VZCZCXRO5218
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDIR #0020/01 3481737
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 141737Z DEC 06
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0035
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0020
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0035
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0028

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; PARIS FOR WALLER; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU 
FOR HAUGEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/14/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR KNNP PHUM
SUBJECT: IRANIAN INSIDER CLAIMS AHMADINEJAD IS LOSING SUPPORT 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S/NF) Summary:  A former high-ranking Iranian official 
indicated his belief that President Ahmadinejad's influence was 
on the decline in Iran and that he had alienated high level 
clerics, IRGC leadership, and the Majles.  The contact 
maintained that the US should calibrate its pressure on Iran so 
as not to be a tool in the president's hand to squelch 
opposition.  At the same time, the contact thought dialogue now 
with Iran would only boost Ahmadinejad's waning prospects.  He 
alleged that "real change" in Iran would occur within a year. 
The former official said Iran was very sensitive about the IRPO 
and US "soft power," which should be viewed as a sign of 
success.  Despite the possibility that some of his comments were 
self-serving, we agree the December 15 elections will be a 
barometer of Ahmadinejad's support in Iran.  End summary. 
 
2.(S/NF) A former high-ranking official in the Iranian Ministry 
of Affairs indicated in a December 14 meeting with IRPOffs that 
he was not optimistic about any Iranian compromise in the near 
term on the nuclear issue.  He believes that President 
Ahmadinejad -- unlike Supreme Council for National Security 
(SCNS) head Larijani or IRGC Commander Safavi -- wants to build 
a nuclear bomb, to have the legacy of accomplishing this feat 
for Iran.  However, he felt Ahmadinejad was losing support, and 
that the December 15 elections would be an indicator of this. 
(The contact's views on the December 15 elections to be reported 
septel.) 
 
Ahmadinejad on the descent 
-------------------------- 
 
3.(S/NF) The former official, most closely aligned with 
reformers and with Expediency Council head Rafsanjani but with 
wide ties in Iranian power circles, claimed Ahmadinejad is 
increasingly unpopular in Iran.  The president has passed his 
zenith, he maintained, and is now on the decline.  Intellectuals 
never supported him, but now clerics, the IRGC, and the Majles 
are also against him.  He claimed former President Khatami, 
former Majles speaker Karroubi, and Expediency Council head 
Rafsanjani are coordinating in opposition to the president.  The 
Basij, however, still support the president, because he doles 
out payments to them. 
 
4.(S/NF) The former official, whose relative is a high level 
cleric, claimed that Ahmadinejad has alienated the clerics, 
particularly the sources of emulation, although the contact did 
not go into detail how.  He claimed that Ahmadinejad sent Majles 
Speaker Haddad-Adel to Qom to request a meeting for him with 
Grand Ayatollah Lankarani, but got a negative response.  By 
contrast, Rafsanjani still has good relations with Qom. 
 
5.(S/NF) The contact, who claims a friendship with IRGC 
Commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, says the IRGC leadership no longer 
supports the president, despite Ahmadinejad's distribution of 
largesse among the IRGC.  The source claimed that the leadership 
of the IRGC is fundamentally pragmatic, and the officials are 
worried about Ahmadinejad's aggressive posturing.  The contact 
said he recently gave a presentation at the IRGC's PhD program 
including a map showing that the US has a military presence in 
12 out of 15 countries around Iran.  He claimed Safavi took the 
slide to Ahmadinejad as a warning.  The president instead hailed 
it as an opportunity, providing Iran more targets for 
asymmetrical warfare.  The former official said that Ahmadinejad 
falsely believes that the US is a declining empire that can be 
defeated by Iran. 
 
6.(S/NF) The former official said that the Majles has also 
turned against Ahmadinejad.  He claimed that the Majles recently 
passed a bill to fingerprint US visitors solely because the 
president opposed it.  He claimed that the president has to 
choose ministers from among the Majles in order to get them 
approved.  He also said the Majles recently summoned Ahmadinejad 
for questioning because they believe he is veering off the 
five-year development plan, and because they want to question 
him about his development projects.  The former official also 
named a number of conservative Majles members who supported 
Ahmadinejad in the presidential election, but later criticized 
him, such as Imad Afrugh and Elias Naderan. 
 
Holocaust conference 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000020  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
7.(S/NF) The contact, who had direct links to the Institute for 
Political and International Studies (IPIS) while at the Foreign 
Ministry, said he was disappointed that the IPIS went forward 
with holding the Holocaust conference.  He claimed the IPIS 
director put it off once, but Deputy Foreign Minister Manouchehr 
Mohammadi told him to go organize it so that the ministry could 
demonstrate its loyalty to Ahmadinejad.  The former official 
said it was noteworthy all the people who did not attend the 
conference, including Hassan Ruhani, the Supreme Leader's 
representative to the Supreme National Security Council, 
Rafsanjani, considered an expert on the Palestinian issue, and 
Palestinian Prime Minister Haniyeh, recently in Iran.  The 
contact said that Haniyeh had visited his university the day 
before the conference began.  He asked Haniyeh if he were going; 
Haniyeh reportedly said no, this was too sensitive an issue for 
him. 
 
US policy - back off and let the paper tiger fall 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8.(S/NF) The former official asserted that both US intensified 
pressure on Iran, particularly the threat of military attack, 
and the rumors of potential dialogue play into Ahmadinejad's 
hands.  He uses the tense atmosphere to restrict debate in Iran 
and silence critics who may fear being accused of siding with 
the US.  The contact, with the caveat of saying that he is 
always in favor of diplomatic dialogue, said he thought 
Ahmadinejad would use an offer now of dialogue to argue 
internally that his aggressive strategy had been successful.  In 
light of Ahmadinejad's "decline," now was not the time to engage 
Iran, in his view.  He predicted significant political change in 
Iran within the next year, with Ahmadinejad losing power, 
calling it a "regime change."  He thought that a strong 
indicator of this changing playing field would be the results of 
the December 15 elections.  He mentioned that he had been 
offered a fellowship next year in the US but decided to decline 
it in part because others have advised him to stay around during 
this critical time. 
 
Iran on IRPO 
------------ 
 
9.(S/NF) The former official told IRPOffs that even with 
"500,000" US soldiers in the region, the Iranian government is 
most sensitive about the Iran Regional Presence Office in Dubai. 
 He claimed that we should take it as a sign of our success.  He 
said the IRIG is vocal about its concerns about the office and 
its director by name.  Asked why, he said the government is very 
worried about US "soft power" because it is the hardest to 
combat.  It screens emails and telephone calls to track 
Iranians' interactions with the US.  The government used the 
arrest of intellectual Ramin Jahanbegloo to scare intellectuals 
against working with US NGO institutions.  (Note: He also said 
Jahanbegloo told lies about a lot of people to get out of 
prison, including himself.  Endnote)  On IRPO's cultural 
activities, he echoed others' advice to focus US exchange 
programs away from political subjects to areas where there is 
less sensitivity, such as the sciences, to avoid jeopardizing 
participants. 
 
10.(S/NF) Comment:  The former official's bottom line message to 
the US was: don't do anything to resuscitate Ahmadinejad in his 
decline, either by heaping on pressure or engaging in dialogue. 
He did not, however, offer a way out on the nuclear issue, other 
than to infer that support for a weapons program would go with 
Ahmadinejad.  We have heard rumors (or wishful thinking) of 
Ahmadinejad's political demise for a year, during which time he 
instead seemed to out-maneuver his rivals.  Other contacts have 
claimed his popularity is still strong inside Iran as a result 
of his generous handouts around the country.  We have also heard 
a similar message from other contacts that Ahmadinejad derives 
power from all the attention the US and the media have directed 
his way.  While some of this contact's points seemed designed to 
advance a particular political agenda, including regarding 
Iran's alleged concern about IRPO and unwanted side-effects of 
US pressure, there are enough indications of a real battle going 
on inside the conservative ranks to warrant close examination of 
the December 15 election results. 
BURNS