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Viewing cable 06NICOSIA2010, ECHR GIVES TENTATIVE BLESSING TO "TRNC" PROPERTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NICOSIA2010 2006-12-08 16:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO8378
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #2010/01 3421607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081607Z DEC 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7300
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0703
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 002010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON CASC PHUM EUN UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: ECHR GIVES TENTATIVE BLESSING TO "TRNC" PROPERTY 
COMMISSION 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA SIPRNET DAILY REPORT (12/06/06) 
 
     B. NICOSIA 959 AND PREVIOUS 
 
NICOSIA 00002010  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  In a December 7 ruling on the 
Xenidis-Arestis case (reftels), the European Court of Human 
Rights upheld a Greek Cypriot claimant's ownership of her 
property in the closed city of Varosha and ordered Turkey to 
pay her over a million dollars in damages.  At the same time, 
the ECHR "in principle" accepted the recently-established 
"TRNC" Property Commission as a local remedy for similar 
claims in the future.  Turkey and Turkish Cypriots welcomed 
this decision, which might get Turkey off the legal hook in 
the roughly 1400 property cases currently pending before the 
Strasbourg court by transferring responsibility to Turkey's 
"subordinate local authority" -- and which confers 
unprecedented (if indirect and derivative) legitimacy on a 
Turkish Cypriot institution.  Greek Cypriots are aghast at 
the prospect of being forced to seek redress from the 
"illegal occupation regime," and have suggested that the 
Court's ruling is a narrow one, devoid of implications beyond 
the Arestis suit.  This ruling will not solve the property 
question -- which remains the most intractable part of the 
Cyprus problem -- although it may blunt the previously 
effective Greek Cypriot strategy of seeking redress through 
the courts rather than through a political settlement.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
THE CASE 
-------- 
 
2. (SBU)  On December 7, the ECHR made its long-awaited 
ruling in the case of Myra Xenides-Arestis, who had sued the 
"occupying power" Turkey for violating her rights by denying 
her access to her property in the closed city of Varosha.  In 
a preliminary 2005 ruling, the ECHR found in favor of Arestis 
and ordered Turkey (which had initially moved for dismissal 
of the case on the grounds that the "TRNC," not the GOT, was 
the governing power in the north) to provide relief to the 
plaintiff.  But the Court acknowledged that the Turkish 
Cypriot administration, while not sovereign, was nonetheless 
a "subordinate local authority" of Turkey.  The Court gave 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots three months to design an 
"effective local remedy" to the violation of the plaintiff's 
rights, and another three months to implement it.  Only 
absent an effective local remedy could cases be referred to 
Strasbourg, they reasoned. 
 
3. (SBU) In response to this ruling, the "TRNC" (with 
significant prodding from the mainland) redesigned its 
Denktash-era Property Commission so that Greek Cypriot 
claimants could request compensation for -- and in certain 
very limited cases restitution of -- their property in the 
north.  In June 2006, just shy of the ECHR's six-month 
deadline, the "TRNC" Property Commission made its first 
offers.  So far six Greek Cypriot claimants have accepted 
cash compensation, while three others have been allowed to 
reclaim their property outright.  Arestis, however, turned 
down the Commission's million-dollar buy-out offer, demanding 
complete restitution of her property instead. 
 
4. (SBU) The Court's December 7 ruling went generally in the 
plaintiff's favor.  Absent an agreement with Turkey over 
whether she would accept a payoff in lieu of restitution, the 
ECHR reaffirmed that Arestis is still the legal owner of the 
property and awarded her over 900,000 euros in damages. 
Legal observers note that this decision does not officially 
close the Arestis case, since the pecuniary damages awarded 
only compensate the plaintiff for the violation of her rights 
until now; as long as she remains the legal owner and 
continues to be denied access to her property, the door 
remains open for Arestis to request further damages and 
relief.  In a public statement just after the ruling, she 
suggested she would consider further court action as long as 
her property was not returned to her.  The Court decided not 
to force Arestis to seek redress from the new Property 
Commission, as the Turkish side had asked, since initial 
rulings had already been made in Strasbourg regarding her 
case. 
 
"PYRRHIC VICTORY" 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) Of broader significance was the ECHR's finding that 
the Turkish Cypriot Property Commission nevertheless, "in 
principle," met the Court's 2005 requirements to be 
considered a "local remedy" for other, similar property 
cases.  The Court also noted that the new law granted 
applicants the right of appeal to the "TRNC High 
Administrative Court."  Although the Court has not said so 
 
NICOSIA 00002010  002 OF 002 
 
 
explicitly, many observers feel this means that most of the 
1400-odd cases currently pending before the ECHR could be 
kicked back down to "TRNC" authorities for action at the 
local level, and heard in Strasbourg only when all on-island 
avenues for appeal had been exhausted. 
 
6. (C) For the Greek Cypriots, the prospect of being forced 
to seek redress from the "TRNC" is politically unappetizing, 
to say the least.  One pro-government paper breathlessly 
warned that the ECHR decision was an "ominous" step toward de 
facto recognition of the "pseudo-state," while another 
commentator bemoaned Arestis's "pyrrhic victory."  More 
thoughtful observers are concerned, but have sought to 
minimize the importance of the ruling. 
 
7. (C) Arestis lawyer Achilleas Demetriades has pointed out 
that the "TRNC" law places severe limitations on the amount 
of property the Commission can actually give back.  (COMMENT: 
Restitution of a large majority of Greek Cypriot land in the 
north is effectively impossible, since most of this property 
is currently in use by either civilians or the military.  In 
such cases, the Property Commission is only empowered to 
offer either delayed restitution, pending a solution to the 
Cyprus problem, or immediate payout -- which would not be 
acceptable to many claimants, like Arestis.  END COMMENT.) 
While the Court may have accepted the Commission "in 
principle," Demetriades believes that time and further 
appeals will demonstrate that new Turkish Cypriot property 
mechanism cannot provide "effective" remedy in practice, as 
demanded by the ECHR in 2005.  This argument could turn out 
to be especially strong if, as many expect, the Commission -- 
now over the "hump" of yesterday's decision -- begins to 
slow-roll or short-change other claimants. 
 
8. (C) Turkish Cypriots, predictably, are crowing about the 
ECHR's "historic" decision and the legitimacy it confers 
(albeit indirectly and conditionally) on a Turkish Cypriot 
institution.  According to Asim Akansoy, "President" Talat's 
Private Secretary, the decision could help force Greek 
Cypriots to "deal with Turkish Cypriots as a legitimate 
presence on this island."  Too often, said Akansoy, the GOC 
seeks to "ignore" the Turkish Cypriots and their concerns, 
"pretending instead" that the Cyprus problem is purely the 
result of mainland Turkish aggression. 
 
9. (C) Some Turkish Cypriots are more cautious, however.  One 
"MP" close to Talat acknowledged that the ECHR ruling could 
result in an uptick in the number of Greek Cypriot property 
applications (at least 80 had applied as of December 7).  In 
order to prove it was indeed "effective," the Commission 
would have to process such claims reasonably quickly and 
fairly, he said.  At the very least, this would involve 
significant payouts that the "TRNC" can scarcely afford. 
Although Turkey has said it would help foot these bills, he 
told us, it is an open question whether the GOT will be 
willing to do so if this involves writing hundreds or 
thousands of million-dollar checks.  According to another 
Talat advisor, the Turkish Cypriots were quietly hoping that 
"political factors" (i.e., an unwillingness to deal -- or be 
seen dealing -- with a "TRNC" institution) would keep the 
number of Greek Cypriot applications for 
compensation/restitution to a manageable minimum. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) Although the ECHR decision will not solve the 
property question (which remains the most intractable and 
emotional element of the Cyprus problem) it may blunt what 
has heretofore been one of the Greek Cypriots' most effective 
political weapons -- litigation.  Coming coincidentally on 
the same day as a local Supreme Court ruling that overturned 
the GOC's uncompensated expropriation of Turkish Cypriot land 
in Paphos, the Arestis ruling shows that property is an issue 
which cuts both ways.  The USG and others interested in 
pushing the parties back to the negotiating table should use 
the growing number of complicated judgments that are now 
enmeshing each side as an argument for re-engagement in 
settlement talks.  Only an overall political agreement can 
produce a comprehensive solution to property and other 
issues.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER