VZCZCXRO4665
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #5349/01 3370737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030737Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2535
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 005349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA; NSC FOR MARCHESE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY
SUBJECT: SARG FEELING CONFIDENT IS THE MESSAGE TO STAFFDEL 
TALWAR 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Charge D'Affairs Michael Corbin 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Professional staff member on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Puneet Talwar, held meetings in 
Damascus November 22 with an opposition member, informal SARG 
advisor, journalist, and others.  The common perspective from 
the meetings is that the SARG feels it is  operating from a 
position of strength and is willing to be helpful on Iraq, 
but continues to focus on maintaining the stability of the 
regime.  It is also focused on events in Lebanon and has 
become alarmed about the formation of the international 
tribunal to investigate the murder of former PM Hariri. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) PROSPECTS FOR THE OPPOSITION IN SYRIA: Opposition 
leader XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the SARG feels it has prevailed 
after a difficult period and that time has vindicated its 
confrontational policies, as evidenced by recent EU 
re-engagement.  He said the opposition elements are concerned 
that the West, in this new environment, will forget about 
their efforts to build democracy in Syria, although he 
reported that he had been told that the EU did commit to 
imposing human rights conditions on their engagement with 
Syria.  He asked that the United States make a similar 
commitment if it proceeded towards engagement, asserting that 
without international scrutiny the SARG would crush the 
opposition.  He argued that while the regime maintains a few 
reform figures, like Abdullah al-Dardari, for public 
consumption, the regime is not capable of real reform.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
asserted that the regime has developed a powerful rhetoric of 
fear to deflect internal pressures, which leaves average 
Syrians feeling they must either support the regime or face 
Islamic extremists and Iraq-style instability and violence. 
 
¶3.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that despite regime pressure the opposition 
has managed over the last four months to strengthen the 
organization of the Damascus Declaration (DD) group.  He says 
the group, formed after the Damascus Declaration of 16 
October 2005, brings together credible leaders from across 
Syria, and is composed of diverse groups, including 
communists, Arab nationalists, liberals, Kurds, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB).  He says that despite regime efforts 
to sow discord between the groups, they are now working 
together towards a common democratic goal and have supporters 
both in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in the United States. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Regarding Abdul-Halim Khaddam, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the 
former regime figure is a real thorn in the side of the 
Bashar al-Asad regime, especially because he has the ability 
to speak knowledgeably about inner-circle corruption and to 
appeal to some Sunnis.  However, Khaddam is fatally tainted 
by his own corruption and his long-term association with the 
regime of Hafez al-Asad.  As such, Khaddam is not acceptable 
to the DD group as a figure with whom they are willing to 
cooperate, although the DD group does not publicly criticize 
his National Salvation Front, wishes him well in his efforts 
to damage the regime, and thinks the two can work in 
parallel.  The group has decided to continue partnering with 
the MB, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
¶5.  (C) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTING DEMOCRACY IN SYRIA: 
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that because the United States has lost credibility 
in the region, most recently because of its veto of the 
resolution on Beit Hannoun in the Security Council, the U.S. 
needs to partner with Europe on democracy and human rights 
issues.  He encouraged the U.S. to exploit weaknesses in the 
regime's propaganda, including: 
 
--finding a fair solution in Palestine to undercut Asad's 
rhetoric as defender of the Palestinian people; 
 
--exposing the corruption of regime supporters who claim to 
be high-minded, virtuous supporters of Islam; and, 
 
--identifying regime members as perpetrators of the 
assassinations in Lebanon. 
 
He also suggested that the United States encourage the Saudis 
to allow Saudi-owned media such as Al-Hayat or Al-Arabiya to 
publish negative articles about Asad and positive articles 
about Muslim life in the United States.  He further suggested 
that the U.S. press the Saudis to give Khaddam much greater 
access to their influential regional media.  He expressed 
doubt that a statement on human rights released by the United 
States would be useful at the present time. 
 
DAMASCUS 00005349  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) PRO-REGIME ANALYST ASSERTS SYRIA'S KEY ROLE IN THE 
REGION: XXXXXXXXXXXX, a pro-regime foreign policy analyst, 
said time has proven Syria plays a key role in the region and 
that the SARG cannot be overthrown by a coup d,etat.  He 
asserted that the SARG is ready to cooperate with the United 
States if it accepts Syria as a partner with common interests 
in obtaining peace in the Middle East.  XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that 
the United States needs the rationality of the 
secular-oriented Asad regime to counter ideological 
extremists in the area, noting SARG efforts to arrest 
Al-Qaeda members in Syria.  He also claimed that Syria is not 
in the pocket of Iran, but merely using the relationship to 
pragmatically guarantee Syria's interests. 
 
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX briefly outlined Syria's goals in the region. 
He claimed that although the SARG is willing to compromise in 
Lebanon, it does not want an anti-Syrian Lebanese government 
and feels attacked by the recent acceleration of the 
international tribunal formation.  He also noted that while 
"Syria is currently the lung of Hizballah" and intensely 
concerned about developments there, the SARG will not need to 
be so involved in Lebanon once it gets back the Golan and is 
assured through a revitalized peace process that Israel will 
not seek to use Lebanese territory for invasion routes into 
Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that towards this end Syria wants to 
re-start the larger peace process and that it has not been 
responsible for blocking the unity government in Palestine. 
Regarding Iraq, XXXXXXXXXXXX said Syria is concerned about the 
violence and is willing to work with the United States, 
although he did not offer many specifics. 
 
¶8. (C) SARG FEELINGS OF VICTORY: XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that the Syrian regime's position 
had changed over the last year, from extreme insecurity and 
fears of regime change after the Hariri assassination, to a 
growing confidence that has turned into surging feelings of 
SARG confidence, especially following the Hizballah-Israel 
war in Lebanon.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that President Asad no 
longer cares as much about his image as a reformer that was 
publicized at the beginning of his Presidency, instead 
shoring up his legitimacy with his assiduous efforts to 
support the resistance in Palestine and Lebanon.  He says 
this shift has empowered Asad and that his more 
confrontational posture and his anti-Israeli, anti-American, 
pro-Hizballah rhetoric have greatly increased his popularity 
and standing with the Syrian public XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that 
the regime was not overly concerned about bilateral tensions 
with Saudi Arabia or Egypt, noting relations with Egypt are 
already on the mend, and that relations with Saudi Arabia 
would necessarily improve over time as the Saudis inevitably 
realize that Syria had an indispensable role to play in 
Lebanon and Iraq. 
 
¶9. (C) GOOD COP, BAD COP:  XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that recently 
President Asad is using Vice-President al-Shara'a to play the 
"bad cop" and FM Mu'allim to serve as the "good cop" in 
international politics, and asserted that since meeting with 
Baker in September Mu'allim has enhanced his status inside 
the regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that Mu'allim pushes for 
engagement with the U.S. to achieve a settlement in the 
Golan, asserts Syria needs Europe for economic profit, and 
speaks of Syria as a constructive player in the resolution of 
regional problems, while Shara'a tends to deny Syria's need 
to make concessions on any of these fronts, believing it is 
in a position of strength and benefits from its current 
posture of confrontation and delay.  XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that by 
isolating Syria the United States has inadvertently 
strengthened Shara'a and the hardliners, and through 
engagement would strengthen the moderates. 
 
¶10. (C) MU'ALLIM's TRIP TO IRAQ: XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that from a 
Syrian perspective Mu'allim's trip to Iraq has three 
significant components: it's the first time in 25 years that 
a high ranking Syrian official had gone to Iraq; the trip 
signified the resumption of diplomatic ties between the two 
countries; and this was the first time a "senior-level" Arab 
official stayed for a three-day visit in Iraq.  He asserted 
that Mu'allim would not attend a summit in Iran because the 
purpose of the trip to Iraq to was to strengthen Syria's 
"Arab hand," not the Iranian hand, and that traveling to Iran 
would undercut the international goodwill that may have been 
generated by Syria engaging with Iraq.  While XXXXXXXXXXXX thought 
Syria was more willing to be helpful in Iraq than Lebanon, he 
asserted that Syria's capacity for influence in Iraq was 
weaker than commonly believed among Shiites and Kurds, and 
only moderately useful among Baathist elements in the Sunni 
 
DAMASCUS 00005349  003 OF 003 
 
 
camp. 
 
¶11.  (C) Staffdel Talwar cleared this cable. 
 
CORBIN