Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06NICOSIA2052, UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06NICOSIA2052.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NICOSIA2052 2006-12-20 15:50 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO0190
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #2052/01 3541550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201550Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7353
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0730
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 002052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY
SUBJECT: UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Hosting local Perm Five ambassadors and the 
resident UN chief to a working lunch December 18, the 
Ambassador orchestrated a tour d'horizon that touched on the 
UN transition in New York, horsetrading over the UNFICYP 
mandate renewal, developments on the UN negotiating track in 
Nicosia, the December 17 municipal elections, Turkey's EU 
track, and friction within the Cypriot MFA's ranks.  UN 
Special Representative Michael Moller opened the discussion 
by refuting rumors he would soon abandon Cyprus for New York 
and a position on incoming SYG Ban Ki-Moon's team.  Job 
jockeying was consuming his colleagues' days, however, as 
Moon likely would fill fifty positions in the next few 
months.  Turning to the Cyprus Problem, Moller voiced 
satisfaction with the UNFICYP renewal process, which he'd 
witnessed first-hand in New York.  While there, he also had 
netted "seed money" to fund costs related to a potential UN 
Good Offices mission re-start.  The UN mediator would host 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators later December 
18; he worried, however, that mutual mistrust still plagued 
the sides' relations.  Property issues likely would dominate 
the meeting, Moller thought. 
 
2.  (C) Ambassadors broke down the results of Cyprus's 
day-earlier local elections.  All agreed the 
something-for-everyone results gave neither the coalition nor 
opposition a mandate, and were unlikely to force a Cyprus 
Problem change of tack by President Tassos Papdopoulos. 
Turkish EU accession also made the discussion, with the 
Ambassador's British and French counterparts claiming that 
Brussels had tired of the twice-yearly crises the process 
brought.  Germany hoped to focus its presidency on the EU 
Constitution, not on enlargement issues, they added.  Lunch 
concluded with invitees dissecting Cypriot Foreign Minister 
Lillikas's recent and future personnel moves.  The FM hoped 
to shake up the listless ministry, they concurred, but faced 
opposition from potent unions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Polishing Resumes in the Big Apple 
---------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Moller days earlier had returned from New York, where 
he had presented the Secretary General's report on Cyprus to 
the Security Council.  Numerous colleagues there were 
lobbying hard for jobs in the incoming Ban Ki-Moon 
administration. Not Moller.  "I'd rather serve in Baghdad," 
the UN mediator chuckled.  "Rumors of my imminent departure 
are just that -- rumors."  Personnel matters would consume 
Moon's time for the near future, Moller asserted.  First, he 
would need to name his deputy.  Sources close to the South 
Korean claimed Moon wanted a female candidate from a 
third-world nation; Egyptian Minister of State for 
International Cooperation Fayza Abul-Naga, a Jordanian, and a 
Saudi topped the prospect list.  Up next were the UN's 
dozen-plus under secretary slots, plus executive positions in 
the specialized agencies.  All told, Moller thought Moon 
would replace fifty UN diplomats in the coming quarter. 
Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari, who brokered the 
July 8 negotiating framework which UNFICYP was attempting to 
shepherd, would move on, but not until late February. 
"Hopefully we'll see movement before then," Moller added. 
Cyprus did not figure high on the incoming SYG's priority 
list, however. 
 
4.  (C) Security Council deliberations on the latest UNFICYP 
mandate resolution had gone smoothly, especially compared to 
the bickering that had occurred during the prior go-round in 
June.  Its language, while muted somewhat from earlier UK 
drafts, sent the message that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
needed to get serious, Moller asserted.  Japan, always 
concerned about its UN peacekeeping expenditures, had sought 
to review UNFICYP troop levels.  Moller's response -- that 
UNFICYP could get no smaller without a reduced mandate -- 
seemed to satisfy Tokyo.  Before departing New York, Moller 
visited UN bean-counters and acquired "seed money" to fund 
partially the technical committees and expert working groups 
the Gambari Process envisaged.  "But we'll still come around, 
hat in hand, in the coming months," the SRSG promised.  UK 
High Commissioner Peter Millet agreed that the December 
UNFICYP rollover exercise was nearly painless. "Gambari laid 
out the premise of political equality of the communities, and 
both leaders accepted it.  As such, there was no reason for 
the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to get bogged down in the 
sides-versus-communities nonsense." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Getting the Local Process Unstuck 
 
NICOSIA 00002052  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Moller announced he would host Cypriot negotiators 
Tasos Tzionis and Rasit Pertev at UNFICYP HQ later December 
18.  He intended to push hard on both. (Note:  Moller's 
deputy informed us December 19 that the Moller-Tzionis-Pertev 
gathering, while "frank," offered no breakthroughs.  End 
Note)  Fundamental mistrust characterized the Turkish 
Cypriot-Greek Cypriot relationship, Moller lamented; building 
trust appeared his toughest task.  Tackling substance 
appeared a distant prospect, with the sides still debating 
process.  The latest sticking point concerned real property. 
Pertev saw land exchange as a final settlement issue, and 
therefore grist for the expert working groups.  Greek 
Cypriots considered it a everyday life issue, however, and 
thus a technical committee responsibility.  Moller's pitch to 
the disputing parties?  Let both bodies tackle the real 
estate problem. 
 
6.  (C) Rather optimistic, the SRSG thought as many as seven 
working groups and nine technical committees could start work 
immediately after community leaders Papadopoulos and Mehmet 
Ali Talat assented.  Their "green light" was not that far 
off, Moller believed; he described the process of 
synchronizing the sides' agendas as "two-thirds complete." 
Similarly, he expected progress soon on confidence building 
measures, primarily the long-delayed opening of the Ledra 
Street checkpoint.  Both communities had agreed in principle 
to the step, Moller declared; details, especially concerning 
resupply of Turkish troops along the Green Line, remained 
unresolved.  EU funding, channeled through its PFF program, 
would cover "beautification" of the checkpoint surroundings, 
he added.  With enhanced CBMs and movement on Gambari, Moller 
hoped to see the negative environment surrounding bi-communal 
interaction to diminish somewhat. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Municipal Election Results No Boon for Solution 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7.  (C) From the UN process, the conversation segued into the 
December 17 municipal elections.  Cypriot voters had rewarded 
Papadopoulos's AKEL-DIKO-EDEK coalition with mayorships in 
five key municipalities.  But opposition DISY, too, had 
claimed victory, having garnered more votes than any other 
single party.  The ambassadors and Moller agreed the results 
presented neither side a clear mandate, nor did they portend 
a Cyprus Problem policy correction.  Had AKEL's high-profile, 
pro-solution candidates lost in Nicosia and Limassol, party 
leaders might have taken a second look at the benefits of 
coalition membership, believed French Charge Eric Sanson. 
With wins, however, AKEL seemed content, and surely would 
stay with Papadopoulos through the 2008 presidential 
elections.  To keep progressive, pro-solution AKEL voters in 
the fold, all thought Papadopoulos would "play nice" on the 
UN process, although he was likely to defer serious 
substantive decisions as long as possible. 
 
8.  (C) How does Papadopoulos feel he is doing? the 
Ambassador pondered.  Domestic factors, mainly the election 
results and the President's continued high approval numbers, 
likely left him feeling fine, the Ambassador reasoned.  On 
foreign policy and his handling of the Cyprus Problem, the 
story looked different.  Nicosia's hard-line stance vis-a-vis 
Turkey's EU accession had left Cyprus isolated at the recent 
Council summit, and even daily of record "Phileleftheros" -- 
normally the staunchest of allies -- had criticized the 
administration's strategies.  Nonetheless, Papadopoulos was 
unlikely to chart a major course change anytime soon. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Brussels "Fed up" with Turkey-Cyprus Bickering 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9.  (C) Speaking for his EU colleagues, High Commissioner 
Millet noted Brussels' frustrations with the wrangling over 
Turkey's EU accession, and Cyprus's intent to utilize it in 
extracting CyProb concessions from Ankara.  "Every six months 
a crisis," he vented, and each kept the EU from tackling more 
pressing matters.  According to his German Foreign Ministry 
contacts, Berlin hoped to focus on the EU Constitution, not 
on accession, during its January-June 2007 Presidency.  But 
it was unlikely Germany could "hide" from Turkey issues for 
long, Millet ventured, since pro-Turkey forces within the EU 
would soon push to open those Acquis chapters which the 
recent Council conclusions had not locked. 
 
10.  (C) Finland's presidency had erred in seeking to open 
chapters at the COREPER immediately following the Council 
 
NICOSIA 00002052  003 OF 003 
 
 
summit, Sanson argued.  Opposition from Cyprus was a 
near-guarantee, as Papadopoulos -- feeling heat locally for 
not delivering greater penalties for Turkey -- could 
ill-afford another Brussels setback.  Laying low for a brief 
period appeared a better tactic; the German Presidency likely 
would have faced little EU opposition in quietly pushing for 
renewed negotiations at the technical level, the French 
diplomat believed. 
 
11.  (C)  Mentioning recent media accounts regarding Turkish 
Cypriots' request of UK aviation authorities for direct 
flights between north Cyprus and Great Britain, Russian 
Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko asked Millet for the current 
state of play.  FCO legal experts continued to study the 
application and relevant international conventions, the High 
Commissioner replied.  PM Tony Blair's recent message in 
Turkey, that Britain wished to initiate direct air service if 
international law permitted, was not hyperbole.  The "if" was 
mighty big, however.  Millet relayed his government's 
attorneys' initial findings:  that requests to commence 
international flights, under the Chicago Convention, must 
originate in internationally recognized states.  Grasping at 
straws, "TRNC President" Talat was even seeking U.S. 
assistance with UK regulators, the Ambassador added, 
referring to the Turkish Cypriot leader's December 4 letter 
to the Secretary.  Washington would not attempt to influence 
this internal British decision, he added.  Miller made clear 
that this would be the proper USG response. 
 
--------------------- 
Moves Afoot a the MFA 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Lunch concluded with ambassadors and Moller 
analyzing RoC Foreign Minister George Lillikas's personnel 
moves.  Millet claimed Lillikas was furious with diplomats' 
working hours; by five p.m., he was often left alone, and 
personally had to respond to requests for instructions from 
Cypriot ambassadors in western Europe and North America. 
Effecting workplace changes meant taking on powerful unions, 
however, always a challenge on Cyprus.  Lillikas faced an 
even tougher union battle, the Ambassador opined, should he 
attempt to implement a pet project -- bringing in political 
appointees for high-ranking MFA slots. 
 
13.  (C) The permanent secretary ("D" equivalent) would go to 
a career diplomat, however.  Lillikas continued to ponder 
possibilities, the Ambassador noted, with Acting PermSec 
Alexander Zenon and Cyprus Problem Political Director (U/S 
equivalent) Erato Marcoullis -- the RoC's former ambassador 
in Washington -- the leading candidates.  At least two other 
PolDir slots likely would turn over in coming months. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
14.  (C) A convergence of factors leaves us guardedly 
optimistic we'll see some CyProb movement on the UN track in 
2007.  Moller's decision to re-up is one.  A solid mediator 
equally frustrated with both communities' leaders, the Dane 
has done commendable work keeping them on speaking terms; his 
departure and his replacement's learning curve could have 
cost us six months, easy.  Similarly, Gambari's institutional 
memory on Cyprus and the respect he commands here are 
beneficial, even if, as Moller claims, he leaves DPA in two 
months.  Kofi Annan's last UNSC report on Cyprus, 
particularly his admonition not to take UNFICYP's presence 
for granted, garnered major press in south Nicosia and sent 
the signal that the status quo does not satisfy Cyprus's 
long-time mediator.  The governing coalition's municipal 
elections results were not so horrid as to force Papadopoulos 
to soften his Cyprus Problem stance, but not so grand as to 
convince him he could stall forever.  Last, the latest 
Turkey-EU crisis has passed, with the RoC definitely not 
victorious in the European Council.  From their European 
partners' reactions in Brussels, Papadopoulos, Lillikas and 
company must be getting the message that the EU wants out of 
the CyProb business. 
 
15.  (C) In our private meetings and public comments, we will 
push both sides to support the UN process and negotiate in 
good faith.  In our opening salvo, the Ambassador's New 
Year's message, he urges the sides "to focus on what unites, 
not what divides," in hopes of ending the unacceptable 
division of the island.  Public Affairs expects to place the 
piece in leading dailies island-wide. 
Schlicher