VZCZCXRO7039
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4774/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8846
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SALAH AD DIN PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, 
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Salah ad Din, a Ba'athist stronghold under 
the previous regime, has had difficulty finding itself in a 
democratic Iraq.  Most of the Sunni majority in the Province 
do not support the insurgency, but at the same time are 
frustrated by a provincial government in which they do not 
feel they have a substantial voice.  Debaathification and 
dismantling of the former Iraqi Army (IA) caused high 
unemployment and left many without pensions.  Industries are 
aging and operating at diminished capacity.   Substantial 
debathification reform, new elections, and clarification of 
the role of provincial governments could contribute to 
improved stability and security.  This is one of a series of 
analyses from Provincial Reconstruction Teams analyzing the 
governates of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Politically, SaD is at a crucial stage.  As Iraq's 
Baathist stronghold under the previous regime, the heavily 
Sunni province has had difficulty finding itself in a 
democratic Iraq.  Some former Baathists have embraced 
democracy and are supportive of the Coalition Forces (CF); 
others are actively subverting the political process and 
participate in the insurgency.  The vast majority of the 
province's residents, however, are some where in between. 
They do not feel as though the provincial government acts in 
their best interest, as it is perceived to be dominated by 
self-interested leaders.  They are equally not convinced that 
the pro-Baathist insurgents have a better solution.  They see 
the central government as Shia-controlled and biased against 
Sunnis, especially those of Salah ad Din.  They argue for 
reformation of debaathification regulations, a greater Sunni 
voice in the national political process, a united Iraq with 
resource sharing, provincial and national elections, and 
inclusion of SaD residents in the military.  In addition, 
while not vocal about a guilty verdict, SaD residents are 
against the execution of Saddam. 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Economically, Salah ad Din is depressed. 
Debaathification and dismantling of the former Iraqi Army 
(IA) has caused high unemployment, left many without 
pensions, and denied the province its traditional principal 
employer: the military.  The province's industrial factories, 
including the Bayji oil refinery, are aging and unable to 
operate at full capacity.  Agriculture has great potential, 
but limited access to inputs and a disposition against 
farming prevent growth in the industry.  The lack of 
functional banks, access to loans/capital, and efficient 
transportation links prevents development in the private 
sector.  It is clear that some anti-Iraq forces (AIF) support 
is economically based.  Corruption slows economic progress 
and reduces the effectiveness of development and 
infrastructure improvement projects. 
 
¶4.  (S) Targeted fear tactics by pro-Baathist insurgents and 
AQIZ-affiliates, sectarian violence, and other criminal 
activity are creating a security environment in Salah ad Din 
where democracy and a free market economy cannot flourish. 
Provincial Council members are too scared to travel to 
meetings, restaurants and other businesses are being bombed, 
and assassinations and kidnappings of provincial government 
officials routinely occur.  Though largely a homogenous Sunni 
population, sectarian tension came to the forefront in 
mid-October with violence around the Shia enclaves of Balad 
and ad Dujeel.  Concern remains that the sectarian violence 
in Baghdad and Diyala province and tensions related to the 
reconstruction of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra may cause 
additional flares up. 
 
--------------------- 
KEY POLITICAL FIGURES 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Social upheaval and limited integration into the 
political process have resulted in a void of political 
leaders in the province. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00004774  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The elected provincial government officials, 
including the Governor, Deputy Governor, and Provincial 
Council, are not representative of or respected in Salah ad 
Din.  They are seen as largely ineffective and highly 
corrupt.  That said, they (especially the Deputy Governor) 
wield significant influence over the day-to-day operations of 
the provincial government, and residents seek their influence 
to resolve issues or to obtain access to government 
contracts.  Additionally, many of the Sunnis at the 
national-level are perceived as outsiders who do not 
understand the provinces or the intricacies of Saddam's 
regime (and its implications in the current democratic 
political process). 
 
¶7.  (C) The Baath Party, though fractured by the spectrum of 
supporters described in question 1, remains very popular. 
Few in the province are ready to see it go, and most argue 
for its inclusion in the political process.  Of the parties 
participating in the political process, the Iraqi Islamic 
Party (IIP) is the best established and most supported.  Most 
political parties are inactive, and their leaders claim they 
will remain dormant until the elections. 
 
¶8.  (C) Former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and ousted 
(for corruption) Parliamentarian Mishaan al Jabouri are often 
listed among the province's favored national politicians.  If 
a strong autocratic Sunni figure emerged on the national 
political scene, he would likely garner significant support 
in Salah ad Din. 
 
------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  POSSIBLE STEPS FOWARD 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The province's cocktail of economic decline and 
thwarted political ambition is hampering stability. 
Improving security and reducing violence in the province hang 
on two issues: political participation and unemployment. 
 
¶10.  (C) To bring the Sunnis of Salah ad Din into the 
political fold, debaathification must be revisited.  While 
debaathification excludes some potential leaders from 
government service, the current debaathification restrictions 
have become a symbol to SaD Sunnis of what they perceive to 
be a Shia-dominated government's rejection of their 
participation in the political process.  In addition to 
reforming the debaathification regulations, establishing a 
"Sunni broker" in Baghdad to help the SaD provincial 
government liaise with the GOI and assisting high-level GOI 
leaders visit SaD would increase SaD resident's feeling that 
they have a voice in the national political decision-making 
process. 
 
¶11.  (C) To reduce unemployment, debaathification exceptions 
should be processed more expeditiously (with restoration of 
pensions), support should be given to vocational/technical 
schools, and the agricultural and industrious sectors must be 
expanded.  Additionally, while politically tenuous, many 
contacts have suggested re-incorporation of former Iraqi Army 
military professionals in the new IA. 
 
¶12.  (C) Additional sectarian violence in the ethnically 
mixed areas of Balad and ad Dujeel could be avoided through 
strengthening the local ISF presence, ensuring militias with 
sectarian allegiances do not take hold, and encouraging local 
tribal leaders to condemn sectarian violence and militias. 
 
¶13.  (C) Democratic political structures are nascent in SaD. 
Democratic principals and processes, with safeguards and 
checks and balances in the system, have not been fully 
embraced, resulting in the legislative branch's assumption of 
many executive branch powers, such as contracting and project 
execution.  While active, the executive branch does not have 
a clear role or a defined mandate. As the national 
constitution does little to clarify the duties and 
responsibilities of each branch and of elected officials, it 
is largely left to the officials themselves to define their 
offices. This tips power into the hand of the more ruthless 
players who are able to assemble power by intimidation, and 
reinforces tribal and religious power bases of elected 
officials. The Directorates General (DGs) of the ministries 
are functioning, but decentralization has caused confusion, 
mismanagement, and inefficiency. Many of the DGs are also 
demoralized by the confusion within the provincial government 
that results in misuse or non-use of their experience and 
training.  Corruption is also diminishing the establishment 
 
BAGHDAD 00004774  003 OF 003 
 
 
of effective democratic institutions in the provincial 
government. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The PRT's engagements are doing much to define the 
independent roles of each branch of the provincial 
government, to increase transparency and accountability by 
systematizing contracting and budgeting procedures, and to 
help make elected leaders answerable to their constituents. 
However, legislation clarifying provincial powers and new 
provincial elections are necessary to restore the provincial 
government's legitimacy and to give it the necessary 
authority to full its responsibilities. 
 
¶15.  (C) Reconciliation, for SaD Sunnis, means playing a 
greater role in the national decision-making process. 
Practically speaking, that would look like action on the 
national reconciliation plan, revision of the 
debaathification regulations, equitable resource sharing, and 
assurances that a "federalized Iraq" does not mean three 
separate political entities. 
SCOBEY