VZCZCXRO5403
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRH #8989/01 3381338
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041338Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3611
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0471
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 008989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE PASS TO GPERSON AND AALVAREZ 
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 
TAGS: EPET PGOV PINR PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: MOI UNDERSCORES NEED FOR BROAD AND FLEXIBLE ENERGY 
FACILITIES SECURITY COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 8836 
     ¶B. RIYADH 8811 
     ¶C. RIYADH 5781 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Robert Silverman for reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
-------- 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  Economic Counselor Silverman and Energy Attache Ross 
met with Dr. Saad al-Jabri, Advisor to the Assistant Minister 
of Interior, on November 26 to discuss the draft Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation to improve security at 
critical infrastructure facilities.  Dr. al-Jabri underscored 
the SAG's request for a wide-ranging, long-term, and flexible 
partnership with the USG to protect critical Saudi Arabian 
infrastructure.  He indicated the MOI had decided in 
principle to purchase 30 Sikorsky helicopters, but the 
proposed delivery date presented a significant obstacle.  Dr. 
al-Jabri also expressed both in this meeting, and in several 
other late night discussions, worries regarding Al Qaida 
recruitment of Saudis from the northern part of the Kingdom, 
many of whom share tribal ties with Iraqi Sunnis.  "We will 
have a rough six months ahead," he predicted. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
SAG Seeks a Long-Term Security Relationship 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  Dr. al-Jabri underscored his consistent message 
(refs A and C): the SAG is seeking a long-term security 
relationship with the USG on critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP), which they hope will go far beyond 
protection of a handful of pre-determined sites.  He views 
the proposed MOU as a strategic document to broadly define 
the cooperation.  He noted his concern that language 
referring to a long-term partnership had been removed from 
the draft MOU, and requested it be re-inserted.  He was 
perturbed with changes which narrowed the scope of proposed 
cooperation.  While Dr. al-Jabri agreed the initial focus of 
this cooperation should be on energy infrastructure, he 
emphasized the need for a flexible agreement which coudl 
encompass a variety of potential targets, saying "threats are 
changing from one day to the next." 
 
¶3.  (S)  Dr. al Jabri argued the MOU must provide flexibility 
to allow the Joint Working Group (JWG) of experts to do their 
job to evaluate and implement plans to protect critical 
infrastructure.  If the MOU pre-judges which facilities are 
included in the CIP program, he told us the JWG experts would 
be hamstrung and unable to respond to rapidly evolving 
threats.  For example, Dr. al-Jabri noted that an attack on 
one of Saudi Arabia,s key three power plants would shut down 
all oil production and exports, while an attack on a facility 
such as Qateef Junction would shut down "only" six million 
barrels per day.  Finally, he noted Saudi Aramco, not the 
MOI, would make the determination as to which petroleum 
infrastructure were considered "critical." 
 
--------------------------------- 
JWG Should Evaluate and Designate 
Critical Infrastructure Sites 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  Dr. al-Jabri indicated only the expert JWG should 
make any designations of critical infrastructure.  The first 
meeting of the JWG  is now planned to take place during an 
MOI delegation's early December visit to Washington DC.  Dr. 
al-Jabri and the other meeting participants agreed among the 
JWG's first tasks should be the development of criteria for 
selection of critical infrastructure sites.  To date, there 
has been no comprehensive joint analysis of criteria for 
designating various forms of critical infrastructure, nor 
discussion of which facilities would meet designated 
criteria.  While the DOE-DOS infrastructure protection team 
selected Ras Tanura, Abqaiq Oil Processing plants, and the 
Qateef pipeline Junction as priority energy sites, Saudi and 
U.S. technical experts have not made a comprehensive 
assessment of other critical sites, including power and water 
infrastructure, which could also impact petroleum production 
and exports.  Dr. al-Jabri is also concerned with sites which 
impact the ability of the SAG to govern and ensure the 
security of the Saudi population. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
HRH Bin Nayif Prepared to Sign Broad MOU 
Which Avoids Prescriptive Details 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Finally, Dr. al-Jabri noted that if the CIP MOU 
broadly outlined the nature of the government-to-government 
cooperation, HRH Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, Deputy Minister 
of Interior, would be prepared to sign the document during 
his early December visit to Washington.  However, the MOI did 
not consider it appropriate for HRH to sign a document which 
outlined  minutiae, such as financial details or a detailed 
work program.  The MOI views these details as appropriate for 
discussion and implementation by the JWG at the working 
level.  Dr. al-Jabri further noted the MOU should only 
discuss issues relevant to both governments, not issues 
relating to internal USG administrative procedures.  As an 
aside, Dr. al-Jabri indicated there were ample funds in the 
MOI's modernization program to handle reasonable expenses 
associated with the program. 
 
------------------------------- 
MOI needs the MOU To Cooperate 
Efficiently and Effectively 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Dr. al-Jabri reiterated the value of the MOU from 
his perspective is to provide cover to MOI staff to work 
directly with the USG without having to jump over significant 
SAG bureaucratic impediments.  He told us three weeks prior, 
Saudi ministries had again received a notice forbidding 
meetings with foreign diplomats without MFA approval.  Dr. 
al-Jabri believes efficiently working with the full range USG 
experts on urgent facilities security will be impossible the 
facilitating mechanisms the MOU provides. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Finally, Dr. al-Jabri re-iterated earlier statements 
regarding the need for an MOU to institutionalize 
cooperation.  He hinted he may move on from his position 
within a few months, possibly by promotion or retirement, and 
is seeking a mechanism to ensure the continuity of the CIP 
program. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Aramco: On the Defensive on Security Issues, 
and an Issue to Manage for the MOI 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Dr. al-Jabri outlined his perspective on Saudi 
Aramco's relationship to the MOI CIP initiative.  He praised 
Saudi Aramco's industrial safety practices, but said the 
company does not pay enough attention to security issues.  He 
stated Saudi Aramco officials become "defensive" when their 
security practices come under scrutiny from MOI.  Dr. 
al-Jabri noted MOI would bring Saudi Aramco into the CIP 
program discussion soon, but wished to exclude them from 
policies and guideline discussions more appropriate for a 
government-government forum.  He frankly believes Saudi 
Aramco would present an impediment during such discussions. 
Once the USG and SAG JWG determines CIP program policies and 
guidelines,  the High Commission on Industrial Security, 
chaired by HRH Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, Deputy Minister of 
the Interior, would communicate them to Saudi Aramco. 
 
¶9.  (C)  (Note:  Despite MOI claims that they can order Saudi 
Aramco to cooperate with the CIP program via the High 
Commission on Industrial Security, we have experienced 
difficulties with MOI's practical ability to broker access to 
Aramco facilities.  Saudi Aramco officials have instead 
claimed they take their orders from the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources (MOPR).  While MOI eventually plans to bring the 
MOPR to the table on this initiative, the timing and manner 
of MOPR's involvement remain vague.  We will continue to 
monitor and discuss appropriate access to Aramco facilities 
for officials working on the CIP program.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Helicopter Purchase May Hinge on Delivery Date 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10.  (S)  Discussing procurement of systems under the CIP 
effort, Dr. al-Jabri told us the MOI had decided to purchase 
30 Sikorsky helicopters.  He indicated funds had been 
allocated for the purchase.  However, he stated Sikorsky was 
attempting to shift the delivery date, putting the purchase 
in jeopardy.  If Sikorsky re-instated the original delivery 
date, the sale could be completed, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Iranian Intentions and Influence vis a vis Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶11.  (S)  Dr. al-Jabri discussed his deep concerns with the 
Iran's long-term strategic interests and the challenge this 
presents to Saudi Arabia.  He is deeply pre-occupied with 
growing Iranian influence in the region, stating that if 
Tehran obtains a nuclear bomb, Riyadh, not Tel Aviv, would 
likely be the first target.  He noted Iran wanted Iraq's 
Shi'a areas, while Jordan's  and Turkey's long historical 
ties to parts of Iraq also led them to territorial 
aspirations.  He underscored the SAG's long-term interest in 
a "united, Arab Iraq," and stated every neighbor of Iraq 
except Saudi Arabia has some territorial interest in some 
piece of Iraq.  Discussing the precarious situation in Iraq, 
he stated the USG had requested assistance from the SAG in 
reaching out to Iraqi Sunni leaders.  In turn, he said the 
SAG had asked for a formal request of assistance from the 
USG, but despite the SAG's willingness to help, no such 
request had ever been forthcoming. 
 
¶12.  (S)At another point in our conversation, Dr. al-Jabri 
commented on the US congressional elections that "the 
terrorists are celebrating."    He explained that al-Qaida 
and the Iranians both were misinterpreting the results as a 
weakening of US will in IRaq.  Asked if he saw any 
operational results from this, he pointed to increasing 
recruiting in Syria, and chatter that the MOI picks up of 
operations being planned.  "We will have a rough six months 
ahead," he predicted, adding that the Mubahith are on 
heightened alert. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Internal Security: Al Qaida Recruiting 
Shi'a in the North of Saudi Arabia 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S)  Turning to internal security challenges, Dr. 
al-Jabri stated al Qaida recruiters frequently targeted 
Saudis residing in the north of the country.  He lamented, 
"We are fighting a hidden war, and our own people are being 
recruited to fight against us."  He emphasized the deep 
tribal and family ties which bind Saudi and Iraqi Sunnis in 
the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border region.  He stated prior to 
9/11, al Qaida had recruited in the south of Saudi Arabia, 
from al-Ghamdi and Qahtani tribes while now they were seeing 
recruits from the north, from the Shammari and Anaiza tribes. 
 He also claimed there were Al Qaida sleeper cells in Qateef, 
Eastern Province. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Dr. al-Jabri is Assistant Minister Muhammad bin 
Naif's "go to" man on a range of issues, including on the 
energy facilities protection initiative.  Like several other 
key staff of Prince Muhammad, he has an extensive academic 
background, including in his case a PhD in Arabic grammar 
from al-Imam University in Riyadh, and a PhD in computer 
science form the US. He is from al-Qasim in northern Saudi 
Arabia. 
OBERWETTER