VZCZCXRO2685
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5814/01 3460606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120606Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4823
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3391
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3376
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMETT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV INR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA: A LOOK AT AN AFGHAN BORDER DISTRICT 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Barmal, one of Paktika Province's five 
districts bordering the tribal areas of Pakistan, has been 
the scene of a great deal of insurgent activity since 
coalition and Afghan forces established an Afghan government 
presence in April 2005.  Government influence in Barmal, a 
district dominated by the Waziri tribe, has never been 
strong.  That limited government presence was forced out in 
the fall of 2004 by Taliban fighters, who in turn were, at 
least partially, displaced by coalition and Afghan forces in 
April 2005.  Since then the district has been actively 
contested.  Progress has been substantial in the last 18 
months, but the weakness of the Afghan government in this 
important border district remains a problem. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
Barmal District: West Waziristan 
------------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU)   Barmal, located on Paktika's Eastern border with 
Pakistan, is remote from Afghan population centers.  Lines of 
communication and trade do not naturally run to the West and 
North toward the more urban areas of Afghanistan.  Rather, 
the natural flow of people and goods goes East into 
Pakistan's tribal areas and the towns of Wana and Miram Shah. 
These natural geographical ties, common to many border 
districts, are strengthened in Barmal by strong Waziri tribal 
connections in North and South Waziristan.  Most Waziris live 
in Pakistan with only a small element of the tribe residing 
in Afghanistan--almost all in Barmal district-- where they 
make up nearly 100 percent of the local population. As a 
minority in Afghanistan, Waziris have a natural connection to 
tribal counterparts in Pakistan. 
 
------------------------------- 
Much Progress, Much More Needed 
------------------------------- 
¶3.   (SBU)   Barmal district was taken by insurgents in the 
fall of 2004, killing or displacing the few Afghan government 
police and administrators in the district center.  In April 
2005, the district center town of Barmal Bazaar was 
reoccupied by coalition and Afghan military units, a forward 
operating base was established, and a new District 
Commissioner and Chief of Police were installed.  Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and U.S. troops now have a significant 
presence in Barmal.  The ANA in Barmal are being mentored by 
an American military Embedded Training Team (ETT) and close 
cooperation is evident between the ANA and American units 
located in the district.  The American presence has also 
brought several projects, at least two new schools, a new 
district center building, a new police station, a new primary 
care clinic, and a cobblestone road complete with solar 
street lights for the Bazaar.  However much remains to be 
done. 
 
--------------------- 
GOA Has Limited Reach 
--------------------- 
¶4.  (SBU) While there is an Afghan government presence in 
Barmal, its effect on the general population is minimal. 
Regular travelers and insurgents alike still move through the 
many mountain passes extending into Pakistan. Afghan 
government presence in the district center has had little 
effect on the insurgents' movement or their influence on the 
local population.  Lack of economic opportunity in Barmal, 
and in Afghanistan in general, drive many from Barmal's 
villages to take the difficult six-hour ride to Miram Shah to 
seek employment in Pakistan.  How many fall prey to insurgent 
recruiters is unknown, but locals have been identified among 
those killed during encounters with the ANA and coalition 
elements in Barmal. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In interviews conducted on November 1 in the 
village of Mangretay (12 kilometers from the Pakistan 
border), village elders stated that the people were not 
against the Karzai government, but rather they did not know 
the government.  One elder remarked that for 50 or 60 years, 
as far back as anyone could remember, there had been no 
 
KABUL 00005814  002 OF 003 
 
 
Afghan government presence in Barmal.  The village elders 
asked for more Afghan police and ANA to protect them from the 
Taliban.  They reported that if they did not provide food or 
shelter to the insurgents, they were in danger.  Six days 
later on November 7, coalition elements were attacked by a 
sizable group of insurgents in this same village. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Able District Officials Conduct Outreach 
---------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU)   Barmal is fortunate to have a young, experienced, 
and intelligent district commissioner.  District commissioner 
Mohammed Mobeen, seven months on the job and 35 years old, 
has already been the chief of police in Orgun, and the 
district commissioner of both the Zeruk and Khair Khot 
districts of Paktika.  Mobeen, assisted by three other 
government representatives, the chief of police, an education 
ministry representative, and the director of documents and 
regulations, is working to bridge the perceived gulf between 
the appointed government outsiders and the local tribal and 
religious leaders.  Mobeen explained that he spends half of 
each day working as district commissioner and the other half 
in the Mosque explaining Islam to the people.  In this way he 
demonstrates his commitment to Islam and that he is not a 
slave to outsiders. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Mobeen's main criticism is not about the people in 
his district or the insurgents but about the government. 
Mobeen stated that the provincial and national governments 
need to check on their people in the districts.  The 
Provincial government, the governor, the chief of police, the 
line ministry directors all need to travel to the districts 
and check on their people.  He said they needed to check and 
see if they are honest and if they need assistance.  He went 
so far as to say that "Karzai is sleeping," that he must hold 
the governors accountable for the performance of the 
government and its relationship to the people in the 
districts. 
 
-------------------------- 
Police Lack Basic Supplies 
-------------------------- 
¶8.  (SBU)  Barmal is far from the Provincial capital of 
Sharana, and Sharana is far from Kabul.  Barmal's police 
suffer from this distance.  They also suffer from systemic 
inefficiency, neglect, and very likely corruption. Supplies 
simply do not get to Barmal from Sharana.  While the police 
have a new five-room building, they have no winter clothing, 
little ammunition, and they lack bedding, boots, and fuel for 
the two pickup trucks that serve the entire district.  The 
nine ANP assigned to Barmal are supplemented with 21 contract 
police paid for by the governor.  These contract police lack 
even the summer uniforms common to the ANP.  With only one 
Thuraya phone for communication, 25 AK 47s, 1000 rounds of 
7.62x39, AK47 ammunition and only 1 RPG, the police are 
clearly not prepared for any concerted assault on the 
district.  Lacking boots, coats, winter uniforms, and fuel, 
the police are not even prepared for the Afghan winter. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶9.   (SBU)   Barmal District faces many of the same problems 
as other districts in Paktika.  Remoteness from the center is 
a problem but it is made worse by the nearly wholesale 
failure of the police and other provincial government 
agencies to provide for their people in the field.  In 
Sarobi, Dila, Jani Khel, Yosef Khel, Shaklabad, and Yaya Khel 
districts like Barmal, the police lack uniforms, winter 
equipment, vehicles, ammunition, and fuel for the vehicles. 
The insurgency is clearly a problem but severe inefficiency 
and lack of even basic leadership and discipline among many 
of Paktika's provincial and district government leaders and 
directors are severely hampering the ability of the Karzai 
government to fight the insurgency and to win the hearts and 
 
KABUL 00005814  003 OF 003 
 
 
minds of the Afghan people by offering a positive 
alternative.  END COMMENT. 
NEUMANN