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Viewing cable 06KUWAIT4625, KUWAITIS TELL NEA PDAS JEFFREY INCREASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KUWAIT4625 2006-12-11 15:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXRO1817
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #4625/01 3451509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111509Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7853
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 004625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR AND A/S WELCH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL IZ IR KU KUWAIT IRAN RELATIONS
KUWAIT-IRAQ RELATIONS 
SUBJECT: KUWAITIS TELL NEA PDAS JEFFREY INCREASED 
COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION ARE KEYS TO CONFRONTING IRAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C/NF) Summary: During his December 9 visit to Kuwait, 
PDAS Jeffrey met with a number of prominent Kuwaitis to 
discuss Iraq and Iran.  The Kuwaitis expressed concern about 
rising Iranian influence in the region and emphasized the 
need for international cooperation.  They agreed that the GCC 
should play a more active role in Iraq and in confronting 
Iran, but differed as to what approach would be most 
effective.  The Kuwaitis repeatedly stressed the need for the 
U.S. to coordinate with its Arab allies on regional policies 
and, equally as important, make clear to Arab publics that 
the U.S. was listening to Arab leaders' advice rather than 
dictating its own, unilateral policies to them.  Former GCC 
Secretary General Abdullah Bishara characterized regional 
 
SIPDIS 
tensions as a conflict between the forces of moderation - 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the GCC, the Lebanese government, 
Mahmoud Abbas - and the forces of extremism.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C/NF) During a December 9 visit to Kuwait, PDAS James 
Jeffery met with former GCC Secretary General Abdullah 
Bishara; Ambassador Khaled Al-Babtain, the outgoing Director 
of the Americas Department at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; MP Mohammed Jassem Al-Sager, the head of 
Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee; and leaders of the 
Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the political arm of 
the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood.  He also participated in a 
roundtable lunch discussion with five prominent Kuwaiti 
intellectuals and academics.  The major theme of the visit 
was that Iran presents a grave danger to the region and that 
coordinated action on the part of the international community 
is the only way to effectively deal with the Iranian threat. 
 
International Cooperation is Key to Confronting Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (C/NF) Al-Babtain and Bishara agreed that Kuwait could 
act as a useful conduit to the Iranian regime.  Bishara cited 
strong, unified international cooperation as the key to 
successfully confronting Iran.  He questioned the 
effectiveness of the IAEA in exposing Iran's lies and called 
the EU "toothless and flabby-bellied."  He also criticized 
the weakness and disunity of the GCC.  Bishara said he 
favored the GCC coming out with a strong statement that Iran 
is a threat and sending an envoy to Iran to state that the 
GCC supports the Security Council, the IAEA, and Europe.  He 
expressed pessimism about GCC unity, however, noting that 
Qatar is more worried about Saudi Arabia than Iran and that 
Oman does not share Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain's fears 
about Iranian power and intentions. 
 
4.  (C/NF) Bishara also criticized NATO, saying that it had 
not broken out of its Cold War mentality and realized the 
importance of "oil politics."  It is time, he said, for NATO 
to take an active role in securing the stability of the Gulf. 
 Finally, Bishara said he favors a strong Security Council 
resolution against Iran but emphasized the importance of a 
public relations campaign to convince Gulf Arabs that it 
would not have negative effects on GCC countries.  Al-Babtain 
said the key to American success vis-a-vis Iran was 
coordinating with the Arab world on finding a solution to 
Iraq's instability.  Such coordination would show Iran that 
the U.S. is not alone and this would "scare" Iran. 
 
Kuwait Strategy towards Iran: Confrontation vs. Conversation 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
5.  (C/NF)  Bishara criticized Kuwait's Foreign Minister for 
publicly focusing on the environmental dangers of Iran's 
nuclear program rather than the security dimensions of the 
threat.  Kuwait, argued Bishara, should publicly state its 
private analysis that Iran poses a major security threat to 
the Gulf.  Meanwhile, Al-Babtain said that following 
Bishara's advice would cause Kuwait to lose the significant 
access it now has to the Iranian government.  He argued that 
the Iranians know what the Kuwaitis mean when they talk about 
the environment, and that GOK officials are very frank in 
bilateral meetings with Iran.  If Kuwait confronted Iran 
publicly, the U.S. would lose a valuable means of dialogue 
with the Iranians.  Bishara supported the idea of Shaykh 
Sabah visiting Iran because, he said, no other Gulf leader 
could convey the right message to the Iranian leadership. 
 
6.  (C/NF)  Bishara and Al-Babtain agreed that Kuwait had an 
important role to play as a mediator in the GCC between Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia.  Bishara said that Kuwait had been given 
this mandate at the GCC Consultative meeting in May.    He 
added that Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah was taking an 
 
KUWAIT 00004625  002 OF 003 
 
 
active role in bridging differences but without much result. 
 
How to Fix Iraq: Coordinate with Regional Allies 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7.  (C/NF) Al-Babtain expressed the need for the U.S. to 
coordinate its efforts with the Arab world, and especially 
the Gulf, in the strongest terms.  He stressed repeatedly 
that the U.S. has made decisions regarding Iraq and Iran by 
itself and then imposed them on the countries in the region. 
This has led to many mistakes that could have been avoided by 
consulting with regional allies who understand the region 
better than the U.S. does.  He added that the very perception 
that the U.S. dictates policy to its allies stymies its 
efforts. 
 
8.  (C/NF)  Al-Babtain suggested forming a joint committee of 
Americans and Gulf Arabs that would come up with policy 
recommendations for Iraq.  He said that the committee's 
recommendations could be vetted by participating governments 
behind the scenes but in public the committee would appear as 
an independent body.  If the U.S. were to then act on these 
recommendations it would signal an Arab-U.S. alliance on 
Iraq. 
 
9.  (C/NF) National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chairman Al-Sager criticized the U.S. for its lack of 
coordination with the neighboring countries as well.  This 
lack of coordination, he said, had led to decisions like 
dissolving the army and opening the borders to let 200,000 
Iranians enter Baghdad and change it from a Sunni to a Shi'a 
city.  Al-Sager recently returned from a business trip to 
Iraq to deal with his family's vast date farms near Basra. 
He saw many pictures of Khomeini and said he felt that Iran 
was in control.  He views Iraq as a chaotic place that needs 
to be controlled by force.  As he put it, "Iraq needed 
freedom, not democracy," and urged the U.S. to increase its 
troop levels in Iraq. 
 
10.  (C/NF) The five prominent Kuwaiti intellectuals 
attending a roundtable lunch with PDAS Jeffrey echoed these 
views.  Former Minister of Information Dr. Saad bin Teflah 
stressed that the GCC should not be excluded from any 
potential U.S.-Iranian or U.S.-Syrian negotiations, arguing 
that this would strengthen Iran and Syria at the expense of 
the GCC.  The Kuwaitis urged the U.S. to consider the GCC as 
a "serious partner" and argued that the GCC could and should 
play a more active role in Iraq, particularly by funding 
economic development and promoting investment.  Dr. Sami 
Al-Faraj, the Director of the Kuwait Center for Strategic 
Studies and an advisor to the GCC Secretary General, said the 
U.S. should rely more on the GCC's economic strength and 
noted that GCC investment in southern Iraq in particular 
could serve as a balance to Iranian influence there.  General 
Ali Al-Mumin (Ret.), Kuwait's Ambassador-designate to Iraq 
and a Shi'a, agreed on the need for more GCC investment in 
Iraq, though he emphasized that it should not just be focused 
on southern Iraq.  He said Iraqis received Iranian aid "with 
suspicion" and would welcome more assistance from GCC 
countries.  Al-Mumin added that ongoing security problems 
were not a valid excuse for low levels of aid project 
execution since other countries were active in Iraq.  Former 
State Minister for Foreign Affairs Sulaiman Majed Al-Shaheen 
emphasized that the people in the Gulf need to be reassured 
that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq does not mean it is 
withdrawing from the region. 
 
Iran and Iraq's Wider Regional Effect 
------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C/NF) Bishara characterized the Middle East as in the 
throes of a region-wide battle.  The battle is not between 
Shi'a and Sunni, but rather between the forces of moderation 
(the GCC, Egypt, Jordan, Fouad Siniora's government in 
Lebanon, and Mahmoud Abbas) and those of extremism (Iran, 
Hizballah, Syria, Hamas, and, albeit less menacingly, Yemen). 
 The battlegrounds are Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq.  Bishara 
said that Hassan Nasrallah had passed the point of no return 
with Siniora by accusing him of collusion with Israel, a 
claim which precluded any reconciliation.  He called on the 
U.S. and EU to make strong public statements supporting 
Siniora's government, the fall of which he said would be a 
major blow to the forces of moderation. 
 
12.  (C/NF) Al-Sager echoed Bishara's concern about Lebanon, 
calling Hezbollah a poison and recounting how Saddam Hussein 
and Michel Aoun had both told him personally that Saddam had 
armed Aoun in the 1980s.  Al-Babtain focused more on the 
 
KUWAIT 00004625  003 OF 003 
 
 
Palestinian issue, suggesting that Iran was using it to its 
advantage.  For Al-Babtain, a key step toward U.S. success in 
the Middle East is helping Mahmoud Abbas' government.  If 
Abbas cannot show any gains from his moderate stance, 
Al-Babtain argued, he will only lose power. 
 
13.  (C/NF) Bishara characterized a fragile balance of power 
in the Gulf that was maintained by the Arab Gulf States' soft 
power (i.e. the internal stability provided by their 
legitimacy) and external hard power (the British until the 
1960s and the Americans since the 1990s).  The vacuum of hard 
power in the 1980s led to war, and Iranian nuclear power 
would pose an unprecedented challenge to the regional order. 
 
14.  (U) This cable was sent after PDAS Jeffrey departed from 
Post. 
 
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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
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LEBARON