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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV4895, CODEL MCCAIN'S MEETING WITH MINDEF PERETZ:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TELAVIV4895 2006-12-20 14:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTVA #4895 3541403
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF8238 3541410
O 201403Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 004895 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS MARRIS KWBG IS
SUBJECT: CODEL MCCAIN'S MEETING WITH MINDEF PERETZ: 
STRATEGIC COOPERATION, IDF TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS, POWS 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 4890 
 
     B. TEL AVIV 4851 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GENE A. CRETZ, REASON 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  CODEL MCCAIN, INCLUDING SENATORS JOHN 
MCCAIN, JOSEPH LIEBERMAN, SUSAN COLLINS, JOHN THUNE, AND 
REPRESENTATIVE MARK KIRK, MET WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE AMIR 
PERETZ DECEMBER 18.  CHARGE AND POL COUNS ATTENDED THE 
MEETING, AS DID MOD SENIOR STAFF.  THE CODEL MENTIONED THEIR 
VISIT TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, AND PRAISED THE QUALITY OF 
U.S.-ISRAEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION.  PERETZ, WHO NOTED THAT 
THE CODEL ALREADY HAD RECEIVED A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW FROM 
PRIME MINISTER OLMERT (REF A), SAID THAT PALESTINIAN ATTACKS 
ON ISRAELI CIVILIANS WERE NOT A STRATEGIC THREAT -- THE 
STRATEGIC THREAT CAME FROM IRAN --, BUT POSED A POLITICAL AND 
MORAL DILEMMA FOR THE GOI.  ISRAEL KNEW HOW TO DEFEND ITSELF 
FROM LONG-RANGE MISSILES BUT NEEDED TO DEVELOP A DEFENSE 
AGAINST SHORT-RANGE ROCKETS SUCH AS THE QASSAMS THAT WERE 
STILL FALLING REGULARLY ON PERETZ'S HOMETOWN, SDEROT.  PERETZ 
STRESSED THE IDF'S EFFORTS TO TREAT PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS 
HUMANELY DESPITE THE CONSTANT THREAT OF TERRORISM, AND SAID 
THE IDF WAS IMPLEMENTING A "BIG PROGRAM" TO IMPROVE CROSSINGS 
AND REMOVE CHECKPOINTS.  PERETZ APPEALED TO THE CODEL FOR 
CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING OF GENERAL DAYTON'S SECURITY PLAN.  ON 
ISRAELI POWS, PERETZ SAID THE TWO SOLDIERS KIDNAPPED BY 
HIZBALLAH IN JULY WERE PROBABLY WOUNDED BUT DECLINED TO 
DISCUSS ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ON THEM IN DETAIL.  REGARDING 
CORPORAL SHALIT, PERETZ SAID HIS RELEASE WAS BEING NEGOTIATED 
WITH ABU MAZEN AND THE EGYPTIANS SO AS NOT TO ALLOW HAMAS TO 
SET A PRICE FOR AN ISRAELI SOLDIER.  PERETZ STRESSED THE 
IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE EDGE, CALLING 
IT ISRAEL'S "INSURANCE POLICY."  HE DID NOT RESPOND TO AN 
OFFER TO DISCUSS ISRAEL'S MILITARY SALES NEEDS, NOTING THAT 
MOD DIRECTOR GENERAL ASHKENAZI HAD RECENTLY PRESENTED "ALL OF 
ISRAEL'S REQUESTS" DURING A VISIT TO WASHINGTON.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S.-ISRAEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) SENATOR MCCAIN SAID THE CODEL HAD JUST VISITED IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN, WHERE THE SITUATION WAS SERIOUS.  NOTING 
THEIR MEETING WITH ABU MAZEN THE DAY BEFORE, MCCAIN SAID THE 
PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A MEETING 
WITH PM OLMERT, BUT ALSO HAD MENTIONED HIS URGENT NEED FOR 
FUNDING.  SENATOR MCCAIN THANKED PERETZ FOR THE SERVICE AND 
SACRIFICE OF IDF SOLDIERS.  SENATOR LIEBERMAN PRAISED 
U.S.-ISRAELI STRATEGIC COOPERATION, SAYING THAT IN A 
DANGEROUS WORLD, THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR POWER USED 
WISELY.  SENATOR COLLINS COMMENTED THAT AMERICANS HAD COME TO 
HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY DILEMMAS 
SINCE 9/11. 
 
3.  (C) NOTING THAT PM OLMERT HAD ALREADY PROVIDED THE CODEL 
A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW, PERETZ SAID WE HAD REACHED ONE OF THE 
REGION'S MOST SENSITIVE AND IMPORTANT MOMENTS.  THE ENTIRE 
FREE WORLD FACED A GREAT CHALLENGE OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE 
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RADICALS, BACKED BY IRAN, AND 
MODERATES.  WHETHER THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS A GENUINE 
CONCERN FOR THE ARABS OR A RHETORICAL DEVICE, IT REMAINED A 
CENTRAL CONCERN.  NOTING THAT HE STILL LIVED IN THE TOWN OF 
SDEROT BORDERING GAZA, PERETZ SAID THE SITUATION WAS 
COMPLICATED.  THREE WEEKS AGO, A QASSAM ROCKET THAT LANDED 
NEXT TO PERETZ'S HOUSE HAD BLOWN OFF THE LEGS OF HIS PERSONAL 
BODYGUARD AND KILLED A WOMAN PEDESTRIAN.  WHILE HE CONSIDERED 
HIMSELF A MAN OF PEACE, PERETZ SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO 
EXPLAIN THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT TO ISRAELIS WHO WERE LIVING 
UNDER REGULAR ATTACK.  NEVERTHELESS, PERETZ SAID PEACE WAS 
ISRAEL'S FIRST CHOICE.  MILITARY ACTION SHOULD ONLY BE TAKEN 
IN ORDER TO CREATE A POLITICAL SPACE. 
 
TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC THREATS 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) PERETZ STRESSED THAT QASSAMS AND SUICIDE BOMBERS 
LAUNCHED BY PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WERE A 
TACTICAL, NOT A STRATEGIC THREAT.  IRAN WAS THE ONLY 
STRATEGIC THREAT TO ISRAEL.  BUT THE GOI FACED A POLITICAL 
AND MORAL QUESTION OF HOW TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS FROM 
TACTICAL THREATS AS WELL.  ISRAEL KNEW HOW TO DEFEND ITSELF 
AGAINST LONG-RANGE MISSILES, BUT IT STILL NEEDED TO DEVELOP 
THE MEANS TO DEFEND AGAINST SHORT-RANGE ROCKETS SUCH AS 
QASSAMS AND KATYUSHAS.  PERETZ SAID ISRAEL WAS TAKING A NEW 
LOOK AT SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE NAUTILUS. 
 
HUMANE HANDLING OF PALESTINIANS 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) PERETZ SAID HE WAS OFTEN ASKED WHETHER HIZBALLAH'S 
 
 
KIDNAPPING OF TWO SOLDIERS HAD JUSTIFIED GOING TO WAR. 
NOTING THAT THIS EVENT FOLLOWED THE KIDNAPPING OF ONE SOLDIER 
NEAR GAZA AND OF AN ISRAELI CIVILIAN IN THE WEST BANK, PERETZ 
SAID IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT KIDNAPPING OF 
ISRAELIS COULD NOT BECOME ROUTINE.  HE ADDED THAT RETRIEVING 
MISSING SOLDIERS WAS A "SUPREME VALUE" FOR ISRAEL SINCE IDF 
SOLDIERS NEEDED TO KNOW THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WOULD DO 
EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO FREE THEM IF THEY WERE CAPTURED. 
 
6.  (C) PERETZ STRESSED THAT HUMANITARIAN VALUES WERE PART OF 
THE IDFS WORLDVIEW.  THERE WAS NO WAR BY ISRAEL AGAINST THE 
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, ONLY AGAINST TERRORISTS.  PERETZ CITED 
THE EXAMPLE OF THE IDF HAVING TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE 
INTELLIGENCE THAT A WEAPONS STOCKPILE WAS LOCATED UNDER A 
CIVILIAN HOUSE IN GAZA.  THE IDF DECIDED TO WARN THE 
RESIDENTS OF THE HOUSE BY TELEPHONE TO EVACUATE TWO HOURS 
BEFORE BOMBING THE BUILDING.  THE NEXT TIME THEY WARNED 
CIVILIANS, HOWEVER, HAMAS BROUGHT CROWDS TO THE ROOFTOP OF 
THE TARGETED BUILDING BECAUSE THEY KNEW THE IDF WOULD NOT 
ATTACK.  AT THE KARNI CROSSING, THE MOD KEPT IT OPEN TO 
ENSURE THE DELIVERY OF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES TO GAZA DESPITE 
CONSTANT TERRORIST THREATS TO THE FACILITY.  PERETZ SAID HE 
HOPED THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN GAZA UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL 
 
WANTED TO KEEP THE CROSSINGS OPEN, WHILE THE TERRORISTS 
SOUGHT TO CLOSE THEM. 
 
7.  (C) NOTING THE IDF WAS INITIATING A "BIG PROGRAM" TO 
IMPROVE THE CROSSINGS AND REMOVE UNNECESSARY ROADBLOCKS, 
PERETZ PRAISED THE MODS "CLOSE COOPERATION" WITH THE 
AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY TEL AVIV'S WORKING GROUPS ON AMA 
IMPLEMENTATION.  HE URGED THE CODEL TO SUPPORT CONGRESSIONAL 
FUNDING OF GENERAL DAYTON'S SECURITY PLAN. 
 
POWS 
---- 
 
8.  (C) SENATOR MCCAIN NOTED THAT THE CODEL HAD MET WITH THE 
FAMILIES OF THE THREE KIDNAPPED IDF SOLDIERS.  HE ASKED ABOUT 
PRESS REPORTS THAT THE TWO SOLDIERS KIDNAPPED BY HIZBALLAH 
HAD BEEN WOUNDED AND WHETHER THE MOD WAS SHARING ITS 
INFORMATION WITH THE FAMILIES.  PERETZ SAID THIS WAS A VERY 
SENSITIVE SUBJECT.  HE COULD CONFIRM THERE WERE INDICATIONS 
THAT THE SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED BUT SAID HE PREFERRED NOT TO 
DISCUSS IT IN DETAIL SINCE HIZBALLAH WOULD EXPLOIT ANY LEAK. 
PERETZ CONFIRMED THAT THE MOD SHARED MOST OF ITS INFORMATION 
WITH THE FAMILIES, ADDING THAT THE GOI WOULD ASSUME THE 
SOLDIERS WERE ALIVE UNLESS IT WAS PROVEN OTHERWISE. 
 
9.  (C) SENATOR MCCAIN SAID THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR CORPORAL 
SHALIT WERE DIFFICULT SINCE HE WAS BEING HELD BY HAMAS BUT 
ISRAEL WAS NEGOTIATING WITH FATAH.  PERETZ RESPONDED THAT IF 
ISRAEL DELIVERED 100 PRISONERS TO HAMAS, IT WOULD BE A SLAP 
IN THE FACE FOR ABU MAZEN.  ISRAEL WAS NEGOTIATING WITH FATAH 
AND THROUGH THE EGYPTIANS SINCE IF THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION 
UNDERSTOOD THAT ABU MAZEN WAS THE RIGHT ADDRESS, MANY ISSUES 
COULD BE RESOLVED.  NEGOTIATING WITH HAMAS WOULD ALLOW THE 
TERRORISTS TO SET A PRICE FOR THE FREEDOM OF AN ISRAELI 
SOLDIER, BUT NEGOTIATING WITH ABU MAZEN WAS PART OF OPENING A 
POLITICAL PROCESS. 
 
MILITARY SALES 
-------------- 
 
10.  (C) SENATOR LIEBERMAN ASKED PERETZ ABOUT ISRAEL'S 
MILITARY SALES NEEDS.  PERETZ REPLIED THAT MOD DIRECTOR 
GENERAL ASHKENAZI HAD RECENTLY HEADED A DELEGATION TO 
WASHINGTON THAT HAD RAISED "ALL OF ISRAELS REQUESTS" WITH 
DOD AND STATE.  PERETZ ADDED THAT A SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH THE 
SHORT-RANGE ROCKET THREAT WAS ISRAEL'S MOST IMPORTANT AND 
URGENT NEED.  THIS ISSUE ALSO HAD STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, 
SINCE THE ISRAELI PUBLIC WOULD NEVER ACCEPT WITHDRAWING FROM 
THE WEST BANK DUE TO THE FIRING OF QASSAM ROCKETS FROM GAZA 
AFTER ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL.  IF ISRAEL HAD A SYSTEM TO DEFEND 
AGAINST SHORT-RANGE ROCKETS, HOWEVER, IT WOULD OPEN A BROADER 
RANGE OF POLITICAL OPTIONS.  PERETZ ALSO AGREED THAT ISRAEL 
NEEDED TO CONTINUE WITH THE ARROW UPGRADE. 
 
11.  (C) CONCLUDING THE MEETING, PERETZ STATED THAT 
MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE EDGE WAS CRITICAL SINCE IT 
REPRESENTED ISRAEL'S "INSURANCE POLICY."  ISRAEL DID NOT HAVE 
THE LUXURY OF GAMBLING TWICE, HE COMMENTED.  REPRESENTATIVE 
KIRK SAID HE WOULD WATCH OUT FOR THE F-16I, ARROW UPGRADE, 
AND DSP PROGRAMS. 
 
12.  (U) CODEL MCCAIN DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR 
THIS MESSAGE. 
 
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HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/NEA/TELAVIV 
 
YOU CAN ALSO ACCESS THIS SITE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S 
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CRETZ