VZCZCXYZ0030
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0171/01 0251624
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251624Z JAN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7946
INFO RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1013
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 1188
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T ATHENS 000171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER GR
SUBJECT: "REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE" MANIFESTO CLAIMS 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMBASSY RPG ATTACK 
 
REF: A) ATHENS 77 B) ATHENS 94 C) ATHENS 95 D) STATE 
 
     7147 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (S)  On January 24, the left-wing group "Revolutionary 
Struggle" officially claimed responsibility for the January 
12 RPG attack on the Embassy in a manifesto passed to the 
weekly Greek newspaper "Pondiki."  The statement cites 
opposition to U.S. foreign policy as the motive for the 
attack -- and, by specifically criticizing FM Bakoyannis and 
Minister of Public Order Polydoras, appears to mark them as 
potential future targets.  The statement's focus on Greek 
public figures and institutions supports the argument both 
the U.S. and GOG have made since January 12:  that this was 
an attack on both U.S. and Greek interests.  Public reaction 
since the RPG attack appears to support this view, a change 
from the tacit public acceptance of domestic terrorist 
incidents.  While there has been some political fallout for 
the Karamanlis government, this too has been comparatively 
restrained. 
 
¶2.  (S)  Greek authorities are undertaking a comprehensive, 
professional and high priority investigation of the January 
12 PRG attack on the Chancery.  The two-way information flow 
has been good, and U.S. agencies' representatives have good 
access.  We have shared all relevant information in our hands 
with Greek authorities, and are confident that they have 
shared their information equally fully with us.  The 
investigation is proceeding along several tracks.  Our main 
concern is constant press leaks -- likely the consequence of 
political and personal rivalries in an election year -- that 
have hampered the investigations effectiveness, primarily by 
the near-identification of the chief suspect.  Ambassador and 
DCM have emphasized to both government and top PASOK 
officials that such leaks work against both U.S. and Greek 
interests.  A second attack might be in the offing, based on 
analysis of past incidents, but may be against a Greek 
government target.  Embassy has requested and received 
funding for 24-hour surveillance detection and will shortly 
submit recommendations to address the Embassy's greatest 
security challenge:  offices situated only 65 feet from a 
major Athens avenue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE ISSUES ITS MANIFESTO 
 
¶3.  (S)  Authorities have been anticipating a statement from 
"Revolutionary Struggle;" the explanatory manifesto was 
received by the Greek weekly tabloid "Pondiki" following an 
anonymous call.  "Revolutionary Struggle" claims the attack 
was in reponse to U.S. policies in Palestine, Lebanon, and 
Iraq, also citing detainees in Guantanamo.  It contains 
invective against "CIA and FBI agents and assassins" housed 
at U.S. Embassies, and suggests that the Greek National 
Police's Counter-Terrorism Unit houses "American agents." 
 
¶4.  (S)  In addition, the lengthy document criticizes Greek 
officials and institutions.  Its opening paragraph refers to 
the Foreign Minister as "the slave of the Americans, 
Bakoyiannis," and implies that Minister of Public Order 
Polydoras is also too close to the U.S.  While there are no 
explicit threats against either, the mention of both by name 
suggests they are potential targets.  But they are not the 
only ones.  The manifesto blasts the "extraordinary military 
'tribunals'" and the judges currently presiding over the 
appeal of the November 17 terrorists.  It adds that, if 
"Revolutionary Struggle" had its way, the first building that 
would be torn down would be the U.S. Embassy, the second 
would be the Greek parliament, perhaps suggesting that MPs 
are also possible targets. 
 
¶5.  (S)  In contrast to the manifestos issued by the earlier 
terrorist group "17 November," the document does not provide 
details of how the attack was organized and executed.  The 
style is also different, shorter, less ideological and more 
direct/journalistic.  Some have interpreted this as a sign 
that the group's members have a lower level of education than 
some of 17N's leaders.  The Minister of Public Order told us 
he thought the writer had media experience. 
 
INVESTIGATION RUNNING ON SEVERAL TRACKS 
 
¶6.  (S)  Since the investigation began on January 12, it has 
proceeded along several tracks.  The first has focused on a 
prominent Greek anarchist with a police record who is seen as 
the most logical suspect.  This investigation is being 
handled by an extremely restricted group within the police 
department.  However, the fact that the individual was 
described thoroughly (identified in all but name) in the 
January 14 press has complicated police tracking efforts. 
 
¶7.  (S)  The second line of inquiry, pursued by a broader 
police working group, is focused on interviewing witnesses, 
checking phone records of those offering information, and 
tracking the origin of the Chinese RPG used in the attack. 
Police believe that the RPG, which was not a type purchased 
by any GOG entity, was likely among those looted from 
Albanian arsenals during 1997.  (Greek officials report 
positive cooperation with counterparts in Tirana and Skopje.) 
 Police also have high expectations (perhaps overly so) for 
what FBI enhancement of surveillance video shot by Embassy 
cameras may reveal when analysis is completed later this 
week. 
 
¶8.  (S)  Third, police are pursuing pieces of information 
(some potentially credible, some clearly not) that indicates 
the attackers may have come from outside Greece, and were 
therefore not the standard-issue Greek radicals most have 
assumed them to be.  The "Revolutionary Struggle" manifesto 
may challenge this thesis.  Embassy RSO, Legatt, and SIMO are 
working together closely on all aspects of the investigation, 
meeting regularly with the Greek police teams involved. 
 
¶9.  (S)  Recently, both police and press have speculated that 
another attack might take place soon.  This is based on past 
incidents of domestic terrorism; the terrorist group 
"November 17" generally instigated two-three incidents prior 
to claiming responsibility in a written statement.  Press 
sources note that RPGs are usually packaged in groups of six; 
presuming that some were used for "target practice," the 
theory is that this would leave several still available for 
subsequent attacks.  Some accounts have even stretched the 
line of speculation further, suggesting that the next targets 
might be GOG ministries.  While there is no firm basis for 
such speculation, the possibility of course cannot be ruled 
out. 
 
BUT POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED PRESS LEAKS HAMPER EFFECTIVENESS 
 
¶10.  (S)  Although impressed with the energy and thoroughness 
of the investigation, we have been disappointed by leaks from 
PASOK-affiliated police officers directly to Greek media -- 
which has been constant since day one.  While in most cases 
the details leaked are insignificant, the near-identification 
of a primary suspect has, without doubt, hampered the overall 
investigation. 
 
¶11.  (S)  Politics is clearly behind the leaks.  With 
elections this year, after the RPG attack opposition PASOK 
contrasted its record with the New Democracy government -- 
reminding the public that its administration had succeeded in 
breaking the back of Greece's biggest domestic terrorist 
threat, "November 17" (a group responsible for decades of 
violent attacks, including the killing of 5 Americans). 
PASOK-aligned journalists jumped on board, criticizing 
Karamanlis for purportedly re-structuring the police 
counter-terrorism team.  The criticism seemed to hit home 
when Karamanlis asked former Anti-Terrorist Squad Chief Syros 
to take on the job again (in addition to his current 
responsibilities as Deputy Chief of Police).  (We think 
Karamanlis made the assignment in the perhaps unrealistic 
hope of obtaining political peace, and to show he was leaving 
no stars on the bench.)  But Syros -- whose links to PASOK 
were formed while serving under former PASOK Minister of 
Public Order Chrysochoides -- is also fighting for survival 
in the police force's promotion cycle this March.  While we 
respect his experience and conduct of the investigation 
itself, we assess that he is a major source of press leaks, 
which are designed to bolster his own public image and win a 
promotion. 
 
AMBASSADOR TO MPO, OPPOSITION:  STOP THE LEAKS NOW 
 
¶12.  (S)  On January 19 Ambassador conveyed to Minister of 
Public Order Polydoras (through MPO diplomatic advisor 
Ailianos) that, while the Embassy was satisfied with the 
overall level of cooperation, we were concerned that press 
leaks were harming the investigation.  The leaks could 
clearly delay the apprehension of the perpetrators, and 
worked against both U.S. and Greek interests.  Also on 
January 19, Ambassador delivered the same message to 
opposition leader George Papandreou.  DCM and SIMO Chief 
reached out to former MPO Chrysochoides (Minister under the 
PASOK government, leaving office in 2004), stressing that 
while the Embassy was not taking sides in the on-going 
political/factional struggle now being played out in the 
press, we were very concerned that the struggle, and, most 
importantly, the leaks were impairing an effective 
investigation.  On January 21, DCM passed our assessment to 
PM Karamanlis through diplomatic advisor Bitsios. 
 
CONTINUED FOCUS ON EMBASSY SECURITY 
 
¶13.  (S)  In order to keep the Embassy community fully 
informed, Ambassador hosted a Town Hall meeting for Embassy 
employees on January 15.  The country team has emphasized to 
all employees the need to review security practices, both at 
the Embassy and at their residence.  All employees have been 
advised to vary times and routes; the Ambassador, DCM and 
other recognizable Embassy officials will be particularly 
cognizant of this requirement.  Embassy requested (ref C) and 
received (ref D) funding for immediate implementation of 
24-hour surveillance detection teams.  In addition, Embassy 
will shortly submit a cable of both short and long-term 
recommendations on how OBO and DS can contribute to our 
mutual goal of hardening Embassy security at its most 
vulnerable point -- offices located 65 feet from the major 
Vassilisis Sofias thoroughfare. 
 
PUBLIC REACTION:  ATTACK BAD FOR U.S., BAD FOR GREECE 
 
¶13.  (S)  While some press reports have dug deep into the 
details of election-year political scapegoating, overall the 
attack appears to be viewed not only as an attack on the U.S. 
but also on Greece -- a point the Embassy has stressed from 
the outset.  That does not mean that the Greek public's 
anti-Americanism has lessened significantly.  However, it 
appears that, after the arrest and trial of key members of 
noted left-wing terrorist group "17 November" and the 
successful staging of the Olympic Games, the Greek "person on 
the street" no longer has the same level of tolerance for 
domestic terrorism.  One recent opinion poll suggests that 6 
of 10 Greeks now support increased use of surveillance 
cameras to deter crime.  That is a turnaround for a Greek 
public allergic to all forms of "Big Brother" monitoring. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶14.  (S)  Some media have questioned whether, as a result of 
the January 12 attack, the U.S. will refuse to consider 
extending participation in the Visa Waiver Program to Greece. 
 The Embassy has avoided public response on this point. 
There is no evidence that Greek terrorists past or present 
had or have the means or intention to undertake terrorist 
activities outside of Greece.  In fact, any attempt to do so 
would be to operate without the terrorists' key advantages: 
relative anonymity and a support network.  In any case, at 
this point we are broadly satisfied with the professionalism 
and pace of the investigation and consider it important to 
keep the VWP perspective open.  Any presumptive shut-off of 
VWP consideration would likely backfire, generating political 
resentment and impeding bilateral cooperation on this case. 
 
 
RIES