VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBD #0636/01 3560836
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 220836Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3652

S E C R E T BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, AND CA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016 
TAGS: ASEC BX CVIS KHLS KVPR PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFO EXCHANGE WITH BRUNEI 
 
REF: STATE 190832 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.4 (B & D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Reftel requested reporting on Government of Brunei 
(GOB) activities to collect identifying personal information 
on terrorists or suspected terrorists.  Following post 
assessment is keyed to questions posed reftel.  The majority 
of this information has not/not been publicly released by the 
GOB.  It was acquired by post in numerous discussions with 
GOB officials over last several months, including within the 
context of pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement 
with Brunei.  Some of it is classified as "Secret" by the GOB 
and was shared with us in confidence. 
 
--------------------- 
Immigration Databases 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The GOB maintains a computerized immigration database 
at all ports of entry (POE's).  This system tracks all 
entries and exits and provides immigration officers at the 
POE with a detailed record of those events, as well as a 
digital facial image of the traveler that was captured during 
his/her initial entry into the system.  This system, which 
was procured from a German company, looks to be robust and 
efficient.  The database is updated on a continual basis.  It 
 
is also used for screening visa applications.  Its most 
significant limitation appears to be the lack of a rigorous, 
transparent, and consistent GOB-wide set of SOP's for 
entering names into the system watchlist. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Watchlist and Information Sharing 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) A name-based watchlist is integrated into the 
computerized GOB immigration system described above.  It 
includes immigration violators and criminal suspects entered 
by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF).  The RBPF and the 
Internal Security Department (ISD) can add suspected 
terrorists or terrorism supporters to the list.  In addition, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides the names 
of individuals designated on the UNSC terrorist list. 
Multiple classified GOB databases contain background 
information on terrorist suspects whose names may be entered 
into the watchlist. 
 
¶4.  (S) The GOB has no formal watchlist agreements with other 
countries.  Information is shared on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis.  Post is aware that ISD conducts regular intelligence 
exchanges with some (but not all) ASEAN countries, and some 
watchlist entries are presumably shared in these contexts. 
The GOB is currently reviewing the USG proposal for an HSPD-6 
information-sharing agreement. 
 
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Biometrics 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) As noted above, the immigration database available 
at all POE's includes the capability for digital facial 
imaging.  The GOB currently issues a machine-readable 
passport.  It has contracted with a private company for 
manufacture and issuance of a biometric passport that meets 
ICAO biometric standards and USG requirements for Visa Waiver 
Program countries.  The GOB plans to begin issuing this new 
biometric passport when it becomes available from the 
manufacturer early in 2007. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Identifying Appropriate Partners 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The GOB is definitely an appropriate partner for 
data sharing.  Post and Department have been actively 
pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement with GOB for 
the past year, and have provided GOB with the text of a model 
MOU, which it is currently reviewing.  Post is cautiously 
optimistic that we may be able to finalize an HSPD-6 
agreement in 2007. 
 
¶7.  (C) Post believes GOB will be willing and able to apply 
necessary safeguards to USG information supplied under an 
HSPD-6 agreement, and would use such data appropriately.  It 
is conceivable that GOB information supplied to the USG under 
such an agreement could include individuals whom do not meet 
the USG bar for excludable terrorist activity, such as 
Islamic religious dissidents.  This issue can be easily 
avoided, however, by requesting that the lookout entries 
supplied by the GOB under HSPD-6 be tailored to USG 
requirements. 
 
¶8.  (C) Given the progress made to date in pursuing an HSPD-6 
information sharing agreement with the GOB, post believes 
that USG efforts to expand terrorist information sharing with 
the GOB should continue to focus on the HSPD-6 path in 2007, 
unless that approach is ultimately rejected by the GOB. 
SKODON