VZCZCXRO0079
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHSM #1921/01 3421104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081104Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1476
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001921 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNAUS EUN VY SR BK IS LE IR
SW 
SUBJECT: SWEDES ON 11/12 DECEMBER GAERC 
 
REF: A. STATE 195044 
     ¶B. STATE 194456 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (c) Polcouns discussed 12/7 with MFA deputy European 
Correspondent Niclas Kvarnstrom the 12/11-12 GAERC topics 
(reftels).  Responses are keyed to the agenda items. 
 
Turkey/EU Accession 
------------------- 
¶2.  (c) Sweden considers itself to be one of the most 
enlargement-friendly countries; FM Bildt has publicly called 
for the EU to keep the EU door open for Turkey.  Bildt 
released a statement 11/8 welcoming the Turkish report that 
Turkey intended to open a harbor to Cypriot ships.  He said 
"this would be a positive step," and was "very significant 
for Turkey's continued process toward membership."  In the 
internal EU debate, Kvarnstrom said Sweden had hoped to 
reduce the number of chapters of "acquis communitaires" 
affected to less than eight, but this might not be possible. 
 
Western Balkans 
--------------- 
¶3.  (c) Kvarnstrom said Sweden's views on Kosovo track very 
closely with our own.  Sweden wants status issue to be 
resolved as early as possible.  According to Kvarnstrom, FM 
Bildt, who has extensive experience in the Balkans, is taking 
a very hands-on approach to all Balkan issues.  According to 
Kvarnstrom, Bildt intervened with UN Envoy Ahtasaari on the 
timing of the submission of his proposals to the parties, 
seeking to ensure that Serbian parliamentary elections did 
not detrimentally affect the status issue.  Sweden wants the 
status issue to be resolved as quickly as possible following 
the Serbian elections. 
 
¶4.  (c) On Serbia, Sweden believes it will be important for 
the EU to send a signal to Serbia giving it a clear prospect 
of eventually joining the EU.  This could be in the form of 
visa facilitation, for example.  At the same time, it was 
important not to compromise on ICTY cooperation. 
 
¶5.  (c) Sweden does not expect Bosnia to be a focus of 
discussion, pending formation of a government there. 
 
Israeli-Palestinian Issues 
-------------------------- 
¶6.  (c) Sweden does not believe the Zapatero/Chirac 
initiative will find sufficient backing in the EU.  Some of 
the proposals, such as to appoint an EU special 
representative, might be supported.  Sweden remains committed 
to the Road Map, the Quartet principles, and a two-state 
solution.  Swedes are concerned about the humanitarian effect 
of continued freezing of the Palestinian customs revenues. 
In the event of the formation of a unity government, and if 
the right signals are sent in regard to adhesion to Quartet 
principles, Sweden believes a greater opening to the 
Palestinians should be considered. 
 
Lebanon 
------- 
¶7.  (c) Sweden believes it is very important to support the 
Siniora government, and has committed a corvette to UNIFIL 
for marine patrolling. 
 
Iran 
---- 
¶8.  (c) Iran is not expected to be a major topic of 
discussion, with action at the UNSC. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
¶9.  (c) Sweden is a large donor to Afghanistan, has a long 
history of a presence there, and currently leads a PRT. 
Sweden believes it is time for the EU to increase its 
engagement in Afghanistan, and will argue for this.  Sweden 
support an increased role in rule of law, and notes there is 
an EU rule of law mission currently reviewing the situation 
in Afghanistan. 
 
China Arms 
---------- 
¶10.  (c) Kvarnstrom said the Sweden felt isolated in December 
2004 when it was "the last country" holding out against the 
French initiative to remove the EU arms embargo against 
China.  Sweden eventually caved in on the issue, but 
eventually reversed its position, and noted that many other 
EU countries did the same following high-level U.S. 
diplomatic interventions underscoring the importance of the 
embargo to the U.S. and Asian security interests.  Kvarnstrom 
welcomed information that this issue was again being raised 
by the U.S. in other EU capitals (ref b), as it would serve 
 
STOCKHOLM 00001921  002 OF 002 
 
 
to prevent another situation where Sweden could find itself 
isolated in opposing a lifting of the EU's China arms embargo. 
WOOD