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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4775/01 3640135
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P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8849
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: NAJAF PROVINCE:  THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE 
STEPS AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Najaf is dominated by the SCIRI party, 
which controls half the seats on the PC.  As one of the 
holiest locations in Shi'a Islam, it is also home to the 
country's top religious leaders.  The economy in Najaf 
continues to flourish as a result of tourism.  Security has 
been relatively stable over the past year to a detente 
between Badr Corps and JAM militias.  Increased engagement by 
the U.S. with Najaf's political, religious, and cultural 
establishments could be an important step forward, as would 
support for moderate centrist parties and the development of 
a professional civil service.  This is one of a series of 
analyses drafted Provincial Reconstruction Teams, with input 
from the Embassy, providing overviews of the issues, leaders, 
and potential steps ahead in each provices.  End Summary 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Both national and provincial politics play out in 
Najaf.  As one of the holiest locations for Shi'a Islam, it 
is the most concentrated site of clerical authority in Iraq 
and a center of Shi'a political power.  Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Al-Sistani, considered Iraq's leading Shi'a cleric, lives in 
Najaf, as do Muqtada al-Sadr, Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi 
(the spiritual leader of the Fadhila party), and Ammar 
al-Hakim, son of SCIRI leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim.  These four 
figures play important national political roles. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On the provincial level, Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is the dominant party, 
holding 20 of the 40 Provincial Council (PC) seats.  The 
Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) party is increasing in 
strength and may pose a challenge to SCIRI in the next 
provincial elections.   Ayad Allawi,s Iraqi National Accord 
(INA) party is the most viable of the moderate parties, 
garnering roughly 10 percent of the vote during national and 
provincial elections (equating to four seats on the PC). 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The economy in Najaf continues to flourish, as 
tourism has markedly increased since Iraq's liberation. 
During major Shia holidays, millions faithful pass through or 
stop in Najaf to visit the Imam Ali shrine and what Shia 
Iraqis claim is the world,s largest cemetery.  Provincial 
officials have been proactive in luring outside investment. 
This eagerness to create international financial 
relationships has often put the provincial government at odds 
with the national government.  Since spring 2006, provincial 
officials have worked with DOD and DOS to develop and 
construct a commercial airport. 
 
--------------- 
SECURITY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The formal transfer over security in Najaf from 
Coalition Forces to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) took place 
on December 20.  Although the Iraqis have had effective 
control for at least four months, there could be a new 
perception by anti-Iraqi forces that there is now a more 
permissive environment for their activities. 
 
¶6.  (C) Security in Najaf has been relatively stable over the 
past 12 months due to a dtente  between Badr Corps and Jaysh 
Al Mahdi (JAM.).  While both blocs would like to be in 
control of Najaf, open conflict appears to be a symbolic red 
line.  Both Badr Corps and JAM present themselves as solely 
charitable organizations.  SCIRI/Badr and JAM/OMS have 
proposed initiatives expected to be approved by the PC to 
create Popular Committees in the province, ostensibly to 
serve as community watch details but which could morph into 
entities for harassing political enemies. SCIRI is the major 
influence in the Iraqi police, but there are about 5000 
additional police over the number allotted by MOI.  SCIRI and 
OMS have reportedly reached an agreement to place supporters 
in the IP.  This has caused consternation at the national 
level, but it allows both parties to feel the security 
apparatus is protecting their interests in Najaf. 
 
BAGHDAD 00004775  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
THE KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Hawza.  Al-Sistani 
is the leading figure of Najaf's hawza, Iraq's leading Shi'a 
religious seminary.  Through the release of several 
statements from June 2003 to December 2004, he played a 
visible and active role in supporting the development of 
Iraq's democratic institutions (though not always in the ways 
the U.S. wanted).  He helped form the Shi'a coalition which 
contested the December 2005 parliamentary elections, and 
coalition leaders seek his counsel and support on key 
decisions.  Three other grand ayatollahs are also prominent 
figures in the hawza:  Ishaq Fayadh, Basheer al-Najafi, and 
Mohammed Saed al-Hakim. 
 
¶8.  (C) Muqtada al-Sadr.  Al-Sadr is a Shi'a cleric and 
leader in his early 30s who gained political prominence not 
through his religious learning but by inheriting the 
religious and charitable networks, and the family prestige, 
of his father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, an activist ayatollah 
killed by Saddam in 1999.  He has a large popular following 
in Baghdad and southern and central Iraq and leads political 
and military organizations, namely the Office of the Martyr 
Sadr (OMS) and the Jasysh al-Mahdi (JAM). 
 
¶9.  (C) Ayatollah Mohammed Yacoubi.  Yacoubi is the spiritual 
leader of the Fadhila party.  He was a student and follower 
of Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, and his followers consider him 
more qualified to continue al-Sadr's activist leadership than 
Muqtada. 
 
¶10.  (C) Ammar al-Hakim.  Al-Hakim is the son of Abdulaziz 
al-Hakim, SCIRI's leader.  He leads the Shahid al-Mihrab 
Foundation, an organization with both charitable and 
political activities.  The al-Hakims are one of Iraq's most 
prominent clerical families, and Ammar serves as Abdulaziz's 
key link to the Najaf hawza. 
 
¶11.  (S-NF) Najaf Governor Asaad Al Taee, in office since 
February 2005, is very western in dress and attitude.  He 
spent 14 years in Denmark, returning after the liberation. 
He has been a strong partner in reconstruction, but appears 
to be the face of SCIRI in the province.  He has had health 
problems related to his heart.  Deputy Governor Abdul Hussein 
Abtan (aka Hajji Hassan) is a reputed Iranian intelligence 
agent. The PRT reports he is gaining political savvy and 
increasing in stature.  Responsible for all security in the 
province, he was once the local head of Badr Corps. 
 
¶12.  (C) PC Chairman Abdul Hussein Mousa Al Mousawi, viewed 
by the PRT as honest broker, is a strong proponent for 
reconstruction and has worked closely with US interlocutors. 
He has been a mediating voice in the PC, but often comes down 
firmly on the side of SCIRI.  IP Provincial Chief Abdul 
Kareem Al Ameeri was elevated from the Assistant IP position 
approximately five months ago.  His tenure has been 
relatively secure, but there appears to be some opposition 
from non-UIA members on the PC who feel he was forced on them. 
 
¶13.  (C-NF) Adnan Zurufii was governor during CPA.  He is the 
leader of a moderate party that supports coalition efforts. 
He is a political force, but has difficulty with funding and 
has been threatened on a number of occasions by both JAM and 
Badr.  He seeks US support. 
 
-------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Given the national political importance of Najaf and 
its leading Shi'a residents, increased engagement by the U.S. 
of its political, religious, and cultural establishments 
would be an important step forward.  While we do not have 
direct communication with the leading marja'iya (or clerics, 
including Ayatollah al-Sistani), we could certainly advance 
our interests by devoting more resources to engaging Najaf's 
elite.  As of now, our most direct link to Najaf consists of 
a PRT based in Hillah. 
 
¶15.  (C-NF) A major issue at the provincial level will be the 
continued existence of smaller moderate parties.  There 
should be an effort to imbue these parties with a stronger 
 
BAGHDAD 00004775  003 OF 003 
 
 
political sense.    There must also be training and money. 
Islamist parties wage very strong campaigns and it,s a 
message that the moderates haven,t received as yet.  We are 
not at a place where SCIRI and the Islamists are so 
entrenched that a fair and secure election won,t open the 
door for other political organizations.  The next provincial 
elections present a last chance in this regard.  Security of 
polling sites will also be important in the next elections 
elections.  Some parties are able to shepherd their rank and 
file to the polls while other legitimate parties find road 
blocks, literally have been set up to make it impossible for 
many of their constituents to vote. 
 
¶16.  (C) One of the most pressing needs in the province is a 
professional civil service.  Any change in a provincial 
administration would bring with it a wholesale turnover of 
personnel in bureaucratic positions.  The province then risks 
falling back to a time where logistics and training trumped 
accomplishment.   A possible solution would be short-term 
training (across parties and sects) for lower and mid-level 
provincial government employees.  We,ve done well to open 
police academies.  There may be some merit in developing a 
small civil service academy that would provide basic training 
for engineers and scientists and accountants so that they 
would have the ability to work across party lines. 
SCOBEY