VZCZCXRO7037
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4773/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8844
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: WASIT: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS 
FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Wasit has seen a significant rise in the influence of 
Sadrist politicians, who are likely to sweep the next 
provincial elections.  Highly dependent on agriculture, the 
province is plagued by high employment and extreme shortages 
of all critical goods.  An Iraqi-led effort to disarm 
militias to stop violence at its root, along with border 
controls and efforts against corruption.  This is one of a 
series of analyses by Provincial Reconstruction Teams on the 
issues, leaders, and possible steps ahead in every province 
in Iraq.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Currently, Wasit,s Provincial Council (PC) is 
dominated by an Islamic coalition composed of SCIRI, Da,wa, 
Badr Organization and religious Independents, who captured 31 
of 41 PC seats.  The governor of the province, Latif Hamad 
Turfa, while nominally independent, is closely aligned with 
Da,wa, and, almost without exception, follows the line of 
the Shi,a Islamist majority.  Upcoming provincial elections 
will likely see a dramatic increase in the electoral strength 
of Sadrist candidates, if support continues at the current 
level.  There has been a significant increase in the 
Sadrists, influence over the PC, despite the fact they hold 
only a handful of PC seats.  This increased influence has 
manifested for two reasons 1) Wasit,s local councils are 
dominated by Sadrists and 2) the perception that Sadrist 
candidates will do well in the next provincial elections. 
Independents are generally politically weak. 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Wasit is an agricultural-based economy, thanks partly 
to the Tigris River that runs through the area.  Wasit is 
plagued by high employment and extreme shortages of all 
critical goods such as gas, propane etc.  Electricity is 
unreliable and intermittent making it extremely difficult for 
business to open with any kind of regularity.  The 
black-market is flourishing and corruption is endemic and 
systemic throughout all levels of government and the business 
community.  The capital city, Al-Kut, remains the principal 
focus of provincial leaders, as such, fair allocation of 
reconstruction monies to outlying areas of the province is a 
key concern.  Internally displaces people continue to stream 
in from neighboring Baghdad which only serves to further 
stain an already over-taxed social safety network. 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Wasit is strategically important by virtue of its 
long border with Iran.  Many Shi,a religious pilgrims enter 
Iraq at one of Wasit,s border crossings on their way to the 
shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala.  The province,s border 
with Iran is porous and used for the illegal trafficking of 
insurgent personnel, drugs, and weapons (rockets, IEDs, EFP 
etc.).  Militia groups have easy access to weapons and 
financing from Iran, unhindered by inadequately staffed and 
poorly resourced border checkpoints.  CF elements in the 
province are attacked frequently by these well-stocked 
militias.  Nearly all of the key political leaders and 
security officials in the province benefit financially from 
the loose border controls, so there is little movement to 
improve border checkpoints. 
 
¶5.  (C) The area of Suwayra, in northwest Wasit, has a mixed 
Shi,a-Sunni population and remains a trouble spot for 
terrorist attacks, typically by former regime elements 
against Iraqi security forces and civilians. 
 
¶6.  (C) Of late, there has been an up-tick in sectarian 
violence in the Province as various Shi,a militants are 
perpetrating violent acts against the minority Sunni 
population. 
 
¶7.  (C) The IP Chief, Hussein Abid Al Hady Mahbooba is 
ineffective and weak.  He bends at the whim of the political 
elite.  He says the right things to U.S. interlocutors but 
 
BAGHDAD 00004773  002 OF 002 
 
 
his actions do not match his rhetoric.  He has done little to 
quell sectarian violence, does not execute arrest warrants ) 
particularly against militia members -- and has done even 
less to prevent attacks against Coalition Forces. 
 
--------------------- 
KEY POLITICAL FIGURES 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Sayyed Shamil ) As the representative of Al-Sistani 
in Wasit he has the ear of all political officials in the 
province and they are keen to do his bidding. 
 
¶9.  (C) SCIRI Head in Wasit, Dr. Ahmed Al Hakeem and Badr 
Corp Head in Wasit, Sayyed Qasim Al Ar,ajy have emerged as 
the strongest political players in the province executing 
SCIRI policy with great skill. 
 
¶10.  (S) PC Member and Sadrist, Jawad Maqtoof ) Heads the 
Sadrist delegation on the PC and his political influence 
continues to grow.  He is anti-American in the extreme. 
 
-------------------- 
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) In the long-run disarming and disbanding the 
militias in Wasit would most assuredly serve to reduce 
violence, preserve democratic institutions, improve security, 
and promote reconciliation.  Special Force and Coalition 
elements cannot take the lead in fighting militia activity. 
In PRT's view, each midnight raid and arrest on our part only 
bolsters popular support for militia groups while diminishing 
support for Coalition activities, including reconstruction 
projects.  Province-wide buy-in is required if the 
eradication of militia groups is to be fully effective. 
Addressing unemployment is a start ) but security officials, 
political and tribal leaders also need to be pressed into 
taking a firm stance against militias and back those stances 
up with tangible actions.  Iraqis must be seen leading the 
charge against militia activities, not Americans. 
 
¶12.  (C) In the short-run, effective border controls would 
also help.  CF elements and American border teams have put 
fourth detailed recommendations as to how to tighten the flow 
of illicit material moving into the province through the 
border; these recommendations should be implemented 
immediately.   In order to make the recommended changes a 
reality, modest funds (which could be obtained from the 
Ministry of Interior) would be required.  Also, political 
pressure should  be exerted on those who would lose 
financially and politically from a more secure Iraq/Iran 
border.  Corruption is also a problem. Provincial leaders 
should be required to disclose all sources of income, 
properly account for all high-dollar purchases and have their 
financial records open for public scrutiny. 
SCOBEY