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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CANBERRA 001940 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP, EB, CA, P AND IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS AS FJ NZ
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA DECLINES FIJI'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY 
INTERVENTION; PLANS TO CUT DEFENSE TIES AND IMPOSE TRAVEL 
BAN ON BAINIMARAMA AND SUPPORTERS 
 
REF: STATE 195037 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole, for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (C) Australia declined a request by Fijian Prime Minister 
Qarase for Australian military intervention to prevent a coup 
by the RFMF Commander Bainimarama.  In reaction to events, 
the Australian Foreign Minister announced December 5 
Australia would suspend defense ties with Fiji, including 
imposing a travel ban on Fijian military personnel and any 
others involved in the "creeping coup."  Meanwhile, senior 
Australian and New Zealand officials discussed with visiting 
EAP/ANP Director Steven McGann coordinating policy responses 
to events in Fiji during a December 5 Canberra-Wellington 
digital video conference, outlining the range of sanctions 
under consideration by both governments.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
AUSTRALIA REFUSES TO INTERVENE 
------------------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Howard told the press December 5 that 
Fijian Prime Minister Qarase had telephoned him that morning 
to request Australian military intervention to prevent a coup 
by Fijian military commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. 
Howard said he had declined the request because it was "not 
in Australia's national interest" to intervene, adding that 
he could not countenance Australian and Fijian troops 
fighting one another on the streets of Suva. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
OA TO SUSPEND DEFENSE TIES, IMPOSE TRAVEL BAN ON COUP 
PERPETRATORS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶3. (SBU) In Parliament December 5, Foreign Minister Downer 
strongly condemned the attempted overthrow of a 
democratically-elected government, deploring the behavior of 
both Bainimarama and Fiji President Iloilo in supporting the 
RFMF chief in what he termed a "creeping coup."  Warning that 
the international response to a coup would be "swift and 
sharp," Downer announced Australia would suspend defence ties 
with Fiji as soon as it became apparent that the Prime 
Minister could not longer govern.  The suspension of military 
and defense cooperation would include a ban on all travel of 
Bainimarama and his family members, Bainimaram's supporters, 
and any others who might be part of an unconstitutional 
government.  He alluded to the UN Secretary General's warning 
that Fiji might be removed from peacekeeping operations, and 
said the GOA would consider taking other steps against an 
illegal government in Fiji as well, possibly to include 
recommending suspension from the Commonwealth and removal of 
Fiji from the chairmanship of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). 
 (Other steps under consideration by Australia are detailed 
in para 6 below.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
U.S.-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND DVC ON POLICY RESPONSES TO FIJI 
COUP 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶4. (C) Earlier on December 5, visiting EAP/ANP Director 
Steven McGann held a DVC with Australia's DFAT Pacific 
Division First Assistant Secretary David A. Ritchie and New 
Zealand Deputy Foreign Secretary Alan Williams with the aim 
of discussing trilateral coordination of policy responses to 
a possible coup in Fiji.  McGann noted the United States 
would need to consider carefully when to declare events in 
Suva a "coup," which would trigger immediate suspension of 
all aid under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations 
Appropriation Act.  The U.S. might initially declare that "an 
unlawful or unconstitutional change of government" had taken 
place, which would allow flexibility in ending assistance to 
 
CANBERRA 00001940  002 OF 004 
 
 
coup perpetrators while maintaining assistance to the 
civilian population. 
 
------------------------- 
NEW ZEALAND'S PROPOSED STEPS 
------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Prime Minister Clark shared the U.S. view, Williams 
explained.  Rather than wait for a formal announcement of a 
coup by Fiji, New Zealand planned to take steps upon unlawful 
removal of the Fiji government's authority due to 
"unconstitutional actions by the military in Fiji."  Three 
immediate steps the GNZ planned to take, subject to approval 
by Prime Minister Clark, were: 
-- Imposing travel bans on RFMF officers and their families, 
as well as others involved in the coup; 
-- Supporting Commonwealth sanctions, including possibly 
expulsion from the Commonwealth; 
-- Suspending bilateral defense ties, except for maritime 
patrols aimed at illegal fishing or humanitarian operations 
such as search-and-rescue missions.  The latter step would 
include suspending military visits and training. (Note:  As 
this cable was in preparation, Prime Minister Clark announced 
implementation of the steps above.  See also Ref A.) 
 
¶6. (C) Beyond the immediate actions, New Zealand was 
considering other sanctions, including: suspension of 
high-level contacts; a freeze on the recent labor mobility 
initiative announced at the PIF that would permit Fijians to 
work in New Zealand;  other immigration measures, such as 
suspending Fiji's eligibility under the access quota; 
targeted cessation of aid that directly assisted the Fijian 
government (but not aid for the "lower-end" population); a 
sports ban; removing Fiji as chair of the Pacific Island 
Forum (PIF), and freezing of financial assets.  Williams said 
New Zealand was not prepared to invoke trade sanctions or to 
recall either its High Commissioner or its Defense Attache 
from Suva, except for consultations. 
 
--------------------------- 
AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE TO COUP 
--------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Australia was considering similar sanctions, David 
Ritchie said, although the GOA did not envision their phased 
implementation.  Australian sanctions under consideration 
that had been endorsed by FM Downer included: 
-- Imposing travel bans on Fijian coup perpetrators and those 
recruited to an interim government; 
-- Suspending defense cooperation, including funding and 
technical support for the Pacific Patrol Boat program; 
-- Ending technical assistance to the RFMF; 
-- Expelling Fijian students at Australian military training 
academies; 
-- Recommending Commonwealth sanctions; 
-- Removing Fiji as chair of the PIF (noting this was up to 
PIF Secretary Greg Urwin); 
-- Seeking further statements from the UN Secretary General 
and UN Security Council; 
-- Urging other countries to impose sanctions.  (Ritchie 
noted France and approached the GOA, indicating it wished to 
cooperate in putting pressure on Fiji.) 
-- Imposing financial sanctions on Commander Bainimarama; 
-- Urging the UN to name a Special Representative to Fiji; 
-- Urging withdrawal from United Nations peacekeeping 
operations; and 
-- Examining further actions/sanctions under the Biketawa 
Declaration. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
U.S. REDLINE ON REMOVING FIJI FROM PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶8. (C) McGann stressed Washington's concern that parties not 
rush to remove Fiji's participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations, noting the importance of Fiji to UN peacekeeping 
 
CANBERRA 00001940  003 OF 004 
 
 
operations in Baghdad and elsewhere.  Williams acknowledged 
the need to ensure that important peacekeeping operations, 
such as in Baghdad and Darfur, not be hindered, but drew 
attention to the impact such suspension might make on the 
Fijian military, which is highly dependent on PKO 
remittances.  Moreover, he pointed out, the effect of 
reducing military assistance to Fiji would be to degrade the 
RFMF's capability, thus making Fiji less acceptable for 
peacekeeping operations.  The United Nations itself would 
need to make a determination whether poor discipline of 
Fijian troops or adverse impact caused by conditions in their 
home country might disqualify them from PKO participation. 
Ritchie concurred, adding that Australia might consider 
stopping payments to Fijian military elements under the 
Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI).  Williams agreed, saying it would remove 
Fiji's credentials as an upholder of good government, but 
cautioned that such move not expand into UN PKO issues.  He 
supported retaining the Fijian police component in RAMSI. 
 
¶9. (C) McGann outlined USG considerations and options for 
responding to the situation in Fiji, including possibly 
endorsing the suggestion that Fiji be removed as PIF chair. 
Unlike New Zealand and Australia, which saw value in issuing 
statements in advance of a coup, the U.S. did not want to 
make any pre-emptive statement, but wanted to act when an 
unlawful change had occurred, including imposing travel bans 
and other steps.  McGann said the U.S. would not recall its 
Ambassador to Suva, who would be key in coordinating the U.S. 
response.  McGann said EAP DAS Davies planned to convene 
countries represented at the Nandy PIF to outline U.S. steps 
in detail.  Ritchie said the GOA planned to call PIF 
countries together for a briefing on the afternoon of 
December 5.  Williams noted the importance of seeking views 
of India. 
 
¶10. (C) In the midst of the DVC, Williams relayed breaking 
news that Fiji President Iloilo had announced that the 
military could take over the government; the Australian and 
New Zealand participants concluded that the President was 
acting outside his constitutional authority and that their 
governments would likely make statements later in the day. 
All agreed to continue close coordination, including with 
other countries that had been represented at the PIF. 
 
--------------------- 
EMINENT PERSONS GROUP 
--------------------- 
¶11. (C) In a discussion about the Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG), McGann said the United States was not prepared to 
nominate a representative in advance of a coup but could 
issue a statement associating the United States with the 
EPG's objectives of urging adherence to the rule of law. 
The U.S. might be interested in participating in a post-coup 
EPG that sought to restore constitutional government, he 
added.  Williams questioned whether the EPG would have any 
utility, but pledged New Zealand support it if the current 
Fijian Government asked for an EPG to visit.   He listed 
several suggestions by PIF Secretary Greg Urwin regarding 
composition of the EPG.  (Note:  Ref A was not received until 
after the DVC.  Embassy will convey substance separately to 
First Assistant Secretary Ritchie.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ACCEPT INVITATION TO FEBRUARY 1 
SUBREGIONAL CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶12. (SBU) Williams and Ritchie accepted McGann's invitation 
to participate in the United States subregional Chiefs of 
Mission conference in Honolulu on February 1. 
 
¶13. (U) This message was cleared with Embassy Wellington. 
EAP/ANP Director McGann did not have an opportunity to review 
 
CANBERRA 00001940  004 OF 004 
 
 
this message prior to his departure from Canberra. 
 
MCCALLUM