VZCZCXRO9190
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0016/01 3411535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 071535Z DEC 06
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0026
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0019
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0029
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000016 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE; BAKU FOR HAUGEN 
BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; PARIS FOR WALLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/7/2016 
TAGS: IR PREL
SUBJECT: REACTION TO LARIJANI'S PROPOSAL FOR IRAN-GULF ALLIANCE 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000016  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(C) Summary: At the 2006 Arab Strategy Forum in Dubai, Iranian 
National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani delivered a 
speech calculated to create doubt in the minds of Arab leaders 
about the value of their relationship with the US, and to 
present Iran as a more attractive ally.  Larijani called for US 
withdrawal from Iraq and made other key points:  1) Iran is not 
a threat to the region, rather its most effective leader;  2) 
Arab countries should join with Iran to seek regional solutions 
for regional security problems, rather than relying on the US; 
3) US attempts at blocking Iran's nuclear program will be a 
precedent for blocking programs in Arab countries.  Underlying 
Larijani's comments was the idea that Iran is a more appropriate 
ally and leader for the Middle East region than the US because 
Iran shares a common Muslim heritage with its Arab neighbors. 
Iran has made this pitch before, but Larijani's comments mark an 
unusually direct overture to the Arab world.  Contacts report, 
however, that Iran is unlikely to win converts.  That said, we 
should continue to emphasize with our Arab partners the benefits 
of alliance with the US versus Iran, as well as give long-term 
assurances that any eventual change in the relationship between 
US and Iran would not come at their expense.  To counter 
Ahmadinejad's street appeal, we should continue to point out 
that Iran does not offer a positive vision for the region, only 
a negative one.  End Summary 
 
Larijani's Key Points 
--------------------- 
 
2.(C) According to press reports and reports from spectators, 
Larijani made three key points in his December 5 speech at the 
Arab Strategy Forum, under the auspices of UAE Vice President, 
Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid 
al-Maktoum (MbR).  The annual conference brings together 
prominent leaders, business executives, and scholars to discuss 
political and economic strategies for the Middle East. 
 
-- Iran is not a threat to the region.  Instead Iran can be the 
region's most effective leader.  "Some countries consider Iran a 
threat to the region, forgetting about Israel," Larijani said. 
He later insisted, "We are not after a nuclear bomb."  At the 
same time, he called for withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. 
Larijani's remarks are part of a concerted effort to press for 
Iranian leadership of the region, at the same time reiterating 
common criticisms of the US and Israel. 
 
-- Arab countries should join Iran in security cooperation, and 
regional security problems should be resolved by the region 
without outside help.  "The security and stability of the region 
needs to be attained and we should do it inside the region, not 
through bringing in foreign forces...We should stand on our own 
feet," he said.  The remarks were designed to make Arab leaders 
question the nature of their relationships with the US.  He 
continued, "We don't accept the relationship between the US and 
the countries of the region.  If you talk to Arab leaders here, 
you can sense that they aren't happy with the current situation. 
 They feel the Americans are bullies.  They don't want the US 
Ambassador ordering them around." 
 
-- If the US succeeds at constraining Iran's nuclear program, 
Arab countries will be vulnerable to the same pressure.  Were 
Iran to abandon its enrichment program and agree to import its 
nuclear fuel, a precedent would be set and similar restrictions 
would be placed on the potential nuclear programs of Arab 
nations.  "They will allow you to have a power plant, but they 
will keep the fuel," he said.  Underlying Larijani's comments 
was the idea that Iran is a more appropriate ally and leader for 
the Middle East region than the US because Iran shares a common 
Muslim heritage with its Arab neighbors. 
 
Iran's Regional Focus in Foreign Policy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3.(C) Since the election of President Ahmadinejad, Iranian 
foreign policy has shifted a great deal of its focus away from 
relations with Western countries and toward the Muslim world, 
particularly its Arab neighbors.  Iran has sent a constant 
stream of envoys to Gulf states in an attempt to allay the fears 
of Gulf leaders concerning Iran's nuclear program, and to press 
those countries to reject US influence and cooperate more with 
Iran on various political and economic issues.  At a late 
October meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000016  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini 
proposed the formation of a regional security pact, saying that 
US Middle East policy is not in the interests of the region. 
"It is a US policy to create tensions in the region. Iran's 
response will be rational and wise," Hosseini said, adding that 
"active cooperation among the PGCC [Note: Iranians refer to the 
GCC as the "Persian" Gulf Cooperation Council. Endnote.] states 
will be the best way to reinforce security in the region." 
Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar reiterated the proposal 
in November, saying that Iran's policies are based on respect 
and good-neighborliness.  Frequent diplomatic visits to Gulf 
states by Iranian envoys, and a series of recent comments by 
senior Iranian officials promoting a regional security 
arrangement indicate a renewed effort toward Iran's goal of 
regional leadership. 
 
Message Appears Not to Resonate 
------------------------------- 
 
4.(C) Analysts and observers commented that Larijani's message 
garnered a lot of attention but appeared not to resonate with 
its intended audience.  The speech reportedly sparked a great 
deal of discussion later, with some conference attendees calling 
it "extraordinary," but nonetheless, it received only polite 
applause.  A journalist who attended the event told IRPOffs that 
Saudis and Emiratis later commented to him that they were not 
moved by the appeal, saying they felt closer to the Americans, 
who offer them technology and education, than to the Iranians, 
who offer them nothing.  A regional security analyst at a local 
think tank separately commented that Iran's message urging 
security cooperation is nothing new and has no resonance in the 
region, particularly with Iran's new government and in view of 
its interventionist policies regarding Iraq and Lebanon.  The 
analyst dismissed as ineffective Iran's tactic of asserting that 
nuclear restrictions on Iran will extend to the region, saying 
that Gulf states do not view the Iranian nuclear case as a valid 
test case for them, given their strong suspicions that Iran has 
the intention to build a nuclear weapon. 
 
5.(C) Embassy DCM subsequently spoke to MFA Acting U/S Tariq Al 
Haidan for his reaction to Larijani's speech.  Al Haidan limited 
his remarks to saying that the Iranians are "talking a lot on 
this subject but that you (the US) shouldn't worry about it," 
implying that the UAE was not taking seriously Tehran's call to 
eject the US from its bases here. 
 
6.(SBU) There has been scant media reaction to Larijani's speech 
in the local Arabic press, other than reprinting some of the 
Western reports.  Reporting on the Iraq Study Group's report is 
dominating the Arabic press.  Iranian press reported Larijani's 
speech with little commentary, although one outlet, Fars News, 
called Larijani's regional security proposal "audacious" and 
"the strongest sign yet of Iran's rising assertiveness in its 
contest with the United States for influence in the region." 
 
7.(C) Comment: Iran's efforts to date to forge a new regional 
security arrangement and decrease US presence in the region 
appear have gotten little traction with GCC governments and are 
unlikely to do so in the future.  This does not mean, however, 
that countries in the region - particularly Gulf states - feel 
they can ignore or alienate their large Persian neighbor.  At 
the governmental level, Gulf allies like the UAE will likely try 
to continue their balancing act between maintaining restrained 
but economically beneficial ties to Iran, while preserving close 
links to the US.  The USG advances its interests by continuing 
to emphasize to Arab governments the benefits of alliance with 
the US, in contrast to the lack of benefits offered by Iran. 
Arab countries also need assurance that in the long-term, any 
future change to US-Iran relations will not come at their 
expense, either politically or economically.  In contrast, the 
view from the "street" is different from that of Arab 
governments.  President Ahmadinejad has gained some popularity 
on the regional "street" by manipulating and amplifying 
anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments.  While Iran may tap 
into regional discontent with US policies and culture, it has 
not offered a credible and attractive alternative in its place, 
a point we can continue to emphasize in our public statements. 
 
This message was cleared by Embassy Abu Dhabi. 
BURNS