R 141420Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6415
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0839
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1681
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0941
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1351

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR S/CRS, EUR/ERA, EUG/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID KPKO CM GM XA
SUBJECT: S/CRS AMBASSADOR HERBST ENGAGES GERMANY AHEAD OF 
G-8/E.U. PRESIDENCIES 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY.  In a series of meetings December 6, 
S/CRS Coordinator Ambassador John Herbst pushed German 
officials to incorporate stability and reconstruction (S/R) 
programming into their 2007 G-8 and EU presidencies.  His 
interlocutors from the Federal Chancellery and Foreign 
Ministry suggested a willingness to move the G-8 S/R agenda 
beyond steps made during the Russian G-8 presidency, most 
likely in conjunction with the expected G-8 discussion on 
Africa.  Looking at the S/R issue broadly, Development 
Ministry officials expressed concern about China's policies 
undercutting other donors' efforts -- e.g., in Darfur or 
Zimbabwe.  All of Herbst's meetings highlighted that 
Germany's efforts to formalize inter-agency S/R institutional 
mechanisms remain in their nascent stages.  The discussions 
also showed a German concern about maintaining strong roles 
for the UN and, to a certain extent the EU, in S/R. END 
SUMMARY 
 
FOREIGN MINISTRY:  MIXED RESPONSE ON GERMAN G-8 S/R AGENDA 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Secretary's Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS), Ambassador John Herbst, met with 
Foreign Ministry Deputy Political Director Ambassador Ulrich 
Brandenberg to explore German-U.S. stability and 
reconstruction (S/R) cooperation during the 2007 German G-8 
and European Union Presidencies.  Brandenberg expressed 
continued deference to the European Union on S/R issues and 
hoped to formalize U.S.-EU collaboration on civilian crisis 
operations in areas where NATO has not already done so.  When 
pressed to describe additional opportunities, Brandenberg 
cited Afghanistan, with a particular focus on "Europeanizing" 
German national efforts on S/R and then synchronizing those 
of the United States.  Brandenberg also referenced continued 
discussions in the EU about assuming a larger role in 
Israeli/Palestinian peace process.  However, he remained 
skeptical about broad German involvement globally in S/R 
issues. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Herbst noted that S/R first appeared on the G-8 
agenda during Russia's 2006 presidency and suggested it would 
be useful to push the agenda one step further in 2007. 
Brandenburg reiterated Germany's G-8 ambitions to revive 
African development and stabilization efforts, adding that 
the G-8, while lacking the operational structure to deliver 
technical capacity on these issues, still could generate 
political momentum to push this agenda broadly.  Responding 
to Herbst's proposal of an S/R website for Germany's G-8 
presidency or a modest S/R training exchange for G-8 members, 
Brandenberg demurred and reiterated that Germany's Africa 
goals represented a step forward for S/R within the G-8 
context.  He added that Germany is still setting out the 
broad themes for its chairmanship and remained noncommittal 
on a U.S. proposal for a G-8 S/R experts meeting. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Ambassador Friedrich Daeuble, Commissioner for 
Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and 
Post-Conflict Peace-Building at the Foreign Ministry, cited 
adopting German bureaucratic structures to the new S/R 
operational environment as his major obstacle.  Despite 
lamenting his office's lack of staff and resources, Daeuble 
anticipated a political push for S/R issues in the Bundestag 
in the coming months and noted he would push for greater 
steps on S/R within the G-8 framework during Germany's 
chairmanship.  He also hopes to raise the profile of the new 
U.S. S/R framework for cooperation with Canada and the United 
Kingdom within German government. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Referencing the disappointing lack of substance in 
the October 2006 Moscow G-8 S/R experts meeting, Daeuble 
wondered whether the G-8 was optimal group to advance the S/R 
agenda or if the Moscow meeting simply reflected the novelty 
of using the G-8 forum for S/R issues.  Herbst suggested 
demonstrating a G-8 interest in S/R would move the S/R agenda 
forward in all G-8 members, including those that have yet to 
formalize S/R-dedicated institutions, and would ultimately 
precipitate the needed transformations. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Daeuble thought it would be useful for the G-8 to 
support African peacekeeping, stabilization, and relief 
capacities.  He was interested in a proposal to engage an 
African Union-esque election monitoring program or peace 
consolidation exercise.  He thought such a move would be in 
line with the Rule of Law component to Germany's G-8 Africa 
agenda.  As a forum to advance these proposals, Daeuble 
suggested that a G-8 S/R experts meeting might follow the 
June 7-8 Heilengendamm summit and asked the United States for 
specific language by mid-February 2007 to incorporate into 
the G-8 agenda. 
 
CHANCELLERY PUSHING FOR GREATER S/R INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Federal Chancellery Director for United Nations 
and Global Affairs Edgar Gansen outlined efforts to 
coordinate the German government's interagency response to 
S/R.  With the Chancellery particularly focused on 
post-conflict S/R and the "strong feeling" of the government 
to increase S/R efforts, he sees a need to focus 
government-wide coordination in the Chancellery itself and 
acknowledged the bureaucratic challenges facing Daeuble's 
Foreign Ministry office. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Discussing the need for greater attention to S/R 
on the G-8 agenda, Gansen was skeptical about commitments for 
additional money.  He also deflected U.S. proposals to train 
a handful of S/R staff from G-8 states at the State 
Department or the German Center for International Peace 
Operations (ZIF).  Still, he proposed greater involvement 
from China on S/R as a pathway for that country to assume a 
larger international role. 
 
CHINA, U.N. DOMINATE DEVELOPMENT MINISTRY S/R THEMES 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Dr. Doris Witteler-Stiepelmann, Office Director 
for Peace building, Crisis Prevention, and Foreign and 
Security Policy at the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, stressed the importance of the United Nations' 
role in international S/R efforts.  She expressed reluctance 
to move beyond UN instruments in conflict settings. 
Acknowledging the value the UN's experience adds to S/R work, 
Herbst pointed out political realities among states in crisis 
can prevent constructive engagement within formal UN channels 
-- realities that Europe understood in the Balkans in the 
1990's.  This instance necessitated alternative mechanisms. 
He asked Witteler to include S/R on Germany's EU presidency 
development agenda, particularly in the realm of resource 
allocation.  Witteler said pushing S/R through the EU would 
require bilateral and multilateral engagement from the U.S. 
as much as Germany. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Witteler also expressed particular concern about 
the impact of China's political and economic rise on 
Germany's development agenda, particularly in Africa, and 
elicited U.S. opinions.  Citing the November 2006 
China-Africa summit in Beijing and ongoing Chinese support 
for the Sudanese regime amid the Darfur crisis, Witteler 
expressed unease with China's emergence as an "alternative" 
donor.  She feared Chinese offers of development aid to 
regimes (e.g., Zimbabwe) whose human rights records or other 
policies cause concerns to Western donors would weaken the 
political efforts of Germany and its allies.  Her deputy, 
Bernd Gruschinski, noted that China's aspirations for greater 
political influence and resource interests governed the 
Chinese Africa agenda; China therefore had no objections to 
supporting questionable regimes.  In his view, China's 
behavior undercuts Germany's focus on market-based 
development mechanisms.  (Note: In other fora, the German 
government has begun questioning its ongoing annual 
development aid to China following the 2005 closure of 
certain U.N. development agencies Chinese operations and 
China's aid donations to Africa.  End Note.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Ambassador Herbst noted China could offer some 
benefits on S/R issues if engaged properly and cited China's 
existing role in Afghanistan as an example.  Ambassador 
Herbst also identified the need to work with Japan on issues 
affecting Asia, particularly on the Korean peninsula, and 
that developing Japan's S/R capabilities through the G-8 was 
one option. 
 
¶12.  (U)  This text has been cleared by S/CRS Ambassador 
Herbst. 
TIMKEN JR