VZCZCXRO5336
PP RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1824/01 3381244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041244Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5261
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001824 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO AADP CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: RUBERWA LOOKS TOWARD THE FUTURE 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 1787 
 
     ¶B. KINSHASA 1794 
     ¶C. KINSHASA 1788 
 
Classified By: PolCouns DBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  In a private meeting, Vice President 
Azarias Ruberwa emphasized the need to address the security, 
political and judicial concerns of defeated presidential 
candidate and fellow Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba.  He 
declared himself open to working with President Joseph Kabila 
as a member of the government or opposition.  He once again 
called for dialogue to address ethnic tensions which led to 
recent attacks by renegade General Laurent Nkunda in North 
Kivu.  Ruberwa is working to recast himself as a statesman 
and is rumored to be a strong candidate for a ministerial 
post in a Kabila government.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ambassador and Vice President Azarias Ruberwa 
reviewed post-election and security issues November 28 in the 
wake of fighting in North Kivu (refs A, B), Ruberwa's Deputy 
Chief of Staff Tshimpanga Matala and PolCouns sat in. 
Ruberwa, the transitional vice president responsible for 
defense and security, was talkative and relaxed in his last 
days in office. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Ruberwa's 
efforts to ease tensions between President Joseph Kabila and 
Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba since the August 20-22 
violence between their troops.  Ruberwa flagged three issues 
that he said continue to concern Bemba:  his personal 
security (by far Bemba's biggest concern), the role of the 
political opposition, and possible indictment by the 
International Criminal Court. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ruberwa stressed the importance of Kabila and Bemba 
reaching an agreement on Bemba's future security.  The 
Ambassador noted that Kabila and MONUC are prepared to 
assist, but emphasized the need to find a formula that would 
reduce the size of Bemba's large private guard which was 
implicated in armed violence in August and November.  A large 
private military force is not tenable.  Ruberwa estimated 
that Bemba's guard currently numbers around 1000, and agreed 
that its continued presence risked disorder.  The Ambassador 
stated that Bemba needs to repudiate violence clearly and 
publicly, but despite private assurances has never done so. 
 
¶5.  (C) Ruberwa expressed fears that procedural rules 
recently adopted by the National Assembly would reserve all 
key positions for the Kabila-allied AMP coalition and cripple 
Bemba's attempts to lead a viable opposition.  He said he 
shared this concern.  The Ambassador agreed on the importance 
of assuring the minority a voice in parliament, but noted 
that there were many ways to do this and ensure parliamentary 
oversight of the executive.  Ruberwa acknowledged as well the 
Ambassador's point that the new Congolese parliament will be 
composed of various parties within the two major coalitions, 
each with their own agenda, and that parliamentarians' 
independence from executive or party heads could also be a 
factor.  Ruberwa asserted, however, the U.S. Congressional 
models of operations, drawing from over 200 years of 
experience, were not necessarily applicable to the Congo. 
 
¶6. (C) Ruberwa said the Kabila government should refrain from 
bringing a war crimes case against Bemba at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  The Ambassador observed that the U.S. 
is not a party to the ICC, nor did he have any particular 
information regarding what cases ICC may or may not be 
pursuing.  ICC member states do have treaty obligations to 
observe; however, we have seen no sign that President Kabila 
or the GDRC is urging the ICC to open or pursue a case 
against Bemba.  Ruberwa agreed, stating that he thought 
Bemba's fear of ICC prosecution is overblown. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ruberwa was clearly interested in a senior position 
in the Kabila government.  He said he could remain neutral, 
would not take a position of radical opposition, and was open 
to joining the government as minister.  He said he would be 
interested potentially in Defense, Interior, Justice or the 
Supreme Court, but not as a token or figurehead. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador congratulated Ruberwa on his RCD 
party's apparent strong showing in provincial elections (ref 
C).  Ruberwa said its low vote in legislative and 
presidential elections had been a shock, but that it had won 
42 provincial assembly seats thus far, giving it the 
third-highest total of any party.  Ruberwa added that the RCD 
 
KINSHASA 00001824  002 OF 002 
 
 
expects to obtain provincial parliamentary seats in all 
provinces, except South Kivu where it appears no RCD-Goma 
candidates have been elected. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador condemned the fighting instigated by 
renegade General Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu province and 
summarized the previous day's CIAT communique on the subject. 
 He stressed that military action will not resolve the 
concerns of the Tutsi groups Nkunda claims to be defending. 
Ruberwa agreed with the Ambassador's points and the main 
points of the CIAT communique, asserting that he shared 
opposition to the renewed violence.  Ruberwa said however 
security guarantees remain the key issue for Nkunda, his 
troops and the Tutsi community, and said he is encouraging 
dialogue to ease tensions.  The Ambassador stated that the 
government must assure all citizens that their rights will be 
respected.  He said Nkunda's soldiers have no choice but to 
join the military integration or DDR process.  Ruberwa 
observed that Nandes will dominate the North Kivu assembly. 
If adequate assurances are not given to the province's 
Tutsis, their fears will grow of being excluded and targeted. 
 He said many Tutsis remain as refugees in Rwanda, and 
expressed hope that the post-Transition government would have 
the political will to address the issue. 
 
¶10. (C) Ruberwa praised U.S. government efforts to promote 
peace in the country and region.  He cited the Tripartite 
Plus Joint Commission as a good example of promoting 
dialogue.  He and the Ambassador agreed on the importance of 
continuing the work of the Congolese and international 
community in the military reform commission Ruberwa has been 
chairing as Vice President. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment.  Ruberwa has fairly effectively managed to 
recast his image from rebel leader and Tutsi nationalist to 
that of a national politician and statesman.  His party's 
relatively strong showing in provincial elections has 
resurrected leverage that its poor showing in the July 30 
results appeared to have buried.  There are many rumors 
floating as to the composition of the new government, with 
many including a Ruberwa appointment as justice minister. 
Ruberwa's goal of becoming defense minister is probably too 
much of a reach, but it appears his chances are good for 
retaining a prominent role in Kinshasa.  End comment. 
MEECE