VZCZCXRO7581
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHCN
DE RUEHCI #0543/01 3381159
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041159Z DEC 06
FM AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1298
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1168
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 0472
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0470
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0197
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0086
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0299
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0120
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0129
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 0046
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0231
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1595

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, SCA/INS, EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/4/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER IN BM
SUBJECT: TO KEEP CHINESE OUT, INDIA SEEKS CLOSER TIES WITH BURMA 
 
REF: A) NEW DELHI 7514, B) CALCUTTA 0481, C) RANGOON 1670, D) CALCUTTA 0516 
 
CALCUTTA 00000543  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Henry V. Jardine, Principle Officer, U.S. 
Consulate, Kolkata. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The GOI recently provided arms to Burma for 
use in counter-insurgency operations along the Indo-Burma 
border.  The GOI hopes to stop the activities of especially 
violent insurgent groups the United Liberation Front of Asom 
(ULFA) and the United Liberation Front (UNLF), but the GOB has 
so far focused its operations against the National Socialist 
Council of Nagalim-Khaplang (NSCN-K).  While seeking help in 
tackling its insurgency problem, India has other reasons for 
cozying up to the GOB: countering China's influence and natural 
gas.  Reasons enough, in India's view, to ignore Burma's dismal 
human rights record.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The GOI recently transferred weapons, including 
howitzers and related equipment, to Burma (reftel A).  This 
hardware transfer is to assist the Burmese Army in eliminating 
insurgent camps operated by ULFA, UNLF and the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) inside Burmese territory.  UNLF and PLA 
are Manipur-based insurgent groups know for their violent 
tactics.  ULFA has also increased it's attacks recently (reftel 
B) as it pushes for independence for ethnic Assamese.  ULFA and 
the Manipur-based rebels frequently cross into Burma from India 
to escape GOI troops, and are known to maintain camps inside 
Burma. 
 
¶3.  (C) The GOI expects Burmese operations against all of the 
groups - "sanitizing the border region" as one policy analyst 
described it.  Early media reports about Burmese operations 
indicate that at least three bases of the NSCN-K and ULFA - 
Chuiyang Noknu, Challam, and Longjie - have fallen to Burmese 
forces.  The initial focus on operations against the NSCN-K is 
probably because NSCN-K chairman S.S. Khaplang is an ethnic 
Burmese and the NSCN-K has long claimed a portion of Burmese 
territory as part of its ethnic homeland, maintaining its 
headquarters there.  (Note: India has cease-fire agreements with 
the two main Naga insurgent groups, but has only held peace 
talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak 
Muivah (NSCN-IM) and not the NSCN-K.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Cooperation with Burma also facilitates two other GOI 
interests:  containment of China and construction of a gas 
pipeline from Burma's Shwe fields to India (reftel C).  China is 
providing assistance to the GOB for modernization of Burma's 
naval bases at Hainggyi, Mun Aung, Sittwe, Zadetkyi Mergui, and 
the Coco Islands.  That assistance, combined with China's 2005 
deal with Pakistan to construct a deep sea port at Gwadar raised 
concerns that India was being "pinched in" by the Chinese.  The 
GOI fears increased Chinese operational capabilities in the 
Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, leading to eventual 
"encirclement" of India.  (Comment: These fears surely played a 
role in the GOI's denial of a Chinese bid on a proposed deep-sea 
port on West Bengal's southern coast.  End comment.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In addition, India is acutely aware of its unresolved 
border issues with China in India's Northeast.  On November 13, 
China's ambassador to India asserted that China considered the 
entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh a part of China, 
causing a firestorm of criticism from the Indian media and a 
sharp rebuke from Exterior Affairs Minster Pranab Mukherjee. 
China has also pushed for re-opening of China-Burma-India trade 
through the Stillwell Road, which runs from Assam through Burma 
and into China's Yunan province. 
 
¶6.  (C) India is also competing with China and others for access 
to Burma's natural gas fields at Shwe, offering loans and cash 
to modernize an oil refinery and to develop a port at Sittwe 
(reftel C).  India had originally proposed a pipeline that would 
travel through Bangladesh, but is instead focusing on routing 
the gas through its northeastern states of Mizoram and Assam and 
then through W. Bengal, where it would join an existing pipeline 
in Bihar.  News of the Indian plans has spread in the Northeast. 
 
CALCUTTA 00000543  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 Student groups have begun to organize campaigns against the 
pipeline's construction, arguing that it would require an 
increased military presence in the northeast, contribute to 
environmental degradation, and displace locals from their homes. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  GOI worries about China's influence in the 
region are substantial.  India sees its exploring closer ties 
with Burma as necessary for national and economic security 
reasons -- needing Burma as a partner against China, even if 
India faces potential international censure against the actions 
of the Burmese military in eliminating insurgent groups.  The 
chance to tap into Burma's natural gas fields provides another 
incentive to look the other way on Burma's human rights record. 
 However, the U.S. should keep pressing the GOI to play a 
positive role in bringing democratic change in Burma.  India's 
concerns about China, stable borders and natural resources do 
not exclude it, as a global democratic power, from a 
responsibility to maintain pressure on the Burmese junta to 
bring about reform and to respect human rights.  The USG should 
make this a regular talking point in interactions with Indian 
officials.JARDINE