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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSM #1924/01 3451409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111409Z DEC 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1481
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ALL PARAS MARKED CONFIDENTIAL) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SW
SUBJECT: IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO SWEDEN CALLS ON AMBASSADOR WOOD 
 
STOCKHOLM 00001924  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL WOOD, FOR REASON 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Iraqi Ambassador to Sweden, Ahmad Bamarni, 
visited Ambassador Wood and DCM on December 11 and provided a 
frank reaction to the Baker/Hamilton report, personal views 
on the interests of Iran and Syria in Iraq, comments on the 
sectarian violence, the role of U.S. forces, and the sharing 
of oil revenues.   Ambassador Bamarni described President 
Bush as a man of conviction and of his word, and looked 
forward to upcoming address on 18 December on Iraq policy. 
Ambassador Bamarni is a close associate and former fellow 
comrade-in-arms of President Talabani and had recently 
returned from Paris where he had accompanied Talabani during 
the latter,s visit to France.  Bamarni also speaks well and 
knowledgably about Al-Hakim.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Regarding the local Iraqi expatriate reaction to the 
sentencing in the Saddam trial, Bamarni said that most people 
in his community were happy with the sentence.  He observed 
that this was the verdict and sentence for the murder of 148 
people and that the next case coming up was for the deaths of 
thousands of Kurds, a trial he looks forward to Saddam facing 
(Bamarni is a Kurd).  Barmani reminded us that under the 
Iraqi constitution the death penalty is not to be applied to 
persons 70 years old and above.  Saddam turns 70 in April. 
 
Reaction to Baker/Hamilton Report 
--------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C) Bamarni said that most Iraqis he knows do not like the 
report.  He notes that President Bush is reviewing further 
information, and Ambassador Wood referred to the President,s 
upcoming speech on Iraq on 18 December.  Bamarni said he was 
troubled by the report,s focus on a "global" Middle East 
Resolution as a necessary measure to address Iraq,s internal 
problems.  Regarding the proposal to involve Iran and Syria 
to help the internal situation in Iraq, Bamarni sees their 
interests as distinct from Iraq,s (see further comments in 
paragraphs 7 and 8 below).  Bamarni supported the call for an 
increased focus on the training of Iraqi forces and sees an 
important step being the increasing devolution of 
responsibility of force use and tactics from the Coalition to 
the Government of Iraq.  He supported the call for efforts to 
promote national reconciliation but said he did not see the 
Government of Iraq &accepting8 most of the other points. 
Bamarni complained that the report was too Baghdad-focused 
and did not adequately take into account the different (and 
better) conditions in the North and the South. 
 
Sectarian Violence 
------------------ 
¶4.  (C) In response to Ambassador Wood,s question about what 
should be done to address the sectarian violence, Bamarni 
claimed that Al-Qaida and terrorist organizations have 
successfully taken advantage of the situation.  He said the 
answer was for the Iraqi Army and the local people to take 
the lead and cited the progress at Al-Anbar as a good example 
of what he was talking about.  He cited the good relations 
between major families (Al-Hakim noted asa positive 
influence) in Southern Iraq as a good example of how these 
issues could be addressed.  Concerning the Shiite community 
writ large, he said &you can see the hand of the Iranians8 
in their actions.  He also observed that the instability in 
that community is being influenced by many parties, each for 
their own agenda. 
 
What should we do with Coalition troops? 
---------------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C) In light of the situation Bamarni described, the 
Ambassador asked if the Coalition should withdraw its troops. 
 No, Bamarni said, observing further that there are no other 
forces available to replace their role.  He said it was only 
due to the presence of U.S. and Coalition forces that Iraq,s 
neighbors have not intervened.  He said that if U.S. forces 
withdrew, he could see Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, 
each intervening to pursue their own interests in Iraq.  In 
his view, the quick withdrawal of Coalition forces would 
create a vacuum that would lead to a wider conflict in the 
region. 
 
Sharing of Oil Revenues - How best to do so? 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) Bamarni reminded us that under the Iraqi constitution, 
revenues are supposed to be a national benefit.  He said they 
should go to a special national account from which they would 
be shared on the basis of population and need.  He disparaged 
the thought of them being allocated through a governmental or 
bureaucratic mechanism, but did not offer an alternative. 
 
Iranian and Syrian Agendas - In Iraq and Elsewhere 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶7.  (C) Bamarni said Iran,s main agenda is to be the regional 
actor and power.  Iran,s first goal is to demonstrate that 
nothing in the region can happen without their involvement 
 
STOCKHOLM 00001924  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
and they wish to demonstrate that Iran has the power and 
financial resources to underwrite their aspirations.  The 
second goal is to develop a nuclear weapons program to 
support their regional power aspirations.  Bamarni explained 
that on reflection, these aims have little to do with Iraq 
itself; Iraq is only interesting to the extent that it 
furthers Iran's aspirations. 
 
¶8.  (C) Bamarni saw Syrian interests in Iraq as more modest than 
Iran,s.  He saw Syrian activities in Iraq as being a 
facilitator of Iranian interests.  He said Syria,s second 
motivation to be involved in Iraq was essentially an 
extension of its domestic political desire to ensure nothing 
happens in Iraq that would threaten political stability 
within Syria.  In his view, political stability in Syria was 
fragile and that beyond Iraq, Syria was obviously concerned 
over the investigations of Syrian involvement in political 
assassinations in Lebanon. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment.  A couple of observations.  Bamarni,s views on 
the causes of sectarian violence seemed a little facile and 
meant for our audience.  Of more interest were his comments 
on positive examples of Shiite good governance in the south 
and how the benefits of oil revenues should be allocated, 
both observations that would seem to demonstrate an 
understandable affinity for the Kurdish and Shiite 
communities.  End Comment. 
WOOD