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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7353
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0730
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 002052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY
SUBJECT: UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Hosting local Perm Five ambassadors and the 
resident UN chief to a working lunch December 18, the 
Ambassador orchestrated a tour d'horizon that touched on the 
UN transition in New York, horsetrading over the UNFICYP 
mandate renewal, developments on the UN negotiating track in 
Nicosia, the December 17 municipal elections, Turkey's EU 
track, and friction within the Cypriot MFA's ranks.  UN 
Special Representative Michael Moller opened the discussion 
by refuting rumors he would soon abandon Cyprus for New York 
and a position on incoming SYG Ban Ki-Moon's team.  Job 
jockeying was consuming his colleagues' days, however, as 
Moon likely would fill fifty positions in the next few 
months.  Turning to the Cyprus Problem, Moller voiced 
satisfaction with the UNFICYP renewal process, which he'd 
witnessed first-hand in New York.  While there, he also had 
netted "seed money" to fund costs related to a potential UN 
Good Offices mission re-start.  The UN mediator would host 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators later December 
18; he worried, however, that mutual mistrust still plagued 
the sides' relations.  Property issues likely would dominate 
the meeting, Moller thought. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassadors broke down the results of Cyprus's 
day-earlier local elections.  All agreed the 
something-for-everyone results gave neither the coalition nor 
opposition a mandate, and were unlikely to force a Cyprus 
Problem change of tack by President Tassos Papdopoulos. 
Turkish EU accession also made the discussion, with the 
Ambassador's British and French counterparts claiming that 
Brussels had tired of the twice-yearly crises the process 
brought.  Germany hoped to focus its presidency on the EU 
Constitution, not on enlargement issues, they added.  Lunch 
concluded with invitees dissecting Cypriot Foreign Minister 
Lillikas's recent and future personnel moves.  The FM hoped 
to shake up the listless ministry, they concurred, but faced 
opposition from potent unions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Polishing Resumes in the Big Apple 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Moller days earlier had returned from New York, where 
he had presented the Secretary General's report on Cyprus to 
the Security Council.  Numerous colleagues there were 
lobbying hard for jobs in the incoming Ban Ki-Moon 
administration. Not Moller.  "I'd rather serve in Baghdad," 
the UN mediator chuckled.  "Rumors of my imminent departure 
are just that -- rumors."  Personnel matters would consume 
Moon's time for the near future, Moller asserted.  First, he 
would need to name his deputy.  Sources close to the South 
Korean claimed Moon wanted a female candidate from a 
third-world nation; Egyptian Minister of State for 
International Cooperation Fayza Abul-Naga, a Jordanian, and a 
Saudi topped the prospect list.  Up next were the UN's 
dozen-plus under secretary slots, plus executive positions in 
the specialized agencies.  All told, Moller thought Moon 
would replace fifty UN diplomats in the coming quarter. 
Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari, who brokered the 
July 8 negotiating framework which UNFICYP was attempting to 
shepherd, would move on, but not until late February. 
"Hopefully we'll see movement before then," Moller added. 
Cyprus did not figure high on the incoming SYG's priority 
list, however. 
 
¶4.  (C) Security Council deliberations on the latest UNFICYP 
mandate resolution had gone smoothly, especially compared to 
the bickering that had occurred during the prior go-round in 
June.  Its language, while muted somewhat from earlier UK 
drafts, sent the message that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
needed to get serious, Moller asserted.  Japan, always 
concerned about its UN peacekeeping expenditures, had sought 
to review UNFICYP troop levels.  Moller's response -- that 
UNFICYP could get no smaller without a reduced mandate -- 
seemed to satisfy Tokyo.  Before departing New York, Moller 
visited UN bean-counters and acquired "seed money" to fund 
partially the technical committees and expert working groups 
the Gambari Process envisaged.  "But we'll still come around, 
hat in hand, in the coming months," the SRSG promised.  UK 
High Commissioner Peter Millet agreed that the December 
UNFICYP rollover exercise was nearly painless. "Gambari laid 
out the premise of political equality of the communities, and 
both leaders accepted it.  As such, there was no reason for 
the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to get bogged down in the 
sides-versus-communities nonsense." 
 
--------------------------------- 
Getting the Local Process Unstuck 
 
NICOSIA 00002052  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Moller announced he would host Cypriot negotiators 
Tasos Tzionis and Rasit Pertev at UNFICYP HQ later December 
¶18.  He intended to push hard on both. (Note:  Moller's 
deputy informed us December 19 that the Moller-Tzionis-Pertev 
gathering, while "frank," offered no breakthroughs.  End 
Note)  Fundamental mistrust characterized the Turkish 
Cypriot-Greek Cypriot relationship, Moller lamented; building 
trust appeared his toughest task.  Tackling substance 
appeared a distant prospect, with the sides still debating 
process.  The latest sticking point concerned real property. 
Pertev saw land exchange as a final settlement issue, and 
therefore grist for the expert working groups.  Greek 
Cypriots considered it a everyday life issue, however, and 
thus a technical committee responsibility.  Moller's pitch to 
the disputing parties?  Let both bodies tackle the real 
estate problem. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rather optimistic, the SRSG thought as many as seven 
working groups and nine technical committees could start work 
immediately after community leaders Papadopoulos and Mehmet 
Ali Talat assented.  Their "green light" was not that far 
off, Moller believed; he described the process of 
synchronizing the sides' agendas as "two-thirds complete." 
Similarly, he expected progress soon on confidence building 
measures, primarily the long-delayed opening of the Ledra 
Street checkpoint.  Both communities had agreed in principle 
to the step, Moller declared; details, especially concerning 
resupply of Turkish troops along the Green Line, remained 
unresolved.  EU funding, channeled through its PFF program, 
would cover "beautification" of the checkpoint surroundings, 
he added.  With enhanced CBMs and movement on Gambari, Moller 
hoped to see the negative environment surrounding bi-communal 
interaction to diminish somewhat. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Municipal Election Results No Boon for Solution 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7.  (C) From the UN process, the conversation segued into the 
December 17 municipal elections.  Cypriot voters had rewarded 
Papadopoulos's AKEL-DIKO-EDEK coalition with mayorships in 
five key municipalities.  But opposition DISY, too, had 
claimed victory, having garnered more votes than any other 
single party.  The ambassadors and Moller agreed the results 
presented neither side a clear mandate, nor did they portend 
a Cyprus Problem policy correction.  Had AKEL's high-profile, 
pro-solution candidates lost in Nicosia and Limassol, party 
leaders might have taken a second look at the benefits of 
coalition membership, believed French Charge Eric Sanson. 
With wins, however, AKEL seemed content, and surely would 
stay with Papadopoulos through the 2008 presidential 
elections.  To keep progressive, pro-solution AKEL voters in 
the fold, all thought Papadopoulos would "play nice" on the 
UN process, although he was likely to defer serious 
substantive decisions as long as possible. 
 
¶8.  (C) How does Papadopoulos feel he is doing? the 
Ambassador pondered.  Domestic factors, mainly the election 
results and the President's continued high approval numbers, 
likely left him feeling fine, the Ambassador reasoned.  On 
foreign policy and his handling of the Cyprus Problem, the 
story looked different.  Nicosia's hard-line stance vis-a-vis 
Turkey's EU accession had left Cyprus isolated at the recent 
Council summit, and even daily of record "Phileleftheros" -- 
normally the staunchest of allies -- had criticized the 
administration's strategies.  Nonetheless, Papadopoulos was 
unlikely to chart a major course change anytime soon. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Brussels "Fed up" with Turkey-Cyprus Bickering 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9.  (C) Speaking for his EU colleagues, High Commissioner 
Millet noted Brussels' frustrations with the wrangling over 
Turkey's EU accession, and Cyprus's intent to utilize it in 
extracting CyProb concessions from Ankara.  "Every six months 
a crisis," he vented, and each kept the EU from tackling more 
pressing matters.  According to his German Foreign Ministry 
contacts, Berlin hoped to focus on the EU Constitution, not 
on accession, during its January-June 2007 Presidency.  But 
it was unlikely Germany could "hide" from Turkey issues for 
long, Millet ventured, since pro-Turkey forces within the EU 
would soon push to open those Acquis chapters which the 
recent Council conclusions had not locked. 
 
¶10.  (C) Finland's presidency had erred in seeking to open 
chapters at the COREPER immediately following the Council 
 
NICOSIA 00002052  003 OF 003 
 
 
summit, Sanson argued.  Opposition from Cyprus was a 
near-guarantee, as Papadopoulos -- feeling heat locally for 
not delivering greater penalties for Turkey -- could 
ill-afford another Brussels setback.  Laying low for a brief 
period appeared a better tactic; the German Presidency likely 
would have faced little EU opposition in quietly pushing for 
renewed negotiations at the technical level, the French 
diplomat believed. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Mentioning recent media accounts regarding Turkish 
Cypriots' request of UK aviation authorities for direct 
flights between north Cyprus and Great Britain, Russian 
Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko asked Millet for the current 
state of play.  FCO legal experts continued to study the 
application and relevant international conventions, the High 
Commissioner replied.  PM Tony Blair's recent message in 
Turkey, that Britain wished to initiate direct air service if 
international law permitted, was not hyperbole.  The "if" was 
mighty big, however.  Millet relayed his government's 
attorneys' initial findings:  that requests to commence 
international flights, under the Chicago Convention, must 
originate in internationally recognized states.  Grasping at 
straws, "TRNC President" Talat was even seeking U.S. 
assistance with UK regulators, the Ambassador added, 
referring to the Turkish Cypriot leader's December 4 letter 
to the Secretary.  Washington would not attempt to influence 
this internal British decision, he added.  Miller made clear 
that this would be the proper USG response. 
 
--------------------- 
Moves Afoot a the MFA 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Lunch concluded with ambassadors and Moller 
analyzing RoC Foreign Minister George Lillikas's personnel 
moves.  Millet claimed Lillikas was furious with diplomats' 
working hours; by five p.m., he was often left alone, and 
personally had to respond to requests for instructions from 
Cypriot ambassadors in western Europe and North America. 
Effecting workplace changes meant taking on powerful unions, 
however, always a challenge on Cyprus.  Lillikas faced an 
even tougher union battle, the Ambassador opined, should he 
attempt to implement a pet project -- bringing in political 
appointees for high-ranking MFA slots. 
 
¶13.  (C) The permanent secretary ("D" equivalent) would go to 
a career diplomat, however.  Lillikas continued to ponder 
possibilities, the Ambassador noted, with Acting PermSec 
Alexander Zenon and Cyprus Problem Political Director (U/S 
equivalent) Erato Marcoullis -- the RoC's former ambassador 
in Washington -- the leading candidates.  At least two other 
PolDir slots likely would turn over in coming months. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶14.  (C) A convergence of factors leaves us guardedly 
optimistic we'll see some CyProb movement on the UN track in 
¶2007.  Moller's decision to re-up is one.  A solid mediator 
equally frustrated with both communities' leaders, the Dane 
has done commendable work keeping them on speaking terms; his 
departure and his replacement's learning curve could have 
cost us six months, easy.  Similarly, Gambari's institutional 
memory on Cyprus and the respect he commands here are 
beneficial, even if, as Moller claims, he leaves DPA in two 
months.  Kofi Annan's last UNSC report on Cyprus, 
particularly his admonition not to take UNFICYP's presence 
for granted, garnered major press in south Nicosia and sent 
the signal that the status quo does not satisfy Cyprus's 
long-time mediator.  The governing coalition's municipal 
elections results were not so horrid as to force Papadopoulos 
to soften his Cyprus Problem stance, but not so grand as to 
convince him he could stall forever.  Last, the latest 
Turkey-EU crisis has passed, with the RoC definitely not 
victorious in the European Council.  From their European 
partners' reactions in Brussels, Papadopoulos, Lillikas and 
company must be getting the message that the EU wants out of 
the CyProb business. 
 
¶15.  (C) In our private meetings and public comments, we will 
push both sides to support the UN process and negotiate in 
good faith.  In our opening salvo, the Ambassador's New 
Year's message, he urges the sides "to focus on what unites, 
not what divides," in hopes of ending the unacceptable 
division of the island.  Public Affairs expects to place the 
piece in leading dailies island-wide. 
Schlicher