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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 003214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL XF IR LE UNAUS EUN IT
SUBJECT: ABRAMS ENGAGES ITALIANS ON MEPP, IRAN AND 
SYRIA/LEBANON 
 
REF: ROME 3050 
 
ROME 00003214  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams 
November 27 engaged senior MFA officials, members of the 
Prime Minister's Office and (on background) journalists from 
Italy's leading dailies on Syria/Lebanon, the Middle East 
Peace Process (MEPP) and Iran.  On Syria and Lebanon, he 
noted the need to support Lebanese PM Siniora, bring greater 
economic and political pressure on Syria, and improve efforts 
to prevent arms smuggling to Hizballah.  He said UNIFIL was 
currently failing the test of being a model for future 
deployments in Palestinian areas because it was not working 
energetically enough with the LAF to seize Hizballah arms 
caches.  On the MEPP, Abrams stressed the President's 
continued, strong commitment to a two-state solution and 
cautioned that uncoordinated initiatives such as the recent 
Spanish/French one are unhelpful.  But there have been 
positive signs from both Palestinians and Israelis in recent 
days, and the Quartet and the Roadmap remain the way forward. 
 On Iran, he noted Russia had been unhelpful at the UNSC, and 
while there was movement toward a sanctions resolution, its 
impact would likely be symbolic.  Abrams therefore also 
stressed the need for increased financial pressure on Iran, 
particularly in the banking sector. 
 
¶2. (C)  The Italians said UNIFIL was fulfilling its mandate 
and had had a positive impact by preventing further attacks 
against Israel.  They suggested movement on the Shebaa Farms 
issue could help Siniora.  GOI officials also supported the 
notion of passing a UNSCR on sanctions against Iran quickly 
and working with the USG to develop follow-up mechanisms once 
they join the Security Council in January.  While they agreed 
on the need to keep up pressure on Syria and Iran, they 
expressed concern about getting into a blind tunnel of 
escalation with Tehran, absent greater U.S. engagement with 
Iran.  End Summary. 
 
 
Lebanon/Syria: Press Syria, Support Lebanon 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U)  Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams 
November 27 met separately with Italian MFA Middle East 
Director Cesare Ragaglini, Vice Foreign Minister and Under 
Secretary Ugo Intini, and MFA Director for Political Affairs 
 
SIPDIS 
Guilio Terzi.  Abrams also met with FM D'Alema's Foreign 
Policy Advisor, Marta Dassu', together with PM Prodi's Chief 
Diplomatic Advisor Sannino and Sannino's deputy for the 
Middle East, Marco Carnelos.  Ragaglini was accompanied by 
Minister Sergio Scarantino (DAS equivalent) responsible for 
BMENA and Barcelona Process, Near East Office Director 
Luciano Pezzotti, and Chief of Staff Carlo Formosa.  VFM 
Intini was accompanied by Chief of Staff Minister Giorgio 
Malfatti, Pezzotti and a staffer.  DG Terzi was accompanied 
by Minister Sebastiano Cardi (new DAS equivalent UN 
coordinator); NATO Office Director Minister Gianni Bardini; 
and Nonproliferation and Disarmament Office Director Minister 
Filippo Formica.  Ambassador Spogli attended the meeting with 
Terzi.  Pol M/C and poloff attended all meetings. 
 
¶4. (C)  Abrams stressed to Ragaglini the need to support 
Lebanon and the Siniora government, especially in the face of 
Syrian efforts to use Hizballah to destabilize the Lebanese 
government.  He noted that the timing of the Gemeyel 
assassination coincided with Syrian efforts to derail the 
establishment of the Hariri Tribunal.  Abrams said Syria gets 
the wrong message with high-level visits to Damascus - the 
Syrians don't listen to the messages delivered by their 
interlocutors, however tough.  All they register is the 
presence of a high-level visitor, and it reinforces their 
sense of legitimacy.  He said it was important to figure out 
with the EU a way to pressure Syria to change policy and 
suggested EU countries consider increasing political and 
economic pressure on Damascus. 
 
¶5. (C)  Ragaglini agreed with Abrams on the need to support 
Siniora in order to help Lebanon become truly independent and 
free from foreign influence.  He said there appeared to be 
two avenues to encourage a change in Syrian policies: 
engagement or confrontation.  He suggested starting with 
 
ROME 00003214  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
engagement, because if that doesn't work, we will be better 
positioned to proceed to a policy of confrontation.  He said 
PM Prodi had delivered a strong message to Syrian President 
Bashar al-Asad on the need for Syria to act positively in 
Lebanon.  The Syrian President had protested disingenuously 
that his influence was limited, now that all Syrian troops 
had pulled out of Lebanon at the international community's 
request.  Ragaglini observed that the Hariri tribunal, while 
clearly important, will likely last quite a long time and 
thus could be a factor affecting the country's stability for 
an extended period. 
 
¶6. (C)  (In a later discussion with MFA Multilateral Affairs 
Director Terzi, Abrams noted the problems Siniora's 
government will face when it has to get final parliamentary 
approval for the Hariri tribunal.  He wondered if it would be 
possible for the tribunal to be set up without securing the 
Lebanese parliament's ratification, solely on the basis of a 
UNSCR.  Terzi said while he couldn't recall a precedent for 
such a decision, it might be possible given the Security 
Council's flexible authority.  However, he cautioned that 
some non permanent members of the Security Council, such as 
Argentina, were already complaining about the Security 
Council's enlargement of its authority in the recent past 
(specifically on non-proliferation issues) and they, or other 
non-permanent members, such as South Africa, might try to 
block such an attempt.) 
 
¶7. (C)  Abrams said he agreed with much of Ragaglini's 
analysis but said we are not starting from scratch in our 
dealings with Syria.  The U.S. had tried the path of 
engagement, and had sent Secretary Powell and other 
high-level visitors to Damascus, but the Syrians keep making 
the wrong decisions.  Bashar made the wrong decision in Iraq 
and he is making the wrong decisions in Lebanon.  Of course 
it cannot yet be said for certain that Syria was behind the 
Hariri killing, but their efforts to thwart the tribunal 
would lead one to believe they were.  The Syrians are 
supporting the most extreme Palestinian terrorist groups. 
The series of assassinations of anti-Syrian politicians and 
journalists in Lebanon in the recent past indicates that 
Damascus is not changing course.  Finally, the Syrians are 
not fulfilling their obligations under UNSCR 1559 or 1701. 
So the situation is already fairly advanced and engagement 
has not brought about positive behavior; therefore, the time 
has come to increase economic and political pressure. 
 
¶8. (C)  PM Prodi's Chief Diplomatic Advisor Sannino said 
Siniora had told Prodi movement on the issue of Shebaa farms 
would help strengthen his domestic position.  Sannino 
suggested even small movement on the issue could help and 
suggested placing the territory under UN-administered 
control.  Abrams acknowledged that this was Siniora's view, 
and while the Israelis might even eventually buy into it, he 
was skeptical such action would have the desired effect. 
This is because the Shebaa Farms issue is likely only a 
pretext, and if that is the case, then even if the disputed 
area were put under UN control, there would be nothing to 
prevent Syria/Hizballah from inventing another pretext for 
Hizballah to retain its arms.  Sannino appreciated Abrams' 
analysis but suggested it might be worth trying, since doing 
so was unlikely to have negative consequences.  He asked 
Abrams if the U.S. would support an Italian push, on 
Siniora's behalf, toward some resolution on Shebaa farms. 
Abrams said yes. 
 
MEPP - Possible Beginning of a Virtuous Cycle 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Abrams told Ragaglini that the so-called 
Spanish-French Middle East peace Initiative had been 
uncoordinated and unhelpful.  The Israelis had already 
rejected it.  Ragaglini noted that on November 24 there had 
been a meeting in Rome of the "Quint", an ad hoc EU Middle 
East coordinating group within the EU that had no formal 
status.  He explained that after the intra-EU discord 
following the surprise Spanish announcement, the Italians had 
called a Quint meeting at the MFA Mid-East Director level to 
coordinate a position.  Ragaglini assured Abrams that it was 
agreed by participants at the Rome meeting that there would 
be no more uncoordinated initiatives.  EU initiatives would 
be coordinated not only at the Quint level, but with Solana, 
the full EU 25, Quartet partners, and finally with Israel and 
the moderate Arabs.  That said, Italy and other European 
countries accord priority attention to the Middle East. 
 
ROME 00003214  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Instability there affects the security of Europe -- its 
security, stability, commerce, and energy supply. 
 
¶10. (C)  Abrams underscored President Bush's commitment to a 
two-state solution and pointed out that the U.S. would not 
try to force a solution in order to fit the timing of our 
election calendar.  But there had been some positive signs 
lately.  A deal on a Palestinian government of national unity 
was likely and could start a virtuous cycle, especially in 
light of the recent cease-fire and Israeli PM Olmert's recent 
speech.  Once Israeli prisoner Shalit has been released, 
regular Olmert-Abbas meetings can begin, more prisoners can 
be released and the overall tone could improve.  He noted 
that not only were Israel and the Palestinians trying, but 
the Egyptians and Saudis were also engaging, which was 
encouraging. 
 
¶11. (C)  Ragaglini said we all agree the status quo is not an 
option.  Other senior MFA officials echoed this sentiment, 
saying there was a new sense of urgency on this issue, a 
sense that the situation was worsening.  Ragaglini said he 
spoke November 26 to FM D'Alema who was glad the Israelis 
were showing restraint and that the cease-fire was holding. 
He said the European Union was ready to support a PA 
government that substantially reflects the Quartet 
principles.  Ragaglini said a degree of ambiguity might be 
necessary, e.g. on the question of the formula for expressing 
recognition of Israel.  For the EU, another issue is the 
composition of the government, e.g. who will be the Finance 
Minister, since it will be a priority to track where the 
money goes. 
 
¶12. (C)  Abrams said the choice of Minister of the Interior 
was also important, given the issue of security force reform. 
 The Israelis have agreed in principle to the Palestinian 
Badr Brigade deploying to Gaza from Jordan; however, General 
Dayton has said they would need a few months of training 
before they will be ready to be deployed.  Abrams said it 
would be better to have a truce on the ground first before 
deploying the Badr Brigade in order not to put them in 
confrontation with Hamas from the beginning.  He also said 
the U.S. remains concerned about arms smuggling.  Ragaglini 
suggested the best way to crack down on arms smuggling would 
be to increase the number of Egyptian border guards along the 
Gaza border. 
 
UNIFIL: Failing Test as Model for Gaza 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C)  Abrams said if UNIFIL is a test case for future 
deployments, it is failing that test so far.  It has not 
succeeded in preventing the flow of arms from Syria.  UNIFIL 
and the LAF are both careful not to challenge Hizballah.  The 
consequence is that Israel looks at it as a failed experiment 
and not as a possible model for future deployments in Gaza. 
Ragaglini said it was important for Italy that UNIFIL be a 
success.  Italy evaluates UNIFIL positively though it can 
always be improved.  UNIFIL can't seal the border with Syria 
but it can control movement in the south and prevent 
confrontation with Israel.  UNIFIL is fulfilling its mandate 
and has had a positive impact by preventing further attacks 
against Israel.  But Israeli overflights are disturbing. 
Italy has asked Israel to halt the most provocative of 
overflights, e.g. over Beirut and over French troops.  Abrams 
said the U.S. had done the same, although there was still a 
legitimate requirement for some intelligence collection. 
 
IRAN: Sanctions and Economic Pressure 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C)  Abrams engaged Vice FM Intini and DG for Political 
and Multilateral Affairs Terzi on Iran.  He said Ahmadinejad 
and other hardliners in Iran could argue that their approach 
has succeeded so far.  Absent some consequences for Iran, 
therefore, it was hard to see why they would choose to change 
course or feel a need to get the diplomatic process back on 
track.  Abrams noted Russia had been unhelpful at the UNSC, 
and while there was movement toward passing a UNSC sanctions 
resolution before the new year, its impact would likely be 
symbolic.  Abrams also stressed the need for increased 
financial pressure on Iran, particularly in the banking 
sector.  He noted the need to continue increasing the 
pressure via banks working with Iran, and especially pointing 
out the risk that they could be unwittingly assisting in 
Iran's nuclear/missile procurement.  Such concrete 
 
ROME 00003214  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
consequences, coupled with the symbolic blow of UN sanctions, 
could have an effect on the Iranian economy and public 
opinion.  The Iranian government is not popular.  The strong 
desire of the government to avoid sanctions suggests they are 
concerned about the domestic impact. 
 
¶15. (C)  Abrams said the USG hopes for Italian support for 
UNSC sanctions and cooperation on increasing other financial 
pressures.  Iran is not just dangerous because of its nuclear 
ambitions but because of its support for Palestinian 
extremists, its support for Hizballah in Lebanon, and its 
role in Iraq supplying arms to groups killing U.S. forces. 
 
¶16. (C)  Both Intini and Terzi said Italy would support an 
initial round of sanctions and agreed that such sanctions 
would not destroy the possibility for negotiations.  Terzi 
echoed Abrams' concern regarding the Russian position, saying 
Italy agreed the time for sanctions was now, and offering 
Italian cooperation with the U.S. on follow-up measures 
(sanctions committee or other monitoring of the resolution,) 
once Italy takes its Security Council seat in January.  Terzi 
hoped Italy would be consulted early and often now that it 
will be taking its Security Council seat. 
 
¶17. (C)  Terzi noted Abrams' request for assistance with 
tougher financial pressures on Iran and said he would share 
it with Minister D'Alema.  He said the "lack of a clear 
financial framework" for dealing with Iran (as apposed to the 
framework that exists for North Korea) makes things more 
difficult.  (Note:  The GOI has stated similar concerns in 
recent conversations with senior USG officials, per ROME 
3050.)  However, Terzi said the Italians were beginning to 
take action.  He said the Bank of Italy had reduced its 
credit exposure vis-a-vis the Bank of Iran; additionally, he 
said SACE's reduction of its exposure in Iran is particularly 
significant for Italy, given Italy's trade position with 
Iran.  Regarding Bank Sepah, Terzi referred to ongoing GOI 
exchanges on how to limit activity. 
The director of the MFA's Office for Disarmament and 
Non-proliferation, Filippo Formica, pointed out that Italy is 
an active participant in the Paris G7 exercise to build a new 
framework for countering proliferation finance.  He said 
Italy is very committed to the success of the exercise. 
 
¶18. (C)  On the internal struggle in Iran, Intini agreed the 
current regime is unpopular, but cautioned that perceived 
external threats could favor extremists, not moderates.  He 
said UN sanctions could be used by the regime to justify its 
actions to the Iranian public.   Both Intini and Terzi agreed 
Iran needed to understand it could not split the West; Europe 
will not let itself be divided over the issue, nor will it 
let itself be split from the U.S.  According to Intini, Iran 
appears to want three things: ensure against regime change; 
avoid future military attacks; and, most importantly, obtain 
recognition, in particular from the U.S., of its role as a 
key player in the region.  While Intini and Terzi agreed on 
the need to keep the pressure on Iran, they expressed concern 
on about getting into a blind tunnel of escalation, absent 
some form of increased U.S. engagement with Iran. 
 
U.S./Italy UNSC Cooperation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C)  Abrams asked Intini, Terzi and PM Diplomatic Advisor 
Sannino for Italian support at the UN to help us avoid being 
put in the position of having to use our veto on unhelpful 
Middle East resolutions, such as the recent one originally 
sponsored by Qatar.  Terzi agreed that the Security Council 
should not be used as a venue to create additional venom and 
expressed concern over a recent trend to split the EU vote. 
He said Italy is planning to coordinate with the EU 
presidencies on common EU positions (which he noted might not 
always be the same as the U.S. position.)  It was important 
for the U.S. to have clarity on the EU position and important 
for the EU to unify its position in order to have more clout 
on the Council.  Abrams agreed, and noted that European 
freelancing and announcements such as the recent 
Spanish/French initiative undermine the EU goal of a unified 
and coordinated foreign policy.  On Middle East peace process 
issues, coordinating and working through the Quartet would be 
most useful. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
ROME 00003214  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶20.  (C) The Italians greatly appreciated the opportunity to 
engage with Abrams on the peace process, Iran, and 
Lebanon/Syria, all issues that are top foreign policy 
priorities for them.  It was also an opportunity for us to 
administer a useful antidote to some exaggerated political 
speculation, mainly on the left, about the possible impact of 
midterm elections on US foreign policy.  Abrams made clear, 
especially with the journalists, that the Administration 
remained in place, and that there will be policy continuity. 
Even on Iraq, which was undoubtedly an election issue, the 
much-discussed study group will propose, but the President 
will dispose.  GOI officials reflected governmental angst 
about the possible fallout for Europe's stability, 
prosperity, and security if there is no serious movement on 
the Middle East peace process.  Abrams's message of 
Administration commitment, and the possibility of a virtuous 
cycle starting, was therefore particularly welcome.  The 
Italians clearly shared our concern about the threat to the 
Lebanese government's stability by Syria and its allies.  And 
Abrams strongly countered a few polite probes on the 
practicality of enhanced engagement with Syria, pointing out 
that this had already been tried.  On Iran, the Italians 
agreed completely on the need to move to UN sanctions, and on 
coordinating more effective financial pressure, but with 
their substantial economic/commercial ties to Iran they were 
also clearly uneasy about where the process was heading.  And 
that is because, in their analysis, the holy grail for Iran 
is not really the bomb; and it is not anything that Italy or 
the EU can provide; rather, it is respect, recognition, and 
engagement from the U.S.  End Comment. 
 
¶21.  (U) DNSA Elliott Abrams cleared this cable. 
SPOGLI