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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7345
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0722
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 002050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNGA CY
SUBJECT: UN REP, P-5 AMBS TAKE STOCK 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Hosting local Perm Five ambassadors and 
the resident UN chief to a working lunch December 18, the 
Ambassador orchestrated a tour d'horizon that touched on 
the UN transition in New York, horsetrading over the 
UNFICYP mandate renewal, developments on the UN negotiating 
track in Nicosia, the December 17 municipal elections, 
Turkey's EU track, and friction within the Cypriot MFA's 
ranks.  UN Special Representative Michael Moller opened the 
discussion by refuting rumors he would soon abandon Cyprus 
for New York and a position on incoming SYG Ban Ki-Moon's 
team.  Job jockeying was consuming his colleagues' days, 
however, as Moon likely would fill fifty positions in the 
next few months.  Turning to the Cyprus Problem, Moller 
voiced satisfaction with the UNFICYP renewal process, which 
he'd witnessed first-hand in New York.  While there, he 
also had netted "seed money" to fund costs related to a 
potential UN Good Offices mission re-start.  The UN 
mediator would host Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
negotiators later December 18; he worried, however, that 
mutual mistrust still plagued the sides' relations. 
Property issues likely would dominate the meeting, Moller 
thought. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassadors broke down the results of Cyprus's 
day-earlier local elections.  All agreed the 
something-for-everyone results gave neither the coalition 
nor opposition a mandate, and were unlikely to force a 
Cyprus Problem change of tack by President Tassos 
Papdopoulos.  Turkish EU accession also made the 
discussion, with the Ambassador's British and French 
counterparts claiming that Brussels had tired of the 
twice-yearly crises the process brought.  Germany hoped to 
focus its presidency on the EU Constitution, not on 
enlargement issues, they added.  Lunch concluded with 
invitees dissecting Cypriot Foreign Minister Lillikas's 
recent and future personnel moves.  The FM hoped to shake 
up the listless ministry, they concurred, but faced 
opposition from potent unions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Polishing Resumes in the Big Apple 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Moller days earlier had returned from New York, 
where he had presented the Secretary General's report on 
Cyprus to the Security Council.  Numerous colleagues there 
were lobbying hard for jobs in the incoming Ban Ki-Moon 
administration. Not Moller.  "I'd rather serve in Baghdad," 
the UN mediator chuckled.  "Rumors of my imminent departure 
are just that -- rumors."  Personnel matters would consume 
Moon's time for the near future, Moller asserted.  First, 
he would need to name his deputy.  Sources close to the 
South Korean claimed Moon wanted a female candidate from a 
third-world nation; Egyptian Minister of State for 
International Cooperation Fayza Abul-Naga, a Jordanian, and 
a Saudi topped the prospect list.  Up next were the UN's 
dozen-plus under secretary slots, plus executive positions 
in the specialized agencies.  All told, Moller thought Moon 
would replace fifty UN diplomats in the coming quarter. 
Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari, who brokered the 
July 8 negotiating framework which UNFICYP was attempting 
to shepherd, would move on, but not until late February. 
"Hopefully we'll see movement before then," Moller added. 
Cyprus did not figure high on the incoming SYG's priority 
list, however. 
 
¶4.  (C) Security Council deliberations on the latest 
UNFICYP mandate resolution had gone smoothly, especially 
compared to the bickering that had occurred during the 
prior go-round in June.  Its language, while muted somewhat 
from earlier UK drafts, sent the message that both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots needed to get serious, Moller 
asserted.  Japan, always concerned about its UN 
peacekeeping expenditures, had sought to review UNFICYP 
troop levels.  Moller's response -- that UNFICYP could get 
no smaller without a reduced mandate -- seemed to satisfy 
Tokyo.  Before departing New York, Moller visited UN 
bean-counters and acquired "seed money" to fund partially 
the technical committees and expert working groups the 
Gambari Process envisaged.  "But we'll still come around, 
hat in hand, in the coming months," the SRSG promised.  UK 
High Commissioner Peter Millet agreed that the December 
UNFICYP rollover exercise was nearly painless. "Gambari 
laid out the premise of political equality of the 
communities, and both leaders accepted it.  As such, there 
was no reason for the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to get 
bogged down in the sides-versus-communities nonsense." 
 
NICOSIA 00002050  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Getting the Local Process Unstuck 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Moller announced he would host Cypriot negotiators 
Tasos Tzionis and Rasit Pertev at UNFICYP HQ later December 
¶18.  He intended to push hard on both. (Note:  Moller's 
deputy informed us December 19 that the 
Moller-Tzionis-Pertev gathering, while "frank," offered no 
breakthroughs.  End Note)  Fundamental mistrust 
characterized the Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot 
relationship, Moller lamented; building trust appeared his 
toughest task.  Tackling substance appeared a distant 
prospect, with the sides still debating process.  The 
latest sticking point concerned real property.  Pertev saw 
land exchange as a final settlement issue, and therefore 
grist for the expert working groups.  Greek Cypriots 
considered it a everyday life issue, however, and thus a 
technical committee responsibility.  Moller's pitch to the 
disputing parties?  Let both bodies tackle the real estate 
problem. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rather optimistic, the SRSG thought as many as 
seven working groups and nine technical committees could 
start work immediately after community leaders Papadopoulos 
and Mehmet Ali Talat assented.  Their "green light" was not 
that far off, Moller believed; he described the process of 
synchronizing the sides' agendas as "two-thirds complete." 
Similarly, he expected progress soon on confidence building 
measures, primarily the long-delayed opening of the Ledra 
Street checkpoint.  Both communities had agreed in 
principle to the step, Moller declared; details, especially 
concerning resupply of Turkish troops along the Green Line, 
remained unresolved.  EU funding, channeled through its PFF 
program, would cover "beautification" of the checkpoint 
surroundings, he added.  With enhanced CBMs and movement on 
Gambari, Moller hoped to see the negative environment 
surrounding bi-communal interaction to diminish somewhat. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Municipal Election Results No Boon for Solution 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7.  (C) From the UN process, the conversation segued into 
the December 17 municipal elections.  Cypriot voters had 
rewarded Papadopoulos's AKEL-DIKO-EDEK coalition with 
mayorships in five key municipalities.  But opposition 
DISY, too, had claimed victory, having garnered more votes 
than any other single party.  The ambassadors and Moller 
agreed the results presented neither side a clear mandate, 
nor did they portend a Cyprus Problem policy correction. 
Had AKEL's high-profile, pro-solution candidates lost in 
Nicosia and Limassol, party leaders might have taken a 
second look at the benefits of coalition membership, 
believed French Charge Eric Sanson.  With wins, however, 
AKEL seemed content, and surely would stay with 
Papadopoulos through the 2008 presidential elections.  To 
keep progressive, pro-solution AKEL voters in the fold, all 
thought Papadopoulos would "play nice" on the UN process, 
although he was likely to defer serious substantive 
decisions as long as possible. 
 
¶8.  (C) How does Papadopoulos feel he is doing? the 
Ambassador pondered.  Domestic factors, mainly the election 
results and the President's continued high approval 
numbers, likely left him feeling fine, the Ambassador 
reasoned.  On foreign policy and his handling of the Cyprus 
Problem, the story looked different.  Nicosia's hard-line 
stance vis-a-vis Turkey's EU accession had left Cyprus 
isolated at the recent Council summit, and even daily of 
record "Phileleftheros" -- normally the staunchest of 
allies -- had criticized the administration's strategies. 
Nonetheless, Papadopoulos was unlikely to chart a major 
course change anytime soon. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Brussels "Fed up" with Turkey-Cyprus Bickering 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9.  (C) Speaking for his EU colleagues, High Commissioner 
Millet noted Brussels' frustrations with the wrangling over 
Turkey's EU accession, and Cyprus's intent to utilize it in 
extracting CyProb concessions from Ankara.  "Every six 
months a crisis," he vented, and each kept the EU from 
tackling more pressing matters.  According to his German 
Foreign Ministry contacts, Berlin hoped to focus on the EU 
Constitution, not on accession, during its January-June 
2007 Presidency.  But it was unlikely Germany could "hide" 
 
NICOSIA 00002050  003 OF 004 
 
 
from Turkey issues for long, Millet ventured, since 
pro-Turkey forces within the EU would soon push to open 
those Acquis chapters which the recent Council conclusions 
had not locked. 
 
¶10.  (C) Finland's presidency had erred in seeking to open 
chapters at the COREPER immediately following the Council 
summit, Sanson argued.  Opposition from Cyprus was a 
near-guarantee, as Papadopoulos -- feeling heat locally for 
not delivering greater penalties for Turkey -- could 
ill-afford another Brussels setback.  Laying low for a 
brief period appeared a better tactic; the German 
Presidency likely would have faced little EU opposition in 
quietly pushing for renewed negotiations at the technical 
level, the French diplomat believed. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Mentioning recent media accounts regarding 
Turkish Cypriots' request of UK aviation authorities for 
direct flights between north Cyprus and Great Britain, 
Russian Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko asked Millet for the 
current state of play.  FCO legal experts continued to 
study the application and relevant international 
conventions, the High Commissioner replied.  PM Tony 
Blair's recent message in Turkey, that Britain wished to 
initiate direct air service if international law permitted, 
was not hyperbole.  The "if" was mighty big, however. 
Millet relayed his government's attorneys' initial 
findings:  that requests to commence international flights, 
under the Chicago Convention, must originate in 
internationally recognized states.  Grasping at straws, 
"TRNC President" Talat was even seeking U.S. assistance 
with UK regulators, the Ambassador added, referring to the 
Turkish Cypriot leader's December 4 letter to the 
Secretary.  Washington would not attempt to influence this 
 
SIPDIS 
internal British decision, he added.  Miller made clear 
that this would be the proper USG response. 
 
--------------------- 
Moves Afoot a the MFA 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Lunch concluded with ambassadors and Moller 
analyzing RoC Foreign Minister George Lillikas's personnel 
moves.  Millet claimed Lillikas was furious with diplomats' 
working hours; by five p.m., he was often left alone, and 
personally had to respond to requests for instructions from 
Cypriot ambassadors in western Europe and North America. 
Effecting workplace changes meant taking on powerful 
unions, however, always a challenge on Cyprus.  Lillikas 
faced an even tougher union battle, the Ambassador opined, 
should he attempt to implement a pet project -- bringing in 
political appointees for high-ranking MFA slots. 
 
¶13.  (C) The permanent secretary ("D" equivalent) would go 
to a career diplomat, however.  Lillikas continued to 
ponder possibilities, the Ambassador noted, with Acting 
PermSec Alexander Zenon and Cyprus Problem Political 
Director (U/S equivalent) Erato Marcoullis -- the RoC's 
former ambassador in Washington -- the leading candidates. 
At least two other PolDir slots likely would turn over in 
coming months. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶14.  (C) A convergence of factors leaves us guardedly 
optimistic we'll see some CyProb movement on the UN track 
in 2007.  Moller's decision to re-up is one.  A solid 
mediator equally frustrated with both communities' leaders, 
the Dane has done commendable work keeping them on speaking 
terms; his departure and his replacement's learning curve 
could have cost us six months, easy.  Similarly, Gambari's 
institutional memory on Cyprus and the respect he commands 
here are beneficial, even if, as Moller claims, he leaves 
DPA in two months.  Kofi Annan's last UNSC report on 
Cyprus, particularly his admonition not to take UNFICYP's 
presence for granted, garnered major press in south Nicosia 
and sent the signal that the status quo does not satisfy 
Cyprus's long-time mediator.  The governing coalition's 
municipal elections results were not so horrid as to force 
Papadopoulos to soften his Cyprus Problem stance, but not 
so grand as to convince him he could stall forever.  Last, 
the latest Turkey-EU crisis has passed, with the RoC 
definitely not victorious in the European Council.  From 
their European partners' reactions in Brussels, 
Papadopoulos, Lillikas and company must be getting the 
message that the EU wants out of the CyProb business. 
 
 
NICOSIA 00002050  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶15.  (C) In our private meetings and public comments, we 
will push both sides to support the UN process and 
negotiate in good faith.  In our opening salvo, the 
Ambassador's New Year's message, he urges the sides "to 
focus on what unites, not what divides," in hopes of ending 
the unacceptable division of the island.  Public Affairs 
expects to place the piece in leading dailies island-wide. 
Schlicher