VZCZCXRO7983
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #2500/01 3521711
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181711Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0556
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 002500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR HU
SUBJECT: INSIDE LOOKING OUT: MAKING HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
REF: A) BUDAPEST 1823 B) BUDAPEST 2269 C) BUDAPEST 
 
     2383 D) BUDAPEST 2419 E) BUDAPEST 2230 
 
Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Hungarian foreign policy has remained a 
notable exception to partisan domestic disputes to date, but 
new individuals and new institutions are testing the waters 
in the policy process.  Although EU membership allows the GoH 
to default to the consensus position on the many issues in 
which it has no direct national interest, the introduction of 
austerity measures has left many Hungarians increasingly 
ambivalent about the Union.  Hungary will remain selectively 
active on key issues including the Balkans, but the Gyurcsany 
government seems content to take a lower-key approach in 
managing questions regarding Hungarian minorities in 
neighboring states.  Indeed, even supporters agree that 
Gyurcsany has centralized decision-making authority in the 
PM's office without improving operational efficiency, and for 
many Hungarian politicians foreign policy remains an issue to 
be kept at arms length or considered in the context of 
domestic political advantage.  Continued consultation and 
public outreach will help promote selective activism on 
issues of mutual concern.   End Summary. 
 
MADE IN BRUSSELS? 
 
¶2.  (C) With the allure of accession fading and the economic 
impact of austerity measures looming ahead, Hungary is 
expressing a degree of ambivalence regarding its membership 
in the European Union.  Having made the EU its overarching 
policy goal for so long, the GoH has yet to fill the void 
following accession with new objectives.  Many of its 
accession requirements had been considered foreign policy 
issues but have now been internalized as it adjusts to 
membership. 
 
¶3.  (C) Budapest is often content to follow the EU consensus, 
and effectively "outsourcing" its policy to the Union is 
clearly a temptation for a country principally concerned with 
its internal political issues.  As former President Arpad 
Goncze commented to Ambassador Foley, "influence Brussels and 
you influence Budapest."  Although this is not yet a foregone 
conclusion, Hungary often has little interest in issues where 
it has no perceived national interest. 
 
¶4.  (C) There are exceptions to this rule.  Hungary has 
engaged on Cuba and remains actively focused on the Balkans 
due to its interest in regional stability and its position as 
a gateway for investment.   Budapest is still looking for a 
constructive role in multilateral fora, however, particularly 
after a sharp clash with the UK over Croatia's EU accession 
in 2005. 
 
WHAT BORDER? 
 
¶5.  (C) The presence of Hungarian minorities in the region 
will continue to prompt a degree of Hungarian activism, 
though more often rhetorical than practical.  Although 
concerns over their co-ethnicists are sincere, the issue also 
remains a political football as the opposition continues to 
maintain strong ties to ethnic Hungarians abroad.  The 
opposition has been muted in criticizing the government on 
this issue (most notably during this fall's incident in which 
an ethnic Hungarian student in Slovakia claimed to have been 
assaulted), and FIDESZ officials have candidly conceded that 
they remained silent largely to avoid giving the Gyurcsany 
government the opportunity to portray itself as the champion 
of ethnic Hungarians (ref a). 
 
¶6.  (C) Others have been less reticent.  Representatives of 
international Hungarian associations have criticized the 
government's "inaction" on this issue, describing the 
Gyurcsany government as unwilling to engage on an issue they 
believe "can only hurt them and not help them."  They suspect 
that the government's decision to give the bureaucratic lead 
on ethnic Hungarian issues to the Prime Minister's Office 
reflects Gyurcsany's recognition that "nothing will happen 
without him" ... and his desire to ensure that "nothing 
happens at all." 
 
CONTROLLING THE MEANS OF POLICY PRODUCTION 
 
¶7.  (C) This centralization of decision-making authority in 
the PM's Office is part of a broader trend.  Even Gyurcsany's 
supporters concede that his reliance on his personal staff 
and ad hoc commissions has opened him to political criticism 
without noticeably increasing efficiency (ref b).  Gabor 
Kuncze, outgoing president of the junior coalition partner 
SZDSZ, notes that cabinet ministers have been relegated to 
"giving the bad news while Gyurcsany takes all the credit." 
 
BUDAPEST 00002500  002 OF 003 
 
 
"Despite his exceptional talents," Kuncze concludes, 
"Gyurcsany has no leadership skills." 
 
¶8.  (C) The government is expected to make changes after the 
New Year, including the establishment of a Chief of Staff 
within the Prime Minister's Office.  These will also 
reportedly involve reinstating the position of Administrative 
Secretaries in each Ministry, reversing a recent cost-saving 
 
SIPDIS 
move in light of widespread dissatisfaction with poor 
bureaucratic performance.  The MFA has also established a 
Strategic Planning office, and is bringing back former 
Ambassador to the UK and France (and Cultural Attache in 
Washington) Bela Szombati as its director.  (Note: We 
understand Szombati met recently in Washington with DAS 
Karsner and with representatives from the Brookings Institute 
and the Heritage Foundation.  End Note.)  Other changes to 
streamline the GoH bureaucracy and improve its strategic 
focus are also under consideration (septel). 
 
¶9.  (C) There is a growing sense that changes are overdue. 
The deployment of Hungary's PRT in Afghanistan is straining 
the GoH.  We understand there have been sharp clashes between 
officials in the Prime Minister's Office and the MFA 
regarding plans for civil reconstruction, and communication 
between some high-level officials has all but broken down. 
Inter-agency coordination is often limited to various 
ministries each talking to the embassy but not to each other. 
 Senior MFA officials have intimated to us that "solutions to 
these problems are already in train." 
 
¶10.  (C) FM Goncz has, on balance, exceeded the very modest 
expectations that followed her surprise appointment.  She 
remains the target of occasional sniping from the opposition, 
which has cast itself as the defender of "professional 
expertise" in foreign affairs.  Moreover, Goncz's reportedly 
good relationship with PM Gyurcsany has not made her the 
government's leading voice on foreign policy.  Nor has it 
spared the MFA from significant personnel cuts in its 
domestic and overseas staffing.  In a cabinet filled with 
political players, Goncz lacks the independent power base 
enjoyed by many of her colleagues and remains far from first 
among equals. 
 
CONSENSUS, COMMITTEES, AND KATALIN 
 
¶11.  (C) Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive purview of 
the executive agencies.  As underscored by the Parliamentary 
Foreign Affairs Committee's discussion of NATO issues in 
anticipation of the Riga Summit (ref c), the bipartisan 
consensus on most foreign policy issues remains strong 
despite Hungary's domestic political situation.  Committees, 
members, and staffers are developing expertise and moving 
cautiously toward a more active role in the policy process, 
and we are redoubling our outreach with them. 
 
¶12.  (C) Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili has also 
established a markedly higher international profile than her 
predecessors.  She has travelled frequently in the region - 
so much so that our MFA contacts play the occasional game of 
"where's Katalin?" - and tried with mixed success to use her 
office to organize and host international conferences in 
Budapest.  Szili's interest may have more to do with her own 
political ambitions than a pure interest in foreign affairs, 
but she, too, has established a position supportive of our 
key priorities. 
 
THE WILD CARD AT THE TOP OF THE DECK 
 
¶13.  (C) President Solyom has also ventured into foreign 
policy.  He has travelled to meet with foreign counterparts, 
including trips to Cyprus and Egypt this month to visit 
Hungarian troops serving in peacekeeping missions there.  His 
limited constitutional powers do include the right to refer 
legislation to Parliament for reconsideration, and many 
political scientists see Solyom as trying to expand the 
prerogatives he worked to limit as President of the 
Constitutional Court.  He demonstrated his willingness to do 
so on the question of the US-EU passenger data sharing 
agreement.  Although Solyom's relationship with the MFA is 
reportedly distant, he has recently raised eyebrows by 
asserting his right to go directly to the Ministries contrary 
to traditional practice.  Most observers agree that his 
(often ill-timed) engagement is driven by his legalistic 
attitude, but our EU colleagues tell us that Solyom has been 
exceedingly candid regarding his strong personal antipathy 
for PM Gyurcsany, whom he has described as "morally unfit" 
for his position.  Although Solyom's motives may not be 
anti-American, his opinions may reflect a tendency to 
question the Gyurcsany's government's actions.  His actions 
may also remain largely immune to diplomatic engagement. 
 
 
BUDAPEST 00002500  003 OF 003 
 
 
WHEN THINGS SOUND TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE ... 
 
¶14.  (C) Finally, the Hungarian Embassy in Washington is 
always a variable in the equation.  The MFA often finds 
itself running - and sometimes only grudgingly walking - to 
catch up with commitments made in Washington.  Their Embassy 
often tries to lead from afar - and usually in the right 
direction - but their activism contrasts sharply with 
bureaucratic inertia here and can exacerbate Hungary's 
reputation for "overpromising and underdelivering." 
 
INNOCENTS ABROAD 
 
¶15.  (C) Comment: On balance, the gradual emergence of 
alternate sources of opinion and expertise in foreign affairs 
is a positive development that will bring foreign policy 
closer to the public.  This will be a gradual process, and 
the temptation to use foreign policy as a pawn in domestic 
politics will continue. Domestic experience remains the key 
to political prominence in Hungary, and Brussels is more 
often a pasture than a stepping stone to promotion for 
Hungarian officials.  Even senior party officials are visibly 
uncomfortable in their dealings with the diplomatic 
community.  Our colleagues in the diplomatic corps confide 
that PM Gyurcsany's recent trip to Germany was "painful," and 
the government has relied on former PM Medgyessey as an 
Ambassador-at-large in dealings with the EU and other 
European capitals.  While the growing visibility of 
international political fora such as the European Peoples 
Party (of which Viktor Orban is Vice-President) does provide 
a source of support and an avenue for foreign exposure, the 
parties often leave foreign contacts to selected officials 
(ref d).  As Hungary tries to put its economic house in 
order, the best-case scenario is that a more fiscally sound 
GoH will adopt a more active foreign policy working in close 
concert to advance our mutual interest (ref e).  Continued 
high-level consultations will help enormously in encouraging 
this outcome.  The worst-case is the relegation of foreign 
policy to a new venue for domestic political arguments which 
are rapidly getting old.  End Comment. 
 
 
FOLEY