunal.  This would show that sufficient 
parliamentary support for the tribunal exists and that, if 
only Berri would call the parliament, the tribunal documents 
would readily be adopted.  With the Lebanese inclined to cite 
political history in making their points, laying down a 
historical marker by 70 signatures may prove important in the 
future. 
 
GROWING CONSENSUS FOR PETITION 
SIGNED BY 70 MPS TO BE SENT TO UN 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  It is our impression that the March 14 and GOL 
leaders are generally leaning toward the last option -- to 
send to the UN a letter from PM Siniora and a petition from 
70 MPs asking that the UNSC adopt the tribunal.  We defer to 
our colleagues in New York and Washington as to the likely 
reactions of UNSC members and UN officials.  If there are 
messages we should send regarding this approach, we need to 
do so quickly, as the cabinet might move in this direction as 
early as Thursday night, January 4. 
 
TRYING TO KEEP DOOR OPEN 
FOR BROADER CONSENSUS 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S)  While emphasizing that we have no instructions from 
Washington regarding USG reaction to the petition idea, we 
are privately recommending to our contacts two additional 
steps in parallel.  First, in our view, GOL and March 14 
leaders should be aggressive and visible in trying to get the 
March 8-Aounist leaders to engage on their specific concerns 
regarding the tribunal documents, per the second option in 
para 4 above.  Since Lebanon's political leaders collectively 
approved the principle of the tribunal in the March 2 
National Dialogue session, March 14-GOL leaders should be 
seen as open to consideration of small modifications to the 
text that do not change the substance of the tribunal.  This 
is the only way to know for sure whether the opposition is 
merely shielding Syria or whether they can eventually accept 
the tribunal with some changes.  It may be the only way to 
arrive at a tribunal which will enjoy wide Lebanese 
consensus.  Yet, realistically, we do not believe that March 
8-Aounist leaders will respond.  So this gesture is primarily 
designed to show that March 14-GOL leaders seek a broad 
consensus and that the March 8-Aounist refusal to engage is 
responsible for the fact that none emerged.  Used wisely by 
March 14 leaders, an attempt to engage in serious dialogue 
could embarrass the March 8-Aounist forces. 
 
ASKING NOW FOR UNIIIC EXTENSION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S)  Second, we believe strongly that, whatever happens 
with the tribunal, Siniora's cabinet should request the UN 
now to extend the mandate of the UN International Independent 
Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) for another year or, if a 
more open-ended commitment is possible, until such time as 
the Special Tribunal is established and can take over the 
UNIIIC's investigative work.  As it stands now, the Brammertz 
Commission expires in June.  It does not seem likely that the 
Special Tribunal will be up and running by then.  If the 
Siniora cabinet has collapsed -- whether due to the murder or 
resignation of only two ministers, because of street 
protests, due to a compromise, or in response to other 
actions -- it could very well be replaced by a cabinet more 
favorably inclined toward Syria's interests. 
 
¶8.  (S)  Even Amr Moussa's proposed 19-10-1 cabinet could 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  004 OF 005 
 
 
prevent the renewal of the UNIIIC for another year, as March 
14 forces would have abdicated their two-thirds supermajority 
needed to override presidential vetoes even on those cabinet 
decisions initially requiring the approval of only a simple 
majority.  Thus, we are strongly encouraging Siniora and his 
ministers to ask for the UNIIIC extension now.  We have 
discussed this with the French and Saudi ambassadors, who 
fully agree.  (We also hope that people in New York are 
already thinking about the replacement for Brammertz, in case 
he is serious this time about leaving in June.  We don't want 
or need a last-minute problem that results in a gap in the 
leadership of the UNIIIC at a critical time.) 
 
RIZK ARGUES FOR TALKING TO THE SYRIANS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) In his 12/30 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of 
Justice Rizk argued that, at some point, someone needs to 
talk quietly with the Syrians about the tribunal documents. 
He volunteered himself.  Admitting that he feels that the 
tribunal is "my baby," Rizk said that he is tired of probing 
Hizballah officials, without success, on their real concerns 
regarding the texts.  It is time to leapfrog the 
subcontractors and go straight to Damascus, Rizk said.  If 
some slight changes to the texts make them acceptable to all, 
so much the better.  Someone needs to test the Syrians. 
 
¶10.  (S)  While emphasizing that U.S. expertise regarding 
Syria resides in Embassy Damascus and Washington, the 
Ambassador made three remarks.  First, multiple foreign 
visitors to Damascus have raised the tribunal, giving the 
Syrians the opportunity to make remarks.  They refuse to talk 
about the tribunal.  Second, the Syrians would likely see a 
Lebanese VIP visitor as a sign of Lebanese weakness and that 
the pro-Syrian intransigence in Lebanon is working. 
Lebanon's pro-Syrians thus might escalate rather than 
retreat.  Third, the Syrians, just like their allies in 
Lebanon, are probably not going to provide specific proposals 
for changes to the text.  Responding ambiguously, they would 
have more interest in a process that drags on indefinitely, 
in hopes that momentum for the tribunal eventually peters out. 
 
¶11.  (S)  Rizk, looking unconvinced, repeated that he thinks 
that it would be "worth it" to test the Syrians via a secret 
trip to Damascus.  The Ambassador cautioned him not to allow 
himself to be used in ways that damaged his credibility 
locally, particularly given his presidential ambitions.  Rizk 
said that he would do nothing without the explicit support of 
Hariri, Jumblatt, and Siniora.  He stated his intention to 
explore the idea with them.  "Will you support me?" he asked. 
 The Ambassador said that USG support would be unlikely.  (We 
are certain that Hariri et al. will talk Rizk, who would need 
their support to realize his presidential ambitions, will 
talk him out of a trip to Damascus.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (S)  Whatever the rhetorical demands, most people 
believe that Hizballah-dominated demonstrations in downtown 
Beirut are primarily linked to a Syrian demand to derail the 
tribunal.  We agree.  (While no member of the Rafiq Hariri 
fan club, Michel Aoun surely joined his forces to the 
demonstrators for other reasons.  But the Aounist component 
in the ongoing sit-in, while symbolically important to give 
Christian cover to what would otherwise be a transparently 
Shia movement, is relatively modest in size compared to the 
numbers Hizballah can muster.)  As a result of the 
demonstrations, there are no good options for approving the 
tribunal documents, especially since the pro-Syrians and 
Aounists insist that Siniora's cabinet is illegitimate.  We 
do not know what the reaction in New York will be if, as we 
expect, a petition signed by 70 MPs accompanies the tribunal 
documents to the UN.  But, locally, this option makes the 
most sense, as the parliament has not been as vilified as 
Siniora's cabinet by the pro-Syrians. 
 
¶13.  (S)  Given the enormous impact of the fuss over the 
tribunal on Lebanon's domestic politics and economy, we 
certainly hope that Brammertz is developing strong 
investigative files.  Lebanon's current political fight stems 
from the collective assumption that the tribunal will be able 
to deliver credible indictments against high-ranking 
officials who were part of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. 
We expect that to be the case.  Yet if it ever appears as 
though there is no meat on the bones of the Brammertz 
investigation, then increasing numbers of people will start 
 
BEIRUT 00000002  005 OF 005 
 
 
to ask awkward questions about whether it is worth fighting 
the battle over the establishment of the tribunal with such 
urgency.  Such questions are already being raised (along the 
lines of "is it worth allowing Lebanon to be destroyed for 
the sake of the tribunal") but, so far, only infrequently. 
FELTMAN