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Viewing cable 06HAVANA23608, CUBAN REGIME STIFFS CODEL FLAKE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HAVANA23608 2006-12-18 17:00 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXRO8034
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHUB #3608/01 3521700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181700Z DEC 06
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1023
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0013
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0021
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 023608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OTTAWA FOR USINT COM MICHAEL PARMLY 
DEPT FOR H, AND FOR WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 
TAGS: OREP PREL ECON PHUM KDEM CU
SUBJECT: CUBAN REGIME STIFFS CODEL FLAKE 
 
HAVANA 00023608  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Buddy Williams; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A Congressional Delegation led by Rep. Jeff 
Flake (R/AZ) spent the December 15-17 weekend publicly urging 
a change in US policy, but privately getting rebuffed by a 
Cuban regime that insisted it had no reason or desire to 
reform itself.  The CODEL presented a letter requesting 
release of 59 political prisoners and urged the GOC to give 
it something to use if/when the Congress holds hearings in 
2007 on Cuba policy.  Cuban interlocutors, chiefly Foreign 
Minister Perez Roque, Communist Party Foreign Relations 
Secretary Remirez Estenoz, and Assembly president Ricardo 
 
SIPDIS 
Alarcon, told them they were only interested in enhanced 
cooperation with the U.S. on narcotics, migration and 
counter-terrorism.  In a pre-departure press conference the 
CODEL members continued to advocate a change in US policy and 
opening of negotiations with the GOC.  This would respond to 
a line to that effect in Raul Castro's December 2 speech. 
They emphasized, that on the US side, they would look into 
trade, travel and oil exploration.  However, responding to 
questions from international media, the CODEL expressed 
disappointment that Raul Castro wouldn't see them, and one 
member with the GOC's unwillingness to have free elections, 
free access to media, and to respect human rights.  The CODEL 
also repeated in public the GOC's line to them that Fidel 
Castro did not have cancer and was recovering, although 
private discussion of that subject made GOC interlocutors 
nervous.  The CODEL did not meet with dissidents, but 
accepted a letter from some of them urging that any follow-up 
from a recently published GAO report not cut off their 
sources of assistance.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) A bipartisan CODEL led by Reps. Jeff Flake and 
William Delahunt (D/MA) came to Havana December 15 to 17 with 
the express purpose of reaching out to the GOC in response to 
Raul Castro's line in his Armed Forces Day speech regarding 
negotiating with the USG.  The full CODEL roster was as 
follows: 
 
Reps Flake, Delahunt, as noted, 
Michael Conoway (R/TX) 
Lincoln Davis (D/TN) 
Jo An Emerson (R/MO) 
Jane Harman (D/CA) 
Gregory Meeks (D/NY) 
Jerry Moran (R/KS) 
Jim McGovern (D/MA) 
Hilda Solis (D/CA) 
 
Most of the delegation had traveled to Cuba before, had 
worked on the Trade Sanctions Reform Act (TSRA) of 2000, 
and/or were members of the "Cuba Working Group."  They 
advertised themselves as the biggest CODEL to Cuba in 50 
years, and said that the size of the delegation, as well as 
the visit's timing, was significant. 
 
3. (C) Meetings with Cuban Government officials:  Their 
interlocutors were as follows: 
 
-- ALIMPORT Director Pedro Alvarez 
-- Communist Party International Relations Secretary Fernando 
Remirez Estenoz 
-- Basic Industries Minister Yadira Garcia 
-- National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon 
-- Central Bank President Francisco Soberon 
-- Foreign Minister Felipe Perez-Roque. 
 
All of them had a scripted set of talking points and did not 
give the impression that they could speak freely.  CODEL 
members said they had hoped the Cubans could meet them 
halfway and give them something to work with when they held 
hearings in 2007.  Answer:  "The ball is in your court, we 
have no reason or desire to reform our governance.  We are 
the victims of your policy, but would be willing to expand 
cooperation on narcotics, migration and terrorism."  When 
presented with a list of political prisoners that the CODEL 
asked to have released, the Cubans responded criticizing U.S. 
human rights practices, particularly at Guantanamo.  They 
stated the party line on the "Five Heroes" (spies imprisoned 
in the USA) and on the Posada Carriles case.  The ones with 
economic and trade portfolios made the case that Cuba's 
 
HAVANA 00023608  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
economy was booming, and that US Agricultural Exports under 
TSRA were significant (Cuba in 23rd place worldwide as farm 
 
SIPDIS 
export destination), but only a small fraction of the benefit 
potentially available if/when the embargo ends and trade 
opens up.  Perez Roque said that Cuban economic growth is 
strong and irreversible, meaning that Cuba did not need more 
trade with the USA and would not accept any preconditions for 
trade talks.  The CODEL also discussed offshore oil 
exploration with Yadira Garcia. 
 
4. (SBU) Fidel/Raul:  The CODEL had requested a meeting with 
Raul Castro but was not granted one.  When they discussed 
Fidel Castro's health or succession plans the Cuban 
interlocutors got nervous and told them the party line: 
"Fidel is recovering, and does not have cancer."  Fidel 
Castro's medical condition was the subject of media 
questioning at the CODEL's departure press conference.  Rep. 
Harmon repeated what she had been told by the Cubans, adding 
that public statements by intelligence officials on this 
subject should be based on facts. 
 
5. (C) Other meetings:  The CODEL saw Cardinal Jaime Ortega, 
who was supportive of their position against the US embargo, 
saying that it was wrong to wait for a popular pressure to 
change the government of Cuba before engaging with the 
country.  Ortega, on the other had, was critical of Hugo 
Chavez, who he said Cubans would never accept as a 
replacement for Fidel Castro.  The CODEL met with some 
members of the diplomatic corps, all of whom disagree with 
the US embargo, but some of whom described their outreach 
programs with civil society.  The Swiss ambassador also had a 
private meeting with Rep. Flake at which he described GOC 
harassment and administrative squeezing of USINT, and the 
role of the Swiss in seeking solutions to USINT's operational 
problems.  The CODEL did not meet with any dissidents, but 
accepted a letter (via USINT)from Vladimiro Roca (also signed 
by Martha Beatriz Roque, Gisela Delgado and Elizardo Sanchez) 
making the case for continued USAID assistance to the 
democratic opposition, even if the GAO has found a few 
isolated irregularities. 
 
6. (C) USINT Briefing:  COM Parmly hosted and led a briefing 
at The Residence Sunday morning, at which USINT described the 
regime's continuing totalitarian style since Raul Castro took 
charge July 31, with special emphasis on human rights abuses 
and a more realistic appraisal of the Cuban economy.  CODEL 
members pushed hard on what they called the "failure" of US 
policy and the need to relax the embargo, especially the 
travel restrictions.  We replied that containment of the USSR 
took over 50 years to prove that it was the correct policy, 
and was consistent with our values.  Now, with stresses and 
strains about to weigh heavily upon Raul Castro, the 
Administration did not see this as the appropriate time to 
unilaterally give away the embargo, in exchange for nothing. 
COM Parmly reiterated the President's and other senior USG 
officials' comments to the effect that USG policy underscored 
the lead of the Cuban people to bring about change, echoed 
last week by A/S Shannon's statement that Raul Castro's 
negotiation should be with the Cuban people, not with the 
USG.  Additionally, our Coast Guard attache answered 
questions regarding ongoing US working-level contact with the 
GOC on narcotics and migration issues. 
 
7. (SBU) Media:  International media were all over the CODEL 
(septel provides more detail), throughout their visit. 
Members took many opportunities to give on-camera interviews 
and state their views about US policy toward Cuba.  Before 
the final press conference, Rep. Flake released this 
statement: 
 
"It is time for the U.S. to enter a dialogue with Cuba. 
 
America has important interests in Cuba and strong 
disagreements with the Cuban government.  At a time when Cuba 
is changing and the opportunities to advance our interests 
and values in Cuba are not known, we unanimously believe that 
the U.S. should respond positively to the proposal made by 
Raul Castro in his speech of Dec. 2. 
 
No one should be under the illusion that a negotiation with 
Cuba would be easy, or that results would be guaranteed.  But 
if we refuse to engage in normal diplomacy, we are guaranteed 
 
HAVANA 00023608  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
to produce no results at all. 
 
We should be consulting regularly about migration issues, to 
protect national security and to save lives.  We should see 
if more can be done to fight drug trafficking.  We should be 
talking right now about Cuba's offshore oil exploration, 
given its potential impact on our own marine environment.  We 
know there are fugitives from American justice here, and 
there are some in U.S. custody who are of interest to Cuba. 
Perhaps there is the basis of an agreement there. 
 
There may be other areas of opportunity.  Only by probing 
Cuba's proposal is it possible to find out.  Our visit 
provided the first official American contact with senior 
Cuban officials since the delegation of executive powers last 
July 31 (from Fidel to Raul Castro).  We appreciate the time 
and courtesies that our hosts extended throughout our visit." 
 
8. (C) Comment:  If nothing else, this visit proved that the 
current Cuban ruling clique is wedded to its totalitarian 
style, unwilling to make even the slightest concession, even 
when being presented a generous opening offer by the CODEL 
members.  The visit also demonstrates that Cuba's strategy to 
engage a wide swath of the U.S. congress on agricultural 
exports has paid dividends.  The bipartisan nature of the 
delegation is attributable to this strategy.  The CODEL's 
trip reinforced to us that the post-Castro future of Cuba 
should not be plotted out in meetings between the USG and 
Cuba's Gang of Four, but rather by an open consultation 
between the GOC and the Cuban people. 
WILLIAMS