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DE RUEHNO #0734/01 3541330
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0338
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0129
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0103
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0319
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL MASS NATO AU SU UN
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS MEETS WITH NATO SECRETARY 
GENERAL 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 2845 B) ADDIS ABABA 3243 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary. Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios met 
December 15 with NATO Secretary General (SYG) de Hoop 
Scheffer to discuss the situation in Darfur, relations 
between NATO and the African Union (AU), and the spread of 
instability into Chad and the Central African Republic. 
Natsios said diplomatic means are needed to persuade the 
Sudanese government to change its policies; if not, tougher 
coercive measures will be the next step.  De Hoop Scheffer 
noted NATO had recently extended its support for the AU 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to June 2007, and said he would be 
receptive to any request to NATO to help transport UN forces 
into Chad, should such a mission take place.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Natsios recounted his recent meeting with Sudanese 
President Bashir (Ref. A), including a discussion on allowing 
UN "blue hatted" troops into Darfur.  The SYG described NATO 
assistance to AMIS, noting this support is being carried out 
with a "low profile," in part due to African political 
sensitivities. 
 
¶3.  (C) Natsios said it is necessary to persuade the Sudanese 
to voluntarily change their policies in Darfur.  Diplomatic 
efforts must be made to engage China, Arab nations, and the 
Arab League to pressure the Sudanese to cease attacks against 
non-combatants.  He noted the Sudanese have "walked back" the 
agreement reached November 16 in Addis Ababa on UN assistance 
to AMIS.  In turn, the AU Peace and Security Council meeting 
held November 30 in Abuja had adopted a weaker version of the 
agreement (Ref. B).  If Bashir cannot proceed with the Addis 
agreement, said Natsios, there may be a need to take coercive 
steps, beginning with targeted economic and financial 
sanctions. Responding to a discussion of miliary steps that 
could be taken against the Sudanee, de Hoop Scheffer 
commented that these steps miht be better taken by a 
coalition of countries wlling to act, rather than by NATO. 
 
¶4.  (C) Natsos observed that the Darfur crisis was spreadinginstability into Chad and the Central African Repulic, 
adding this had led the French to become mor aggressive 
militarily in the area.  He discusse the possibility of a UN 
force being located in had along the border with Darfur. 
The SYG said h would be "receptive to any request" to help 
puta force into Chad.  De Hoop Scheffer wondered wherethe 
UN would find the troops to man such a force adding that 
drawing any UN troops out of southen Sudan would be a 
mistake. 
 
¶5.  (C) The SYG tld Natsios that NATO had recently committed 
to cntinue assistance to AMIS through June of 2007.  He 
described increasing levels of confidence betwee NATO and 
the AU, and said there is much more NAO could do in the 
provision of "enablers."  He ten reiterated the idea that 
NATO could provide smilar assistance in other parts of the 
region, agin mentioning potential support for any UN mission 
to Chad.  He said NATO can also do more trainingof AU 
forces, including the African Standby Forc, while cautioning 
that there are "political hurles" to clear first. (Comment: 
France opposes anytraining role for NATO in Africa. End 
Comment.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Natsios said the AU appears somewhat "torn" regarding 
NATO assistance - they appreciate and need the assistance, 
but still see NATO as representing former colonial powers. 
However, there is a growing perception in Africa that the 
situation in Darfur is bad and getting worse, and that more 
action is needed.  The SYG opined that the citizens of Darfur 
can only be protected if there are adequate peacekeeping 
forces on the ground, coupled with a political settlement. 
Natsios suggested the need for additional protocols to the 
Darfur Peace Agreement to bring more rebel groups into the 
peace process. 
 
¶7.  (C) Natsios described high levels of corruption within 
AMIS, including looting of equipment, material and fuel 
provided by international donors.  The SYG said that, despite 
these problems, the AU is the only interlocutor NATO 
currently has, and therefore will need to continue providing 
support.  Natsios said he had recently called AU PSC 
Commissioner Djinnit, recommending the removal of AMIS Force 
Commander Major General Aprezi (a Nigerian).  NATO DASG for 
 
USNATO 00000734  002 OF 002 
 
 
Operations Jochems suggested that, given the recent extension 
of AMIS, the weight of Nigeria within the AU, and the fact 
that Aprezi was only recently appointed, now was not the best 
time to replace the commander. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment: De Hoop Scheffer emphasized to Natsios his 
interest and ties to Africa (he was posted to Ghana early in 
his career), and is personally troubled by the situation in 
Darfur.  During this meeting, he was actively looking for 
ways to increase NATO involvement in Africa. End Comment. 
 
¶9. (U) SE Natsios' staff has cleared this cable. 
NULAND