VZCZCXRO2678
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5809/01 3460321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120321Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4813
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3369
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV INR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: BAGHLAN GOVERNOR'S BIG TALK NOT YET 
MATCHED BY SUCCESS ON THE GROUND 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Four months into his term as Governor of 
Baghlan Province, Sayed Ekramuddin Masomi outlined his 
ongoing plan of engagement with district leaders to stop 
narcotics-related activities, control corruption, pursue the 
Disbandment of Armed Groups (DIAG) process, and bring 
security to his province, as well as to bring government 
closer to the people to gain their support.  Ekramuddin 
claims to have already made substantial progress, including 
operations to improve security and the creation of a 
comprehensive development plan to coordinate and attract more 
international and GOA assistance to Baghlan.  Despite these 
efforts, Ekramuddin appears still to be struggling for a firm 
grip on the province, and in particular, on the security 
challenges that it presents.  Although the Governor appears 
sincerely interested in improving the security and overall 
development in Baghlan, it is unclear whether he actually has 
the capacity to do so.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Governor Delineates the Problems... 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During a meeting with Baghlan Governor Sayed 
Ekramuddin Masomi on December 3, PRTOff heard the Governor 
outline his priorities and plans for the province, which 
paralleled most of the main concerns of the central 
government and the international community, namely fighting 
poppy-growing and drug-trafficking; ensuring security for the 
people of Baghlan; fighting corruption; and supporting the 
Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) program. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ekramuddin lamented the conflicts and problems he 
inherited when he became Governor, and said he has been 
working hard to resolve them.  According to Ekramuddin the 
province, which has an ethnically mixed population of Tajiks, 
Pashtuns, Hazaras, and others, was badly managed prior to his 
appointment, with many corrupt individuals in positions of 
authority.  Locals did not like the government because 
officials were corrupt.  In response to this discontent, 
Ekramuddin said he has focused on working on improving 
constituent relations to change their views and garner 
support for local government. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
... and Outlines his Program of Solutions 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Governor asserted in the meeting that he was 
well-known by locals, and that he was intimately familiar 
with their needs.  He said he had already visited eight of 
the 15 districts in the province, and had met with local 
authorities and elders to make sure they understood the 
objectives of the government.  He asked the authorities to 
work for the people, not take bribes, not permit corruption, 
and not let powerful locals make life difficult for the 
people.  He also asked both the leaders and the people to 
tell him if they knew of any problems.  If they didn't tell 
him, he stressed, they were at fault for not letting him know 
how he could improve governance. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ekramuddin said that he told everyone to let him 
know if the wrong people were in positions of authority, and 
he promised to take action to deal with such people.  He said 
he had already fired some District Managers and appointed 
individuals who could be trusted.   He added that he is not 
receiving support from Kabul for this program.  In 
particular, he blamed the Administrative Secretary for the 
Ministry of the Interior, Siddiqi, for his failure to get 
approval for new District Managers.  The Governor said he had 
talked with President Karzai about this.  He stressed that he 
was working hard for the province, and the GOA should support 
him.  Otherwise, he concluded, the central government should 
send another governor to take his place. 
 
---------------------------- 
 
KABUL 00005809  002 OF 004 
 
 
Governor Claims Some Success 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Governor asserted that, due to his efforts, most 
parts of the province are now under control.  He pointed out 
that recent efforts included a police operation to stop the 
rampant banditry in the two most difficult districts.  The 
first operation, in Andarab, resulted in the arrest of two 
murderers and six robbers.  One individual was killed trying 
to escape.  A scheduled follow-up operation in Nahrin did not 
occur because the alleged robbers heard about the successful 
operation in Andarab and fled.  Since then, according to 
Ekramuddin, Baghlan has been considerably calmer.  (Comment: 
These operations took place recently. It is too soon to judge 
whether they have had an effect on criminal activities in the 
province.  It is unclear whether the increased police 
activity is due to the Governor or to Provincial Chief of 
Police Azim.  The drive to improve security has been largely 
overshadowed by a battle of wills between Azim and the 
Governor, who is trying to remove Azim.  Ekramuddin has been 
unsuccessful so far, reportedly because of Azim's connections 
in the Ministry of Interior.  End Comment) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Governor also said that he has put the District 
Chiefs of Police on notice, informing them that if they are 
not able to "control the bad actors in their areas" he will 
personally "clean up" the security situation, district by 
district. (Note: The Governor alluded to his previous role as 
a Commander in Takhar province when making this assertion. 
End Note).  Ekramuddin announced that if he sees any poppy 
growing in any district next year, the District Manager and 
Chief of Police will either have to destroy it or they will 
be fired.  Warming up to his topic, the Governor also said 
that all Illegally Armed Groups will have to join the DIAG 
process.  They will have no choice, he insisted; they must 
either submit, or they will have to bury their weapons and 
run away. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Interior Minister Visits, Assesses District Police 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Governor noted that Minister of Interior Moqbel 
had recently visited Pul-e Khumri District (an area he had 
not visited for several years) as part of a visit to the 
Northeast .  While in Pul-e Khumri, the Governor noted that 
the Minister spoke to a gathering of district officials and 
elders on combating poppy growth and drug-trafficking and 
providing better security in the province.  The Governor said 
that the Minister conveyed a message from the central 
government warning that any district officials who did not 
take decisive and effective action against drug activities, 
including growing poppy, would be fired. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ekramuddin noted that the Minister's message was 
timely.  It supported his own struggle against narcotics and 
corruption, and it would help the police establish better 
security in Baghlan.  The Governor noted that he wanted to 
improve the police throughout Baghlan, adding that many were 
former commanders and not necessarily qualified for their 
jobs.  The Governor added that there were not enough police 
to provide adequate security in the districts.  At 
Ekramuddin's request, Minister Moqbel sent a team to survey 
the needs of the Baghlan district police, including staffing 
requirements (there was a shortfall of over 200 reported), 
training, and equipment.  The Governor said that the Minister 
planned to inform his colleagues in Kabul of the results. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Governor Asks Attorney General For Help 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) At the Governor's request, Attorney General Sabit 
sent two officials to assist the Baghlan prosecutor with 
major land-grabbing disputes, particularly in Killagay 
 
KABUL 00005809  003 OF 004 
 
 
District, where Tajiks reportedly have been taking land 
previously held by absentee (and some returnee) Pashtuns. 
These disputes have been further complicated by an influx of 
Ismailis (Hazaras), also intent on obtaining land in the 
fertile area.  Mediation efforts so far have not been 
successful, though active fighting has been mostly 
controlled.  Ekramuddin was confident that the Baghlan 
prosecutor's office would be able to sort out these issues 
with the Attorney General's assistance.  (Comment:  The 
Governor appeared to think that the Minister of the 
Interior's needs assessment for the police, and the Attorney 
General's expected assistance would solve all of the police 
problems and land dispute issues.  Ekramuddin's attitude may 
be wishful thinking, or he believes that he has done what he 
can and the onus now is on Kabul to deliver.  End Comment.). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Provincial "Development Plan" Completed 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ekramuddin proudly noted that the Provincial 
Government had completed a five-year "development plan", 
including priorities broken down by sector and district, in 
cooperation with the Provincial Government Line Directors, 
UNAMA, the PRT, and others.  The plan consists of a list of 
projects the Governor would like to have completed in the 
province.  He said that this list was given to donors and 
ministries in Kabul, and the Governor expressed hope that 
these efforts will result in a more comprehensive assistance 
program for Baghlan.  The Governor noted that Baghlan has 
received less support from the international community than 
many other provinces.  PRToff pointed out that a list of 
projects needed was not the same thing as a  development 
plan.  Prtoff noted that a development plan should include a 
strategy for development, taking into account the 
relationships among the projects, how they would impact on 
one another, and which ones should be undertaken in what 
order to ultimately bring the greatest benefits to the most 
people.  The Governor showed no interest in PRToff's 
comments, and insisted the Provincial Development Plan was 
complete as presented in its current form. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Four months into his term as Governor of Baghlan 
Province, Ekramuddin appears to still be struggling for a 
firm grip on the province, and in particular, on the security 
challenges that it presents.  Despite substantial experience 
as governor in two other northeast provinces (Takhar in 
2002-2004 and Badakhshan in 2004-2005), and as Minister of 
Labor and Social Affairs for about 14 months in 2005-2006, 
Ekramuddin seems unable to find the key to managing the 
difficult ethnic and political balance that Baghlan presents. 
 He says all the right things about fighting poppy-growing, 
drug-trafficking, and corruption, as well as about supporting 
DIAG and ensuring security in the province, but there is 
little evidence that his efforts thus far have borne 
substantial fruit.  He claims that if necessary, he will use 
his skills as a former jihadi commander to clean up the 
districts of Baghlan, but this threat rings hollow from a 
Governor who himself has been unable to travel to some 
districts where banditry and lawlessness are rife.  He 
refused to consider that a 338-page list of projects, which 
he refers to as his "development plan", might need some 
additional work to turn it into a true development plan. 
Although Governor Ekramuddin appears sincerely interested in 
improving the security situation in Baghlan and in improving 
the life of the people there, his capacity and achievements 
so far are less than convincing.  END COMMENT. 
 
---------------- 
Biographic Notes 
---------------- 
 
KABUL 00005809  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) Sayed Ekramuddin Masomi (aka Sayed Mohammed 
Ekramuddin) was born in 1953/4 to a wealthy Tajik family in 
the Ishkamish District of Takhar Province.  He claims to have 
earned a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics from Kabul 
University, but this is not confirmed.  Other sources 
indicate he has only a high school degree.  Ekramuddin was a 
commander with the Northern Alliance, fighting against both 
the Soviets and the Taliban.  He is a long-time member of the 
Jamiyat party and a is key figure within the party in Takhar 
province, serving as its head in the cities of Chal, Namak 
Ab, and Taloqan. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Ekramuddin was President Rabbani's Deputy Finance 
Minister from 1991-1992, and continued as Finance Minister 
after Rabbani fell.  During the last years of the Taliban, he 
was a front line commander in Chal and Ishkamish (Takhar 
province).  However, he did not have a good relationship with 
Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, and acted 
independently in his districts.  Nevertheless, he later 
established close ties with key Northern Alliance figures 
(Fahim, Qanooni, and Abdullah) and soon after the fall of the 
Taliban (February 2002) became Governor of Takhar for two 
years.  He then served as Governor of Badakhshan for eight 
months before moving to Kabul to become Minister of Labor and 
Social Affairs for about 14 months, until March 2006. 
Ekramuddin was appointed Governor of Baghlan Province on July 
31, 2006. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Ekramuddin grew up with General Daoud and maintains 
a close friendship with him.  He reportedly retains ties to 
Iran through a friendship with former Afghan Ambassador to 
Iran Dr. Ahmad, and Iranians reportedly used to visit him 
regularly.  He also maintains contact Professor Rabbani, who 
reportedly provides him with financial support. 
NEUMANN