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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0514

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 00123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INS, USPACOM FOR FP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTE MARR CE IN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS INDIANHIGH COMMISSIONER ON 
U.S.-SRI LANKAN MILITARY DISUSSIONS 
 
REF: 190653Z DEC 06 
 
Classified By: Abassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. for reasons 
1.4 (b and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Ambassador hosted a one-on-on lunch for Indian High 
Commissioner Alok Prasad n December 22, hours after Prasad 
presented his credentials to President Rajapakse.  The 
Ambassado told Prasad that he and his Embassy colleagues 
looked forward to working very closely with Prasad and his 
mission to share information and coordinate our messages to 
the Government of Sri Lanka, since the U.S. and India share 
virtually identical interests in Sri Lanka.  Prasad fully 
endorsed the importance of very close coordination, noting 
that the U.S. and India were the most influential countries 
in Sri Lanka and therefore should work closely to ensure 
maximum impact. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador briefed Prasad on the request the 
Embassy had received earlier in the week from the Sri Lankan 
Navy Commander for USG assistance in locating and 
interdicting three LTTE ships believed to be 600 nautical 
miles south of Sri Lanka (ref).  Ambassador told Prasad he 
had received the Navy Commander's blessing to brief Prasad on 
the Sri Lankan request since the USG wanted to be transparent 
with India, both because of our close bilateral relations, 
but also because the Indian Navy was active throughout the 
southern Indian Ocean making close coordination a must.  The 
Ambassador noted that PACOM was now studying what the US 
military might do to respond to the Sri Lankan request.  The 
Ambassador told Prasad the Sri Lankans had not approached the 
Indians directly because they believe that Tamil Nadu 
politics would likely preclude Indian action on this matter. 
That said, Ambassador noted that President Bush and PM Singh 
had agreed during the President's visit to India earlier in 
the year that maritime cooperation on such matters as piracy 
and smuggling marked a promising new area in which to expand 
cooperation.  Cooperation to help Sri Lanka interdict LTTE 
arms shipments would be an equally promising area for 
cooperation.  If India was interested in helping the U.S. and 
Sri Lanka regarding the three LTTE ships, the U.S. would be 
open to such cooperation.  Prasad thanked the Ambassador for 
letting him know about the Sri Lankan request, promised to 
report this back to Delhi, but did not venture an opinion on 
whether India might want to participate. 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador also briefed Prasad that he had asked the 
Sri Lankan Navy Commander to brief the Indian High Commission 
on USG plans to install by mid-2007 land-based radars in 
Trincomalee, Point Pedro (Jaffna) and Mannar to improve Sri 
Lanka's capability to detect and track sea-based weapons and 
other smuggling by the LTTE.  Prasad responded that the Sri 
Lankan Navy had indeed briefed his Defense Attache.  In the 
spirit of transparency he noted that the Indian military 
might object to the radar at Point Pedro since it was so 
close to India that its purpose might be misconstrued. 
Ambassador explained that the purpose of the Point Pedro site 
was to give Sri Lanka the capability to monitor frequent LTTE 
ship movements to the east, north and west of Jaffna, not in 
any way to monitor or spy on India.  Prasad, who served as 
India's Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington from 2001-2004, 
laughed and said he understood that, but others in the Indian 
system might not. 
 
¶4.  (C) Comment:  This was a good, friendly start to what we 
are confident will be a very close working relationship. 
With respect to India's concerns about the proposed radar 
site at Point Pedro, the Embassy will plan to have ODC Chief 
Major Miller meet with the Indian DATT in January to brief 
him more fully on the planned capabilities of the radar at 
Point Pedro to relieve possible Indian concerns and discuss 
options. 
 
 
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