VZCZCXRO5827
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0057/01 0111634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111634Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0547
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000057 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP MOPS TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THE GOT ON LEDRA STREET BRIDGE REMOVAL: 
IT'S TALAT'S DECISION TO MAKE 
 
REF: NICOSIA 000021 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and 
 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Although GOT officials were not supportive of 
"TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's decision to dismantle the 
Ledra Street footbridge at the Green Line in Nicosia, they 
nonetheless stated in the end it was Talat's decision to 
make.  While Talat had broached the subject in late 
November/early December with Ankara, GOT officials here 
apparently believed they had agreed to push off a decision on 
the matter until early in the new year.  Thus, Talat's 
December 28 announcement of his intent to move forward with 
the demolition caught them off-guard.  Although senior 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) officials in particular opposed 
Talat's decision, in the end, Talat's vehement defense of his 
prerogative to make such a decision won the day.  However, PM 
Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) may pay the 
price for Talat's insistence.  Opposition parties are taking 
full opportunity to paint Erdogan and the AKP as being "soft" 
on key national security issues as election season gets 
underway.  END SUMMARY 
 
TALAT CONFERRED...AND DIDN'T LIKE THE ANSWER 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) MFA First Secretary for Cyprus Affairs Can Oztas 
described to us January 10 the circumstances surrounding 
"TRNC President" Talat's decision to dismantle the Ledra 
Street footbridge in Nicosia and Talat's interaction with GOT 
officials in making that decision.  According to Oztas, Talat 
had initially broached his idea of taking down the bridge in 
late November/early December.  At that time, MFA and the 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) counseled against a unilateral 
concession from the Turkish side because, from the GOT 
perspective, such concessions have not been reciprocated in 
the past.  Oztas added that, in the Turks' view, the memory 
of the international community has been lamentably short in 
recognizing steps the Turks have taken in recent years in 
support of a comprehensive settlement and has been equally 
short-sighted in its failure to put adequate pressure on the 
Greek Cypriots to reciprocate. 
 
¶3. (C) Oztas intimated that following the initial exchange 
between Talat and the GOT on the issue, GOT officials were 
expecting to continue the discussion of Talat's proposal 
after the holidays.  This would be part of a broader 
discussion on how to move forward on an overall settlement in 
light of a new UNSYG and the transition to the German EU 
presidency.  Although Oztas did not admit it explicitly, 
Talat's December 28 announcement that he was moving forward 
with the removal of the footbridge appears to have caught 
everyone off-guard. 
 
¶4. (C) Turkish media reports indicate the local Turkish force 
commander, Lieutenant General Hayri Kivrikoglu, remained 
steadfast in his opposition to Talat's proposal and pressed 
for support from Ankara.  Oztas noted that although the 
troops patrolling along Ermou/Hermes Street perpendicular to 
Ledra are actually Turkish Cypriot security forces, 
Kivrikoglu maintains overall command of the security presence 
in northern Cyprus.  Talat traveled to Istanbul and to Ankara 
January 4-5 to press his case with PM Erdogan, FM Gul, and 
TGS CHOD General Yasar Buyukanit.  According to media 
reports, and as noted in reftel, Talat reportedly threatened 
to resign if the Turkish Army maintained its opposition to 
his decision. 
 
GOT DECIDES IT'S NOT WORTH THE FIGHT... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Oztas declined to confirm the media accounts 
concerning Talat's threat.  Rather, he emphasized the GOT 
view that the issue was one for Talat to decide.  Oztas 
admitted that GOT officials believed the bridge held no 
significance from a security perspective.  Adding that to the 
fact that even after the demolition the opening of a new 
crossing at Ledra Street anytime soon is highly unlikely made 
going along with Talat's decision somewhat more palatable.  A 
mid-level officer at the TGS who recently served in Cyprus 
confirmed to us that the bridge itself was of little 
importance but suggested the manner in which Talat handled 
the affair had raised hackles.  He said the TGS now considers 
the issue closed. 
 
 
...THOUGH SOME BELIEVE TALAT JUST DOESN'T GET IT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (C) Retired General Kuloglu at the Global Strategy 
Institute think tank described TGS' concerns with the 
 
ANKARA 00000057  002 OF 002 
 
 
destruction of the bridge as three-fold: 
 
- Without the bridge, the separation between the military and 
civilians will be lost; 
- Since the purpose of the bridge was to separate the 
civilians and military, Talat should have consulted the 
military first; and 
- Most importantly, after already destroying the wall on the 
Turkish side, and now taking down the bridge, TGS believes 
the Greek Cypriots will continue to demand more unilateral 
concessions from the Turkish Cypriots such as removal of the 
Turkish flag and withdrawal of Turkish troops.  They believe 
that the demolition of the bridge should have been done in 
conjunction with the destruction of the wall on the Greek 
Cypriot side. 
 
¶7. (C) Retired General Kucukoglu (protect) of the Center for 
Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) said that Talat was not a 
military person and did not understand the strategic, 
historical, and emotional importance of Cyprus to Turkey.  He 
views Cyprus from a Cypriot point of view, assuming that 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots should work together towards a 
solution.  However, Turkey views itself as the "mother 
country" of Cyprus and expects Talat to consult with all 
elements of the Turkish government before taking such a 
decision. 
 
¶8. (C) Despite those concerns, Talat could perhaps be 
forgiven for thinking he could move forward on removal of the 
bridge without encountering too much resistance from Ankara. 
According to an Ankara University professor and former 
advisor to the Turkish parliament with close ties to the TGS, 
Talat had raised this issue earlier in 2006 with former TGS 
CHOD Ozkok, who had signaled his support. 
 
THE DAY OF "TRNC INDEPENDENCE," AND BASHING ERDOGAN 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (C) Following the January 9 removal of the footbridge, 
Turkish media proclaimed it as the day when the "TRNC" proved 
its independence.  PM Erdogan was quoted as saying that 
although he believed Talat had perhaps moved in haste in 
taking down the bridge unilaterally, "he had to be honored as 
president of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'."  The 
political opposition, meanwhile, seized upon the confusion 
surrounding Talat's declaration as well as Erdogan's eventual 
decision to give in to Talat.  Republican People's Party 
(CHP) leader Deniz Baykal said the developments in Cyprus 
reflected a lack of coordination among national institutions 
and characterized the demolition of the bridge as "a 
challenge."  True Path Party (DYP) deputy chairman Nuzhet 
Kandemir charged Erdogan's government with "declining to 
undertake responsibility in Cyprus," while National People's 
Party (MHP) deputy chairman Mehmet Sandir stated the MHP 
fears the next step would be the demolition of the Turkish 
Cypriot "state" and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the 
island.  Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Erkan Mumcu said he 
is disturbed by Erdogan's conclusion that Turkey must respect 
Talat's decision, adding that he views this as Erdogan 
"distancing himself from developments in Cyprus." 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: It is less than convenient for Erdogan's AKP 
that Talat pressed forward with unilateral concessions as AKP 
enters an election campaign in which it is likely to come 
under the most pressure from nationalists who characterize 
the AKP's record on Cyprus (and the PKK) as "soft." 
Nevertheless, neither AKP nor the TGS was willing to create 
the political crisis in northern Cyprus that would have 
ensued had Talat made good on his threat to resign.  The TGS 
did, however, lay down a marker that it will continue to 
insist upon its role as the ultimate protector of Turkish 
national interests, one of which remains, certainly, the 
Cyprus issue. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eu/ankara/ 
 
WILSON