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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9212
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1896
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1925
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1934
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0727

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINL SNAR TI AF
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN'S NEW CABINET: PRO-RUSSIAN OLD GUARD ENSCONCED ON 
SECURITY AND BORDER ISSUES 
 
REF: DUSHANBE 2171 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy, 
Dushanbe, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  Despite some pre-election hints 
that Tajik President  Rahmonov planned to clean house in the 
Defense and Security Ministries, the old guard remains firmly 
ensconced and has consolidated power by incorporating the Border 
Guards into the security structure.  After winning a solid 
victory in the November 6 presidential election, Rahmonov had an 
opportunity to replace Soviet-style thinkers with more 
progressive officials.  Instead, a pro-Russian cohort will 
continue to maintain a tight grip on the power ministries. 
 
¶2.  (C)  After a period of strong U.S.-Tajik cooperation with 
the Border Guards on counternarcotics and counterterrorism, the 
transfer of General Zuhurov from the Border Guards to the State 
Committee on National Security may mean less U.S. access to 
border facilities and programs, and less information sharing and 
oversight of U.S. assistance programs.  With the reappointment 
of General Nazarov to the Drug Control Agency, our strong 
partnership will continue to support national and regional 
counternarcotics efforts.  Overall, the new cabinet means U.S. 
border, law enforcement and military assistance will continue on 
a working level, but the top-level access so highly valued in 
Tajikistan may remain difficult within the Defense and Interior 
ministries and the reorganized Security apparatus.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (U)  This is one of four cables examining the impact of 
Tajikistan's restructured government and President Rahmonov's 
new cabinet on U.S. bilateral and regional security priorities. 
 (See reftel on November 30 government re-organization and 
cabinet appointments.)  The other reports look at economic 
growth and regional economic integration, democracy and human 
rights, and the bigger picture of Tajikistan's future. 
 
THE NEW STATE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
¶4.  (C)  After rumors that Border Guard Head General Zuhurov had 
been tapped to lead the new State Committee for National 
Security, the reappointment instead of former Minister of 
Security Abdurahimov did not bode well for U.S. cooperation on 
security issues.  As Minister of Security, Abdurahimov 
repeatedly refused meetings with the Ambassador and other 
visiting officials.  By contrast, we had enjoyed a productive, 
open relationship with General Zuhurov and relied on his frank 
communication and effective leadership to implement many 
assistance programs.  Zuhurov has now been transferred to head 
the Committee for the Protection of State Secrets.  Except for 
Colonel Tojibaev, head of the Border Guards' International 
Department, Zuhurov's deputies have been released from their 
positions.  Former Deputy Minister of Defense Major General 
Sheralisho Mirzoev takes control of the renamed "Main 
Directorate of Border Troops" accountable to the State Committee 
on National Security under Abdurahimov. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Compared with the easy access to General Zuhurov, going 
through the State Committee for Security for all border-related 
issues might slow communication and create delays in 
implementing programs.  Several key U. S. programs are at risk 
if our ability to provide oversight and conduct frank exchanges 
with the Border Guards diminishes as feared under the 
reorganization.  The State Department's International Law 
Enforcement and Narcotics (INL) -funded salary supplement 
project, due to begin in 2007, was aimed at revising Border 
Guard deployment strategies, placing emphasis on the Afghan 
border while improving the morale and quality of officers and 
preventing corruption.  However, if the new Committee restricts 
our oversight or access to top border officials, we may need to 
reevaluate.  An ongoing INL program with the former Ministry of 
Security to renovate training facilities, if it goes as planned, 
could provide an indication of the newly reorganized State 
Committee on National Security attitude toward USG assistance. 
 
¶6.  (C) One somewhat positive outcome of the consolidation of 
the Ministry of Security and Border Guards could be a freer flow 
of intelligence information between the Tajik forces, resulting 
in a synergy of both entities' enforcement capacity and thus 
 
DUSHANBE 00002201  002 OF 003 
 
 
better understanding and more aggressive protection of the 
border against terrorists, drugs and contraband.  However, the 
United States would likely not be as active a partner in border 
activities as we have been in past years, particularly give 
Abdurahimov's pro-Russian leanings, close ties to the Russian 
security services, and proven reluctance to share intelligence. 
 
¶7.  (C) Rumors are circulating that Rahmonov had indeed signed a 
decree appointing Zuhurov head of the new security committee, 
which would explain why initial press reports named Zuhurov to 
the post.  However, Abdurahimov supposedly appealed to Hasan 
Saidulloev, President Rahmonov's brother-in-law, to intervene 
and reappoint him.  As the president's relative and confidant, 
Saidulloev exerts great influence on policy and controls many 
key industries and businesses in Tajikistan.  If the head of the 
State Committee on National Security is beholden to Saidulloev, 
the first brother-in-law could use that relationship to his 
economic and political advantage. 
 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
 
¶8.  (C) Minister of Defense Sherali Khairrulloev retains his 
position, despite initial reports that National Guard head 
General Rahmonaliev would take his place.  Khairrulloev, the 
former First Deputy Commander of Ministry of Interior, has been 
noticeably out of his league since his appointment as Minister 
of Defense in 1995.   His focus has been on extracting materiel 
resources from international donors to build up the Ministry of 
Defense, which inherited no heavy equipment after the break-up 
of the Soviet Union.  He clearly feels more comfortable as a 
Russian client and does not really understand the U.S. focus on 
capacity-building rather than "drop and run" equipment supplies. 
 
¶9.  (C) Recently, however, he has made some very limited moves 
towards implementing U.S. organizational recommendations and we 
can only hope this trend will continue.  Retaining Khairrulloev 
as Defense Minister may be a mark of presidential confidence, 
but it may also be a sign the ministry will continue to be 
sidelined, as the State Committee on National Security, Border 
Troops and the Ministry of Interior become more important in 
national defense. 
 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
 
¶10.  (C) Rahmonov appointed his former Chief of Staff Mamadnazar 
Salehov to replace outgoing Interior Minister Humdin Sharipov. 
Although we had little contact with Sharipov, Salehov is known 
as an old-school conservative and an old ally of the president 
from Kulob.  U.S. projects with the Ministry of Interior work 
with specialized units whose command has not changed and we will 
continue to support their training and capacity building. 
Salehov will probably not object to the training and capacity 
building for his forces, but may not be an accessible contact. 
We will need to test the waters over the next several weeks to 
determine his level of cooperation. 
 
DRUG CONTROL AGENCY 
 
¶11.  (C) Although he had quietly aspired to a higher position 
such as Foreign Minister or Defense Minister, General Rustam 
Nazarov retained his position as head of the Drug Control 
Agency, which continues to report directly to the presidential 
administration.  The U.S. funds the agency through the UN's 
Office of Drugs and Crime and will continue to enjoy good access 
and cooperation with Nazarov and his staff. 
 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER CONTROL 
 
¶13.  (C) Rahmonov's restructuring broke up the Ministry of State 
Revenues and Taxes, which previously supervised the Customs 
authorities, and created an independent Customs Service that 
reports directly to the central government.  Gurez Zaripov, 
former Deputy Minister of State Revenues and Taxes, will lead 
the Customs Service.  Zaripov may have the power to implement 
much needed customs reform, but the new arrangement may also 
mean a more direct stream of revenue to the president's 
administration. 
 
¶14.  (C) COMMENT:  Regardless of the leadership of certain 
ministries, President Rahmonov has repeatedly noted that 
Tajikistan shares the U.S. security goals in the region, 
 
DUSHANBE 00002201  003 OF 003 
 
 
including fighting drug trafficking and terrorism.  All of 
Tajikistan's forces desperately need equipment, basic 
infrastructure and improved training, and our assistance 
programs have provided us entree into the Ministries of Security 
and Interior that mere diplomatic relations did not.  However, 
we will greatly miss General Zuhurov's solid partnership and 
direct communication as the Border Guards become an arm of the 
security service.  END COMMENT. 
JACOBSON