VZCZCXRO3181
OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHUB #3588/01 3461810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121810Z DEC 06
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0997
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 023588 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR H AND FOR WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV ECON PHUM KDEM SMIG CU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL FLAKE: FIDEL EBBING AWAY 
 
HAVANA 00023588  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: CODEL Flake arrives at a pivotal, historic 
time in Cuba.  We and others consider Fidel Castro's health 
to be so critical that he could die any day.  His brother, 
Raul Castro, has been in charge since July 31, 2006, and has 
done nothing to significantly change the Cuban regime's 
totalitarian or anti-American character.  The Cuban people, 
on the other hand, have great expectations for change, are 
pro-American, and are not likely to be as accepting of the 
status quo under Raul as they have been under Fidel.  The 
peaceful pro-democratic opposition has thought through what 
their country's post-communist future should look like, 
although for now they lack the horsepower to themselves force 
change.  The U.S. Government, having recently updated its 
assessments and contingency plans with the June release of 
the report from the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba 
(CAFC-II), stands ready to assist a democratic transition. 
What we are not ready to do is legitimize a hereditary 
succession from one dictator to another, without any 
consultation with the Cuban people.  Our public statements 
have placed the responsibility for reform with Cubans on the 
island, and called upon the ruling clique to release 
political prisoners, dismantle the police state, and permit 
the development of political parties, civil society and a 
free market.  The regime's answer has been to flex its 
police-state muscles and stifle opposition.  Subsidies from 
Venezuela have played a key role in keeping the dictatorship 
afloat.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Fidel Incapacitated:  The regime announced on July 
31 that Fidel Castro was too ill to lead the country and that 
Raul Castro would be "temporarily" in charge.  Since then 
Fidel Castro has appeared in brief videos and met a handful 
of VIP visitors to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit the second 
week in September.  Fidel Castro's non-appearance at December 
2 anniversary events commemorating 50 years of the rebel army 
and 80 years of his life is the best indicator that he is 
probably near death.  Even if kept alive into 2007, we do not 
expect him to be actively involved in running the country. 
He has not spoken in public since July 26. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Raul Equals Continuity:  Raul Castro as acting 
president has made a few cabinet changes, but not in the 
direction of reform.  His speeches to the Non-aligned 
Movement and on the December 2 anniversaries were doctrinaire 
and anti-American, but without his brother's long-windedness 
or histrionics.  State-run media have run stories about 
corruption in the economy, but with a view towards squeezing 
more efficiency and discipline from the communist system.  A 
state-run labor conference in October also decreed tighter 
discipline, ideological rigor and better output within an 
unchanged command-economy.  Two billion dollars per year in 
Venezuelan subsidies, plus a similar amount in revenue from 
tourism help keep this inefficient system from collapsing 
entirely of its own weight. And human rights abuses have 
continued as ugly as ever.  For example: 
 
-- In Havana on December 10, International Human Rights Day, 
a mob of at least 200 communist militants directed by at 
least 100 State Security officials violently broke up a 
peaceful march by 12 peaceful activists in front of the 
UNESCO building. 
 
-- In Santa Clara on October 10, the opening day of a 
conference of independent librarians, militants brutally 
attacked two dissidents.  Orestes Suarez Torres, a welder, 
and his wife Nancy Gonzalez Garcia, a cigar roller, were left 
with black eyes, deep bruises and cuts.  The husband also 
suffered broken ribs, and the wife had her trousers ripped 
off. 
 
-- In Havana on November 24, 63 members of opposition youth 
groups held a meeting.  Afterwards, the Government detained 
or threatened at least six participants, one of whom was 
informed he will likely be charged with espionage. 
 
-- In Pinar del Rio in November, guards at Taco Taco prison 
showed up at political prisoner Orlando Zapata's cell and 
hauled him away for a forced and bloody shave and haircut. 
When he objected, the guards punched him in the head 
repeatedly and kicked him in the stomach. 
 
-- In Las Tunas on August 3, 100 militants staged an "act of 
 
HAVANA 00023588  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
repudiation" in front of the home of the family of political 
prisoner Jose Garcia Paneque.  His wife, Yamile Llanes, was 
home with 11 youngsters when the mob arrived.  The children 
started crying when a member of the mob shouted, "Let's set 
the house on fire and burn the worms!"  One seven-year-old 
girl remains traumatized. 
 
Although the Raul-led regime released one political prisoner 
from the 2003 group of 75, it also detained others; the net 
number of documented political prisoners remains over 300 by 
mid-December. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Change:  Cubans from all over the island tell us 
they expect changes after Fidel Castro dies; however, it is 
not clear who or what will be the agent of that change. 
Leading dissidents (Oswaldo Paya, Martha Beatriz Roque, 
Vladimiro Roca) have organizations that have planned for 
change, but do not themselves have the means to force the 
regime's hand.  They expect that the stresses and strains on 
Raul from elsewhere in "the palace" or from popular pressure 
to improve standards of living will force the regime to 
collapse.  That said, in the short term, Raul Castro still 
commands all the security forces, including the pervasive spy 
network run by the Ministry of Interior.  In 48 years of 
rule, the regime has been most successful in instilling fear, 
which has the effect of immobilizing many would-be 
dissidents.  In this environment, and with no immediate 
prospects of improving their lives economically, most young 
Cubans' preferred option is to migrate to the United States. 
We issue over 20,000 travel documents per year, and more than 
5,000 others migrate illegally. 
 
¶5. (SBU) USG's Principled Position:  Raul Castro mentioned, 
in a December 2 speech that was largely anti-American, that 
he was ready to sit down with the USG and negotiate our 
differences.  Our reaction, which has earned effusive support 
from Cuba's democratic opposition, is that Raul Castro needs 
to consult with the Cuban people first.  We, along with some 
of our allies, have also made public a call to release all 
political prisoners, a point which unites the entire 
dissident movement, and is the raison d'etre of the "Ladies 
in White," who have continued to march every Sunday after 
attending mass to pray for the release of their loved ones. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The other aspects of our relationship with Cuba are 
clearly spelled out by Helms-Burton and other legislation, 
and by the recommendations in the CAFC reports.  We are 
reaching out both to the opposition and, to the extent 
possible, to the Cuban people.  Our aim is to help to break 
through Cuba's information blockade, and seek to deny 
resources to the regime, which we are certain would make ill 
use of them -- financing anti-American propaganda, assaults 
on fragile democracies, and keeping in place the police-state 
apparatus.  As Raul Castro was making his oft-quoted 
reference to negotiations with the USG, his government was 
holding USINT government property hostage at Cuban ports, 
along with private property of USINT staff.  Our staff is the 
object of systematic spying, harassment, break-ins at our 
residences and other abuses. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  We expect the Cuban regime to warmly 
receive CODEL Flake because they've read the advance media 
reports and expect the CODEL will call for changes in US 
policy towards Cuba.  We see this as an opportunity:  To 
teach the Cuban regime a lesson in separation of powers; and 
provide US Members of Congress with a chance to express their 
views to senior regime officials about democratization, human 
rights and free markets. 
PARMLY