VZCZCXRO7031
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4771/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8838
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004771 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MUTHANNA:  THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS 
AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Muthanna is beset by militia intimidation 
-- notably by the Jash al Mahdi (JAM) -- power shortages, and 
poor economic performance.  That said, the province is 
currently stable, relatively secure, and has a reasonably 
effective provincial government.  MNF-I efforts could be 
effective in helping improve the provincial government's 
capacity, particularly in reducing unemployment, stimulating 
the private sector, and developing the local economy.  This 
is one of a series of analysese by Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams analyzing each governate of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/REL MNF-I) The key issues in Muthanna are the militias 
) principally Jaysh al-Mahdi ) the police, unemployment, 
agriculture, essential services, and the State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs).  Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) is the dominant 
militia force in Muthanna.  Since May 2006 when Muthanna went 
to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), JAM has punctuated 
Muthanna,s general stability with armed demonstrations and 
spasms of violence.  The violence is either directed at those 
deemed enemies of the Sadr movement or of JAM, supplementing 
its continual low-grade intimidation, or it is a show of 
force against the government to make a political statement. 
An example of this latter scenario is the recent 30 November 
2006 crisis in Samawa, where JAM attacked provincial 
government offices in order to boost its leverage in hostage 
negotiations over four of its captured militiamen. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) JAM,s targeted violence and its acts of harassment 
and intimidation create deep resentment within the 
population, which wishes only to go about daily life.  JAM,s 
larger-scale clashes with the government brings the 
population,s resentment to a boil.  In these cases, the 
disruption of daily life is not localized, but widespread, 
and the people,s displeasure forces the tribal sheikhs to 
intervene.  The threat of tribal action against JAM hastens 
the agreement on some sort of truce, and the crisis subsides. 
 The tribes act as guarantors of security and the status quo 
in Muthanna, limiting JAM,s capacity to sustain major 
operations or escalate to the point of overthrowing the 
government. 
 
¶4.  (SEC/REL MNF-I) It is important to note, however, that 
while JAM is relatively weak in Muthanna compared to Dhi Qar 
or Basra ) Australian military estimates place its hard-core 
membership at around 100, its active but auxiliary membership 
at 300-500, and those it can mobilize for demonstrations at 
around 3,000 ) none of the principal players aligned against 
it in the government or in the security realm are willing to 
confront it head-on.  The Governor, a former Badr Corps 
commander, does not bring the police or army units loyal to 
him (the Tactical Support Unit, the Criminal Intelligence 
Unit, etc.) to bear against JAM.  Instead, he seeks to 
preserve outward calm at every turn.  The tribes, as well, 
refuse to mount an attack against JAM unless their core 
interests are immediately at stake.  There are two principal 
reasons for this.  First, the security forces and the tribes 
all have JAM members, JAM sympathizers, and those willing to 
take JAM bribes among their ranks.  Any serious 
confrontations would turn internecine and threaten to split 
these institutions.  This problem is particularly severe 
within the police, with easily 50% of the service primarily 
loyal to JAM militia commanders.  Second, and more 
fundamentally, as long as Iraq remains in a revolutionary 
political period in which the government cannot provide 
essential services, employment, and the rule of law, the 
appeal of radical politics and militancy will be strong, 
especially among the younger generations, and especially when 
such militancy earns one a healthy income. 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Unemployment is rife in Muthanna.  Current estimates 
of the provincial government place it at 65%.  The 
agricultural sector, which in the past accounted for over 40% 
of the employment and over half of the economic activity in 
the province, has shrunk dramatically since the collapse of 
 
BAGHDAD 00004771  002 OF 003 
 
 
government support for it in the 1990s.  Of the four SOEs in 
Muthanna, representing another 10-15% of the province,s job 
pool, one, a brick factory, has closed and three others (1 
salt factory, 2 cement factories) are plagued by inefficiency 
and absenteeism.  Lastly, the government,s provision of 
essential services is uneven.  Electricity in Muthanna has 
reached its worst point since 2003 with currently 1 hour on, 
6 hours off.  The population centers in the province lack 
functional sanitation systems; sewage and refuse clog the 
streets.  On the other hand, urban populations have access to 
drinking water, roads and bridges are mostly passable, and 
the education and health sectors are quite strong.   Security 
is linked to economic performance, in that any fundamental 
attempt to weaken JAM (and other militia elements) hinges 
upon the government,s ability to fulfill the basic needs of 
its citizens. 
 
--------------------- 
KEY POLITICAL FIGURES 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Governor Muhammad Ali al-Hassani is the single most 
powerful individual in Muthanna.  He was in the Badr Corp for 
two decades, rising to the rank of commander of the Middle 
Euphrates region in 2003.  He then assumed the SCIRI mantle 
and entered into politics.  He is the only governor in Iraq 
to have retained his post after the Dec. 2005 elections. 
Hassani,s network of support and patronage is extensive. 
With the aid of SCIRI,s control over the Ministry of 
Interior under Bayan Jabr, Hassani presided over the 
incorporation of Badr members into the elite units of the 
police services.  Institutionally, he has the authority to 
direct the local brigade of the Iraqi Army.  And he also 
relies on Albu Hassan tribesmen for armed support. 
 
¶7.  (C) Hassani has a clique within the Provincial Council 
that helps him control that body and exploit its budgeting 
and contracting processes for kickbacks.  Members of this 
group include Mohammed al-Zayadi (Chairman of the Supervision 
Committee and arch political opportunist), Muhammad Arboud 
(notoriously corrupt Chairman of the PRDC), Ahmed Marzook 
Salal (current PC Chairman), Qassim Hassan Auda (highly 
astute current Badr leader in Muthanna), Hadi Jabr Shirreab 
(PC member, engineer, and technical assistant to the Governor 
involved in project contracting and supervision), Jassim 
Shiraat, Fadhil Muhalhil, and Sheikh Abdullah Shanoon Dadhil 
(Chair of PC Security Committee, head of SCIRI in Muthanna, 
supported by Iran). 
 
¶8.  (C) Politically, the Shi,i parties dominate, but to a 
lesser degree than in the surrounding provinces.  Muthanna 
politicians are opportunistic rather than ideological.  By 
and large, they will affiliate with whomever controls the 
resources or the access they need at a particular point.  As 
a party, SCIRI has the most coherence and delineation.  The 
rest (Da,wa, Fadhila, Iraqi National Accord, Iraqi Communist 
Party, Middle Euphrates Party, Independent Islamic 
Organization, etc) lag far behind.  The stronger parties seek 
to gain control over the various governmental departments in 
order to corner certain sectors and enhance their patronage 
networks. 
 
¶9.  (C) Underneath this political patchwork lies a web of 
tribal affiliations.  In Muthanna, the latter ties are often 
more significant.  Among the strongest tribes are the 
al-Zayad (Sheikh Raysaan Mutasher), the Albu Jayash (General 
Sheikh Ali al-Ajan Dali), the Albu Hassan (Sheikh Abdul 
Mansour and Sheikh Hakim Salman al-Sultan), the Bani Zraige 
(Sheikh Abdullah al-Hajj Kamaal al-Farhood), the al-Juwabir 
(Sheikh Azeez Rahem Sefar), and the al-Abbas (Sheikh Malik 
Hassan Abed). 
 
¶10.  (SEC/REL MNF-I) OMS and JAM are the major political 
forces not represented in the government.  The principal OMS 
leaders in Muthanna are Sheikh Imad al-Shamari, Dr. Hamid 
Rasheed, Dr. Rasheed Alawi Sha,ie, and Ahmed Abdul Kadhum. 
They maintain direct contact with Muqtada al-Sadr.  The top 
JAM leaders are Sheikh Ghazi Jihad al-Zagani (Samawa; has 
direct links to Muqtada but has operated without MAS,s 
approval in the past), Imad Raheem (Samawa; plays roles of 
Chief of Staff and Ops Officer), Kareem Qassim (Samawa BN 
commander), Hamza Chukhaya al-Zayadi (Samawa BN commander), 
Ahmed Saud Karbalaie (Samawa BN commander), Sheikh Nasser 
(Samawa BN commander), Sheikh Adnan Jalawi Hassani (JAM 
leader in Rumaytha), and Husayn Abd Zayd (JAM leader in 
 
BAGHDAD 00004771  003 OF 003 
 
 
al-Khidr). 
 
¶11.  (C) Hassani and the other main politicians in the 
government are out to enhance their own power.  But their 
agenda is not a radical one.  They want stability in the 
province and they are pragmatic.  They are willing to work 
with us and we can cooperate with them.  OMS and JAM, while 
they remain outside the political system, are too radical and 
too focused on political posturing to work with the 
coalition.  If they were to enter the government in the next 
provincial elections, the realities and responsibilities of 
office might moderate their stance towards the PRT and 
Coalition Forces.  But this remains to be seen. 
 
--------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  POTENTIAL STEPS FORWARD 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Muthanna is currently stable, relatively secure, and 
has a reasonably effective provincial government.  It is 
further along on these fronts than its neighboring provinces, 
and it has so far avoided the endemic instability, sectarian 
strife, and militia-driven lawlessness that beset Basrah, 
Maysan, Diyala, Anbar, and greater Baghdad.  That said, JAM 
still poses a threat to provincial order and to the organs of 
government.  Curbing that threat and undermining JAM,s 
popular support among the young should be our central 
objective.  Any attempt to do so hinges upon the 
government,s ability to fulfill the basic needs of its 
citizens.  Provincial institutions must prove themselves to 
be the legitimate, effective alternatives to extra-legal 
militia control. 
 
¶13.  (C) Strategically, it is imperative that the Coalition 
reinforce the Muthanna government's  success with further 
resources, development, and capacity-building so that the 
province remains a bulwark against spreading instability and 
an exemplar to the rest of Iraq of the benefits of effective 
government and the containment of violence.  This can be done 
through programs in the areas of governance, rule of law, 
civil society building, essential services, and economic 
development.  The goal of this entire effort must be to 
create the conditions under which the citizens of Muthanna 
support the provincial government and the ISF as viable 
alternatives to the extra-legal militias in the provision of 
justice, essential services, and basic administration 
 
¶14.  (C) Specific programs would include improving the 
provincial government,s capacity to plan and execute its 
budget (it has spent 20% of its FY06 budget of $40m); 
bringing power to the lowest levels of government and; making 
government accessible to civil society to grassroots through 
strengthening capacity of councils and mayors; improving 
interaction among various levels of government; and promoting 
transparency and access of key interest groups (including 
tribal leaders) to government. We must also undertake 
programs to improve the rule of law at the provincial level. 
We can help the provincial government improve its capacity to 
deliver basic services to the people through analytical and 
material assistance and focused Operations and Maintenance 
training.  We should also help the provincial government set 
the conditions to reduce unemployment, and consequently 
militia enrollment and criminal activity, by stimulating the 
private sector and developing the local economy: 
 
¶15.  (C) We should also encourage the GOI to  pass and 
implement legislation that enhances the ability of provincial 
governments to provide services and further promotes 
sustainable economic growth. 
SCOBEY