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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0001/01 0030657
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O 030657Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7018
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0690

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2027 
TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON HIZBALLAH VISIT, BERRI 
INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 3908 
 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 3913 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja, meeting with 
Ambassador Feltman on 12/30, said that Hizballah members 
Na'im Qassim and Mohammed Fneish would not have been 
reassured by their 12/27 audience with King Abdullah. 
Abdullah rebuffed their attempts to encourage a Saudi-Syrian 
dialogue, insisting that Hizballah work with the other 
Lebanese to find solutions to Lebanon's problems.  Critical 
of the ongoing street protests in Beirut, Abdullah also 
strongly defended PM Siniora and Saad Hariri against Qassim's 
attacks and underscored Saudi Arabia's commitment to the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  Khoja claimed not to be 
familiar with specific threat information the Hizballah 
visitors shared later with intelligence chief Prince Muqrin 
regarding the Hajj.  Khoja and the Ambassador agreed that 
Speaker Berri's initiative (ref a) was a non-starter (and, 
indeed, later that day Berri informed both that he was 
dropping his idea).  Khoja said that, while Saudi Arabia 
remained open to the idea of hosting Lebanon's political 
leaders, he did not see much promise of success for the 
moment.  End summary. 
 
QASSIM, FNEISH CALL 
ON SAUDI KING ABDULLAH 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  Receiving the Ambassador at his apartment on the 
first day of 'Eid al-Adha, Khoja confirmed the account (ref 
b) by Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi that Hizballah 
second-in-command Qassim and (resigned) Minister of Energy 
and Water Fneish had met with King Abdullah the previous 
Wednesday (12/27).  When Hizballah had requested the meeting 
through intermediaries in Riyadh, Abdullah insisted that 
Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah issue a 
communique first -- which Nasrallah did -- calling on Hajj 
pilgrims to be peaceful.  Without going into detail, Khoja 
said that Saudi Arabia had information suggesting that Iran 
hoped to use Hizballah pilgrims to disrupt the Hajj. 
 
¶3.  (S)  On the Saudi side, Abdullah included Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Faisal, intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin 
Abdulaziz, and Khoja.  The Hizballah visitors, Khoja claimed, 
were unhappy at Khoja's presence, having been annoyed at the 
Saudi envoy ever since his forceful intervention to stop a 
potential December 1 Hizballah-Aoun attack on the Grand 
Serail government compound.  While being customarily polite, 
Abdullah made it clear that Khoja enjoys the king's 
confidence.  Qassim, while responding with predictable 
flowery praise for Khoja, hinted that Khoja should maintain a 
more neutral posture.  Abdullah responded that others in 
Lebanon complained that Khoja had been too sympathetic to 
Hizballah, suggesting to the king that Khoja was behaving 
appropriately. 
 
HIZBALLAH URGES SAUDI-SYRIAN 
RAPPROCHEMENT TO SOLVE LEBANON'S ILLS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  According to Khoja, encouraging a Saudi-Syrian 
rapprochement seemed to be the primary Hizballah message. 
Qassim, who did most of the talking, told Abdullah that Saudi 
Arabia and Syria, working together, could easily solve 
Lebanon's problems.  Abdullah could not resist making a 
"little joke," Khoja said;  maybe, the king said, he could 
talk to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad once the king again 
became a "full man" (a reference to Asad's notorious August 
speech referring to the "half-men" of the Arab world).  But 
for the most part, Abdullah did not address the question of 
Syria directly, even though Qassim kept trying it from 
different angles.  Instead, he responded by telling Qassim 
and Fneish that the Lebanese had to work out their problems 
on their own.  Rather than talk to him, the Lebanese should 
be talking to each other.  Specifically, Hizballah needed to 
sit down with Siniora, Hariri, and Walid Jumblatt. 
 
DISAGREEING OVER SINIORA, HARIRI 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  Emphasizing that everything was cloaked in 
 
BEIRUT 00000001  002 OF 003 
 
 
diplomatic language that failed to mask a frank exchange, 
Khoja reported that Qassim and Fneish accused Siniora, 
Hariri, and Jumblatt of perfidy.  While Jumblatt was beyond 
hope of redemption, their experience in dealing with Siniora 
and Hariri in particular was not good.  Something is agreed 
upon, and then they receive orders from their U.S. masters to 
break the deal.  Siniora receives instructions directly from 
the U.S. Ambassador and cannot be trusted.  Abdullah "shut 
them up," Khoja said, by praising effusively Siniora as a 
Lebanese patriot and Saad Hariri "as a brother and son of 
Saudi Arabia."  Saudi Arabia fully supports both.  The king 
again argued that the Lebanese have to learn to deal with 
each other and not rely on foreigners to solve their 
problems.  The king expressed confidence that Siniora and 
Hariri would always work for Lebanon's best interests. 
 
. . . AND OVER THE TRIBUNAL 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S)  Abdullah asked his Hizballah visitors pointedly why 
they were blocking the establishment of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, which he described as a high priority for the 
kingdom.  Qassim claimed that Hizballah, per the decision of 
the March 2 session of the National Dialogue, fully supported 
the principle of the tribunal.  But there were some 
constitutional and legal concerns with the current draft he 
claimed.  Abdullah again urged Hizballah to sit down with 
others to make the concerns clear.  If the concerns were 
minor, then surely the Lebanese could collectively agree to 
address them.  But Saudi Arabia did not want the tribunal to 
be stripped of effective authority.  The king also told his 
visitors that one of the reasons they face difficulties with 
Saad Hariri is the tribunal, since Hizballah is perceived as 
trying to derail something that is a top priority for Hariri 
and the Sunnis. 
 
SIT DOWN TOGETHER, RATHER 
THAN CONTINUE SIT-INS 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S)  According to Khoja, Abdullah also asked Hizballah, 
in reference to the ongoing sit-in demonstrations, "why do 
you want to destroy your country?"  Told by Qassim that 
Hizballah is merely trying to exercise freedom of expression 
and assembly in order to have a more effective voice within 
the GOL, Abdullah repeated his earlier counsel: Hizballah 
should sit down and talk directly with the others.  Abdullah 
made it clear that he did not support using the street to 
change the government.  When Qassim tried to raise concerns 
about Sunni-Shia tensions, Abdullah responded that Lebanon 
also had Druse, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and 
others.  Don't talk of Sunni-Shia tensions; you are all 
Lebanese and should work together for solutions, the King 
urged. 
 
¶8.  (S)  As for the security information they carried, Qassim 
and Fneish, immediately after their meeting with Abdullah, 
met privately with intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin 
Abdulaziz.  Khoja claimed that he had not yet received a 
read-out of that meeting and thus did not know what specific 
security information the Hizballah delegation shared. 
 
BERRI INITIATIVE:  DOA 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S)  The Ambassador and Khoja then compared notes on the 
"National Salvation Government" initiative proposed by 
Parliament Speaker Berri (ref a).  Both agreed that the 
proposed cabinet formation would be unacceptable to the March 
14 forces, who would be reduced to having only three out of 
ten ministers.  (Later that day, during an 'Eid call with the 
Ambassador, Berri said that he was dropping his proposal, a 
message he also passed to Khoja.  "It seems no one likes my 
idea," Berri said.) 
 
SAUDI DIPLOMACY 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (S)  The Ambassador asked Khoja whether Saudi Arabia was 
still interested in hosting Lebanon's political leaders in a 
dialogue session.  Making some veiled criticism of Arab 
League Secretary General Amr Moussa's initiative, Khoja said 
that, indeed, Saudi Arabia would welcome playing a 
constructive role, as long as the Lebanese were making the 
actual decisions among themselves.  But, he said, the 
enthusiasm for some kind of Saudi-hosted meeting is waning 
 
BEIRUT 00000001  003 OF 003 
 
 
slightly compared to ten days ago, for there does not seem to 
be much chance of success at the moment.  Having a 
Saudi-sponsored meeting now would probably raise expectations 
that could not be fulfilled, Khoja said, making things worse, 
not better.  Questioned explicitly by the Ambassador, Khoja 
said that there is no Saudi initiative currently on the table. 
FELTMAN