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DE RUEHGB #0008/01 0021351
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: GOVERNOR, DEPUTY GOVERNOR MEET WITH VP 
HASHEMI, KEY MINISTERS 
 
Classified By: PRT Leader Stephanie Miley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY.  The Governor and Deputy Governor of Salah ad 
Din (SaD) province met with Vice-President Al Hashemi and the 
Ministers of Oil and the Interior during a trip to Baghdad on 
December 27-28.  As the second in a series of trips (the 
first was in mid-November) initiated by BG Wiercinski (DCG(S) 
25ID) to enhance communication between the GOI and provincial 
authorities, participants discussed a number of key 
political, economic, and security issues in the Sunni 
heartland.  Some of these issues include the anticipated 
aftermath of Saddam's execution, the Sunni image in the West, 
the severe refined fuel shortages, and methods to improve ISF 
capabilities in SaD.  While the Vice-President and the 
Ministers hesitated to commit specific resources to requests 
submitted by the Governor, the meetings may serve as a 
springboard to promote improved communication and cooperation 
between provincial authorities and the GOI. 
 
--------------------------- 
An Opportunity for Dialogue 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Communication between the political establishment in 
Salah ad Din, a province located north of Baghdad in the 
Sunni heartland, and key GOI policymakers is extremely 
sporadic.  On December 27-28, Governor Hamad Hamood Shekti 
and Deputy Governor General Abdulla Hussein Muhammed of Salah 
ad Din province traveled to Baghdad to meet with 
Vice-President Al Hashemi, Oil Minister Shahristani, and 
Interior Minister Al Bolani in order to exchange views on a 
number of important subjects.  Accompanied by the PRT Team 
Leader and a representative from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 
82nd Airborne Division (the unit responsible for Salah ad 
Din), the Governor and Deputy Governor were able to express 
their concerns regarding provincial security, the languishing 
economy, the largely dysfunctional Bayji oil refinery, 
De-Baathification, and many other issues. 
 
------------------------- 
From One Sunni to Another 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) During their December 28 meeting, Vice-President Al 
Hashemi emphasized to Governor Hamad and General Abdulla that 
Sunnis are often portrayed as anti-democratic in the Western 
media; this, he said, must be changed.  While concurring that 
the Shia are largely responsible for the division of the 
country along sectarian lines, all participants agreed that 
Salah ad Din could be a shining example of religious harmony. 
 Al Hashemi stressed that positive change should be led by 
the provinces, not Baghdad.  Agreeing with this sentiment, 
General Abdulla then declared that SaD residents would follow 
anyone who was a strong and patriotic leader; even a Jewish 
or Christian person.  Abdulla also added that leaders needed 
to be elected who were not beholden to their tribes.  (NOTE: 
This is currently a key issue in SaD, as provincial budget 
execution is currently being held up by a dispute within the 
provincial council between representatives from Al Alem, 
including the Deputy Governor, and representatives from Tuz, 
an area primarily populated by Kurds and Turkomen area of 
northeastern SaD. END NOTE.) 
 
¶5. (C) The Governor and Deputy Governor expressed concern 
about public reaction in SaD to the announcement of Saddam 
Hussein's pending execution, requesting three days advance 
notice to ensure that adequate security measures were in 
place.  The Vice-President asked if the provincial leaders 
had spoken to any GOI representatives about this, and when 
they answered in the negative, he said he would do what he 
could. (NOTE: This request was not honored, as Hussein's 
execution was carried out on the morning of December 30 
without any notice and causing much concern for the SaD 
provincial leadership about the long-term political 
ramifications and reconciliation efforts. END NOTE.) 
 
¶6. (C) Both Hamad and Abdulla communicated the need for 
immediate public works projects in order to generate 
employment.  Abdulla made several suggestions for potential 
GOI initiatives in SaD, including an oft-heard proposal for 
the construction of an airport, a new cement factory, and the 
hiring of two thousand additional Iraqi Police.  The 
attendees also discussed the need to continue to relax (or 
reform?) current de-Ba'athification strictures, emphasizing 
the hundreds of still-unemployed SaD teachers who had been 
forced out of their positions three years ago.  On this 
point, Al Hashemi requested that Hamad or Abdulla provide a 
list of teachers with which he could follow up to the 
Commission. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000008  002 OF 003 
 
 
-------- 
Oil Talk 
-------- 
 
¶7. (C) Citing the negative economic effect price increases 
have upon the population, Hamad urged Minister of Oil 
Shahristani during a meeting on December 27 to ensure future 
official price increases were more gradual, perhaps only 25 
ID per month.  Shahristani did not commit to any action; only 
stating that he would look into the matter. 
 
¶8. (C) Alluding to the rampant corruption at the Bayji oil 
refinery, they all agreed that stronger leadership was needed 
in order to "clean up" plant operations.  Revealing the 
Governor and Deputy Governor's high level of interaction (or 
interference) with the refinery, the participants also 
discussed specific personnel, including the chief of 
transportation, Ibrahim Hamadi, ) who was described as "a 
good man, but a coward" ) and the head of production, Abdul 
Khader ) who they consider to be "competent."  (NOTE: 
Ibrahim, the former chief of distribution at the refinery, is 
believed to be incarcerated in Baghdad.  He was considered by 
CF units on the ground to be heavily involved in corruption 
onsite.  He is generally hostile to CF presence, and there 
have also been unconfirmed reports that he may be an AQIZ 
sympathizer.  END NOTE.)  There was disagreement about which 
qualifications should be considered when hiring key 
personnel; the Deputy Governor argued that tribal 
affiliations and other issues should be considered, which the 
Governor was not in favor of, while Shahristani's priority 
was only "no Baathists." 
 
¶9. (C) Shahristani charged the Governor and Deputy Governor 
with eliminating the black market for fuel, telling them that 
the governor has the ability to close any station down, at 
any time, especially in the case of stations that had been 
built without proper permits.  However, this is unlikely to 
occur in SaD in the near future; Hamad stated that he would 
not close any stations, regardless of their status, claiming 
that it would put someone out of work.  (NOTE: The Governor 
and Deputy Governor are believed to personally own large 
numbers of gas stations in SaD. END NOTE.) 
 
¶10. (C) General Abdulla also argued that the Strategic 
Infrastructure Brigades (SIB) presently tasked with 
protecting Iraq's critical oil pipelines are not capable of 
their mission.  He requested that Shahristani authorize an 
additional brigade, formed in Salah ad Din, that he said 
"could be like the old army, tough and strong", and would 
have the additional benefit of lowering unemployment. 
Shahristani did not seem to favor the idea. 
 
¶11. (C) Oversupply of heavy fuel oil (HFO) ) or "black oil" 
- was the primary reason the Bayji refinery ceased operations 
for a few weeks in early December.  With this in mind, Hamad 
and Abdulla argued for two key changes: the opening of a 
transportation contracting office in Bayji (all contracting 
of fuel tankers is currently performed in Baghdad) and the 
distribution of HFO to the provinces.  Abdulla pointed out 
that provincial authorities could find creative uses for the 
HFO, simultaneously relieving the storage problem at the 
refinery.  Similar to the other recommendations, Shahristani 
refused to commit to any action, only saying that the ideas 
would be considered. 
 
¶12. (C) Following the meeting with Minister Shahristani, the 
Governor and Deputy Governor had a productive and congenial 
meeting with the Deputy Ministers of Upstream Production, 
Distribution, and Refineries.  The Minister of Upstream 
Production mentioned that Salah ad Din under the previous 
regime had only three economic sectors to generate economic 
growth: the military, the civil service, and the oil 
industry.  Today, he pointed out, only the oil sector remains 
) a statement that his visitors from SaD certainly agreed 
with. 
 
------------------------- 
Former Foes, Now Friends? 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Minister of the Interior Al Bolani (Shia, SCIRI) 
stated to his visitor from Salah ad Din (only the Governor 
attended this meeting), the former cradle of Sunni Baathism, 
that as fellow elected officials they all needed to show the 
old regime, 'takfiri' elements, and the world that Iraq's 
problems were not being caused by outside influences (read: 
Iran).  Al Bolani stated that Iraq's leaders needed to solve 
an entirely Iraqi security problem.  Hamad responded by 
stating that regardless of the origin of the violence, the 
public was losing its patience with Iraqi government's 
inability to restore order. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000008  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶14. (C) Governor Hamad expressed to Al Bolani his concern 
over the secure transport of Hussein's body after the 
execution was carried out.  Al Bolani agreed that security 
would be an issue but stated that Hussein "received a fair 
trial and will receive a fair burial." 
 
¶15. (C) Requesting additional support from the Ministry of 
the Interior (MoI), Hamad  argued to Al Bolani that many 
Iraqi Police (IP) units in SaD were undermanned and 
undersupplied and that an additional battalion was needed in 
the Ash Sharqat region north of Bayji.  Al Bolani countered 
by stating that equipment could be provided, but not weapons. 
 Perhaps trying to offer a gesture of goodwill, he also 
agreed to send extra policemen, saying that "if three hundred 
people are needed, we won't say no."  Al Bolani emphasized 
the need for the IP to hire well educated, high-quality 
people, and when the Governor pointed out that IP were 
under-compensated, Al Bolani asked him to send a list of his 
best officers for year-end bonuses. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) Although the meetings between Salah ad Din's power 
players and key GOI officials will probably not produce an 
immediate bounty of tangible benefits, the Governor and 
Deputy Governor left Baghdad feeling as though a new line of 
communication had been opened.  The value of these improved 
relationships will be tested in 2007 as a number of serious 
economic and security challenges for Salah ad Din are likely 
to arise.  In a country where communication within a 
province, let alone across the entire country, is sporadic at 
best, new, mutually beneficial relationships between the GOI 
and local authorities in all provinces would be a significant 
positive development.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶17. (U) PRT Tikrit thanks the Embassy and MNF-I personnel for 
the support in making this last-minute trip a great success. 
 
¶18. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad 
Din, please see our SIPRNET reporting blog: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit 
SCOBEY