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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM MO AG WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR HOSTILE TO AUTONOMY 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
REF: A. 06 STATE 662755 
     ¶B. 06 ALGIERS 1450 
     ¶C. 06 ALGIERS 2025 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 b, d. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Polisario Ambassador Beissat told us January 
14 that the Polisario had perceived a marked recent shift in 
U.S. policy on the Western Sahara.  The Polisario now viewed 
the U.S. as doing France's bidding and supporting the 
Moroccan position.  Beissat insisted that any discussions 
with Morocco on the Western Sahara needed to take up where 
the Baker Plan left off: the holding of a referendum.  DCM 
noted that Morocco ultimately rejected the Baker Plan and 
encouraged the Polisario to talk directly with Morocco about 
its expected autonomy proposal.  The Polisario should see the 
Moroccan proposal as a beginning rather than an end.  Beissat 
indicated the Polisario would talk with Morocco about a 
solution only within the correct international legal 
framework.  Even if that occurred, he believed that only a 
member of the Moroccan royal household could be a legitimate 
interlocutor. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary (cont'd):  Beissat complained that the 
government of Algeria did little to advance the Polisario's 
cause diplomatically beyond reciting standard talking points 
on the right to self-determination.  He said his usual 
interlocutor on Polisario issues at the MFA was Minister 
Delegate Messahel, but he had occasional meetings with FM 
Bedjaoui.  He also claimed he had good access to Algerian 
ministers and did not face the same constraints from MFA in 
arranging meetings as other ambassadors in Algiers.  Beissat 
closed the discussion by noting that time for finding a 
solution on the Western Sahara was on the side of the 
Polisario because it was supported by international law and 
the United Nations.  In his view, Morocco would respond to 
Sahrawi grievances only under pressure.  While Morocco needed 
a speedy settlement for internal political reasons (growing 
Islamist pressure), Beissat maintained that the Polisario 
would rather wait -- or push -- for the right settlement of 
the Western Sahara dispute than accept autonomy.  He did not 
completely rule out negotiations with the Moroccans, but made 
clear they would have to occur within a UN framework.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. HAS TAKEN MOROCCO'S SIDE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Polisario Ambassador to Algeria (and Sahrawi MFA 
Secretary General-designate) Mohamed Beissat, in a discussion 
 
SIPDIS 
with DCM and PolEc Chief January 14, expressed sharp 
disappointment at the U.S. abstention on the recent UNGA 
Fourth Committee resolution on the Western Sahara.  He said 
the change in the U.S. position on a resolution that was 
identical to what the U.S. had supported the previous year, 
combined with the NSC's September meeting with CORCAS, 
underscored a dramatic shift in U.S. policy in favor of 
Morocco.  The U.S., he complained, had no reason to do the 
bidding of France; the Polisario and the Sahrawi people had 
done nothing to merit such treatment.  DCM noted that the 
U.S. was not alone in abstaining on this year's resolution 
and that other European nations had also changed position and 
abstained.  DCM rejected the notion that the U.S. was 
colluding with France, underscoring that the U.S. position on 
the Western Sahara had not fundamentally changed. 
 
AUTONOMY CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Beissat clearly stated the Polisario's opposition to 
any discussions on the future status of the Western Sahara 
that started at a point other than Morocco's acceptance to 
hold a referendum, which Beissat maintained was agreed to as 
part of the Baker Plan.  After listening patiently to 
Beissat's review of Polisario grievances with Morocco in past 
negotiations, DCM observed that Morocco ultimately refused to 
accept the Baker Plan -- which was why the U.S. was now 
pursuing an alternative approach.  He told Beissat that the 
U.S. had stressed to Morocco the need to present a credible 
autonomy proposal as a basis for negotiation.  DCM also 
pressed Beissat on the need for direct discussions between 
 
Morocco and the Polisario. 
 
¶5. (C) Beissat said the Polisario could not accept using a 
Moroccan autonomy plan as the basis for discussions on the 
future of the Western Sahara.  For one thing, accepting 
discussions on autonomy would signal Polisario abandonment of 
the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination.  For 
another, Morocco "has no right" to make a one-sided proposal. 
 The conflict is a UN issue, he said, and any discussions 
should occur within that framework.  A referendum, he 
continued, was the only way for the Sahrawis to choose 
independence from Morocco, integration with it, or some form 
of autonomy.  Starting discussions on an autonomy proposal -- 
an approach that Beissat insisted had no basis in 
international law -- was unacceptable. 
 
ROYAL MOROCCAN HOUSEHOLD MUST BE ENGAGED 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) DCM and PolEc Chief noted that in the current 
post-Baker Plan environment, a Moroccan autonomy proposal was 
the only vehicle for discussions between the parties.  The 
Polisario's discussion of it with the Moroccans would not 
signal Polisario acceptance of it.  The Polisario could make 
counter proposals, we stressed.  What was not in the 
Polisario interest, in the U.S. view, was to turn down the 
opportunity to talk.  Beissat countered that the Polisario 
would be open to discussion of a proposal managed and tabled 
by the UN.  Agreeing to discuss Morocco's plan, in contrast, 
would be tantamount to accepting King Mohammed VI as the 
Sahrawi sovereign and was not acceptable. 
 
¶7. (C) Leaving aside the readiness and willingness of the 
Polisario to discuss a Moroccan autonomy proposal, PolEc 
Chief asked Beissat for his views on prospective Moroccan 
interlocutors.  Beissat responded that Taieb Fassi Fihri was 
very hostile to the Polisario and made clear in stark terms 
that he lacked credibility with the Polisario.  Beissat said 
a member of the royal family or a senior royal counselor 
would be the best interlocutor -- notwithstanding Polisario 
objection to discussion of an autonomy proposal -- if there 
was to be any hope of a political settlement.  Ultimately, 
concluded Beissat, the King would determine what was 
acceptable to Morocco.  Beissat also offered that any 
discussions with Morocco, in his view, should take place 
under UN auspices in a third country that was trusted by both 
parties. 
 
GOA DIPLOMACY LIMITED TO USUAL TALKING POINTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On the relationship between the Polisario and Algeria, 
Beissat commented that during his recent tour of Latin 
America to seek diplomatic recognition of the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic, the Algerian government had provided no 
support.  His hotel arrangements and meetings were 
coordinated mainly out of the Polisario's regional embassy in 
Havana.  Beissat claimed that Algeria did not lift a finger 
to help the Polisario in pushing its diplomatic interests 
abroad.  Quipping that an Algerian diplomat "doesn't say 
hello without instructions from Algiers," Beissat said even 
when the GOA could be helpful on issues like recognition it 
was not.  He cited the example of South Africa, with which 
Algeria had good relations, as one country that the Algerians 
had not helped encourage to recognize the Polisario.  Beissat 
described Algerian policy as being limited strictly to a set 
of talking points supporting the right of self-determination 
of the Sahrawi people and the need to resolve the dispute 
over the Western Sahara in the context of decolonization. 
 
¶9. (C) Despite that, Beissat said he had excellent access to 
ministers in the Algerian government.  While senior Polisario 
officials, like the "defense minister" would call Algerian 
officials directly, he said most communications with the 
government of Algerian went through him.  (Comment:  Unlike 
the rest of the diplomatic corps, Beissat appeared not to be 
stymied in his requests for meetings by Algerian MFA 
protocol.  Beissat told us he generally submitted the 
required diplomatic note requests, especially when traveling 
outside of Algiers, but called ministers directly to fix a 
time for his meetings.  Other ambassadors have been rapped on 
 
the knuckles repeatedly for doing this.  Beissat said that as 
the Sahrawi ambassador he has easy access.  Beissat also 
mentioned that he met at MFA with FM Bedjaoui, but usually 
dealt with Minister Delegate Messahel on Polisario concerns. 
End Comment.) 
 
TIME (AND VIOLENCE?) ON POLISARIO'S SIDE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Beissat made a point toward the end of our discussion 
of noting that, as regarded finding a solution on the Western 
Sahara, time was on the Polisario's side.  The Sahrawis had 
UN support and international law on their side.  At the same 
time, past experience had taught the Sahrawis that the 
Moroccan leadership ("makhzen") only responded to pressure, 
be it international or internal.  The U.S. and other members 
of the international community should press the Moroccans to 
fulfill their obligations under UN resolutions and 
international law.  If that did not occur, he said, the 
Polisario had made problems for Morocco in the past and could 
do so again, especially if Morocco was wedded to autonomy as 
the only solution.  He blustered that the Polisario could 
strike the Moroccans again if it wanted to do so.  Beissat 
claimed that the Moroccan leadership faced growing opposition 
from Islamists anyway, and needed a quick resolution of the 
Western Sahara conflict for internal political reasons.  The 
Polisario, he said, would wait for the right solution rather 
than accept a bad one.  DCM reiterated the importance of 
talking to the Moroccans directly and considering any 
autonomy proposal as a starting point rather than an end 
point. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT:  Beissat took a surprisingly hard line in 
his discussion with us.  When not accompanied by other 
Polisario officials in the past, he has sometimes shown signs 
of flexibility.  This was not one of those times.  It was 
clear that he and the Polisario believe the U.S. has made a 
deliberate decision at the highest level to take Morocco's 
side over the disputed Western Sahara.  The Polisario appears 
to have hardened its attitudes on discussions as a result. 
While he hinted that the Polisario might begrudgingly agree 
to talk directly with Moroccan officials, he made clear that 
it would only occur in circumstances consonant with what he 
called "international legality."  He once again ruled out a 
unilateral autonomy proposal as a satisfactory basis for 
discussions. 
FORD