VZCZCXRO7028
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4770/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8835
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004770 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH PROVINCE:  THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, 
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Basrah province is home to Iraq,s second 
largest city and has an estimated population of 2.4 million, 
the majority of which are Shi,a.  Basrah is also Iraq,s 
economic center; over 80 % of the country,s commerce passes 
through its ports.  Security concerns center around targeted 
assassinations of tribal leaders, Iraqi Security Force 
personnel, and professionals, as militia groups such as JAM 
and Badr, and various tribes jockey for power.  The keys to 
reducing violence are promoting economic growth and stemming 
Iranian influence.  New jobs could create alternative to the 
Iranian supported militias that foment instability.  New 
provincial elections could help restore confidence in local 
leaders.  This is one of a series of cables from Regional 
Embassy Offices and Provincial Reconstruction Teams analyzing 
the governates of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Basrah province is home to Iraq,s second largest 
city and has an estimated population of 2.4 million, the 
majority of which are Shi,a.  The provincial governor 
purports to support coalition efforts but, in REO's view,  is 
a kleptocrat whose grasp on power is threatened by rival 
factions.  He has overcome attempts to remove him from office 
and survived an attempted assassination.  He and other 
political figures, supported by various militia, vie for 
power and resources and try to limit Baghdad,s take. 
Numerous political parties have strong ties to Iran. 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Basrah is also Iraq,s economic center; over 80 % of 
the country,s commerce passes through the ports around Umm 
Qasr and the oil refineries that dot the landscape. 
Corruption is an integrated part of the economy.  Criminal 
gangs, various police units, and militias compete for 
economic control through a range of illicit activities, 
including assassinations and smuggling.  Basrah city suffers 
from a dearth of essential services.  The city,s power 
supply is irregular with a majority of customers receiving 
less than eight hours a day.  Trash pickup is also an ongoing 
problem as contracts are handed out, money is collected but 
the trash piles up.  Medical supplies often run short. 
Basrah,s unemployment rate amongst men 18-45 ranges between 
30% and 40%.  Militias reportedly recruit from this group to 
launch attacks against coalition compounds, paying, for 
instance, up to $150 per successful launch into the Basrah 
Palace Compound 
 
--------------- 
SECURITY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Security concerns center around targeted 
assassinations of tribal leaders, Iraqi Security Force 
personnel, and professionals, as militia groups such as JAM 
and Badr, and various tribes jockey for power.  As a result, 
there is a high degree of Shi,a on Shi,a violence. Sunni ) 
Shi,a violence is relatively minimal, because most of the 
Sunnis were driven out after the Samarra mosque bombing.  The 
general consensus is that there is little law and order since 
the Iraqi Police are the main culprits of the violence, and 
Basrah,s leaders do little, if anything, to stop it. 
 
--------------------- 
KEY POLITICAL FIGURES 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Basrah Governor Mohammed Moassibh Al Wa,eli of the 
Fadillah Party is best described as a duplicitous crook whose 
primary goal is personal enrichment. He is heavily involved 
in oil smuggling and uses the Oil Protection Force as his 
private militia.  A compromise candidate for governor in 
January 2005, Governor Mohammed secured his current position 
because he was neither strong enough nor extreme enough to 
worry either OMS or SCIRI.  However, he has made many 
enemies, and his life is under constant threat. 
 
¶6.  (S) Ismail Al Wa'eli, brother to Governor Mohammed 
 
BAGHDAD 00004770  002 OF 003 
 
 
Moassibh Al Wa,eli (Fadillah), wields undeniable influence 
over Basrah's local government.  He ran for a seat in the COR 
last year, but did not win enough votes.  Nevertheless, he is 
rumored to assume the Governor's role when his brother is out 
of Basrah.  A thug with political aspirations and not much 
education, Ismail reportedly heads the Fadillah party's 
militia in Basrah and some of the death squads that roam the 
city. 
 
¶7.  (S) Seyid Yusif Al Batat, head of the Thar Allah militia, 
is a notorious figure in Basrah, who receives Iranian support 
for his militia.  Seyid Yusif seeks a legitimate political 
role and has been waging war against the Governor,s private 
militia.  He has asked us not to interfere when succeeds in 
killing the Governor. 
 
¶8.  (S) Majed Al Sari, the Defense Minister,s Intelligence 
Advisor for the South, is a key REO source, who heads his own 
militia.  He is in contact with most other militias and has 
attempted to act as an intermediary between JAM and UK 
forces.  He holds no political office, but is an advisor to 
the Iraqi Minister of Defense.  He made &peace8 with the 
Governor during a REO tea in September but will not meet with 
him at his residence. 
 
¶9.  (S) Major General Abdul Latif, head of the Iraqi Army 
10th Division is one of the few good news stories - the most 
forward thinking of all our ISF contacts. He is respect 
tribal leaders and politicians, and he evaded and attempt by 
the Governor to replace him with a crony.  General Abdul 
Latif works with UK forces to increase the standards of 
conduct for his troops.  He does not have enough men to 
secure Basrah city or Province and would need to double his 
force strength to match the effectiveness of UK forces.  Both 
he and his officer corps are under increasing risk due to 
their cooperation with UK forces. 
 
¶10.  (S) Chairman of the Emergency Security Committee Major 
General Ali Al-Hammadi was appointed by the Prime Minister in 
August 2006.  Officially he could wield more power than the 
governor, but is politically inept.  The British military use 
him as a conduit to the central government. 
 
¶11.  (S) Chief of Police Mohammed Al Hammadi has been unable 
to purge his forces of militia elements.  The majority of his 
force is corrupt, and they are responsible for the majority 
of the crimes taking place in Basrah city, including 
kidnappings, torture, and murders.  He often calls in the 
Iraqi Army,s 10th Division to assist in security operations, 
including at his own police stations. 
 
¶12.  (S) Seyid Baha Ahmed Jamal Al Deen (Da'awa), a Shia Imam 
from a well-known and respected family is an influential 
Islamic moderate.  He managed an NGO before being elected to 
the council, and he has an untouchable reputation as a 
religious man who cares for the poor and needy.  He maintains 
open lines of communication with Coalition partners and has 
expressed interest in mounting projects to employ poor people 
in Basrah. 
 
¶13.  (S) Seyid Ali Al Musawi is the most prominent Shia imam 
in Basrah and one of the wealthiest individuals in the city. 
He is the spiritual leader of the Al Shakheyah sect, a 
minority Shia sect founded by Sheikh Ahmad Al Insa'i in the 
nineteenth century that has followers in several countries in 
the Middle East.  He is politically moderate and not 
antagonistic toward Sunni and Christian minorities.  He owns 
hospital, a construction company and a handful of shops in 
Basrah; leads the largest mosque in the city; and conducts 
philanthropic activities. 
 
¶14.  (S) Sheikh Mansour Al Kanaan is the leader of the Al 
Kanaan tribe and a former member of the Transitional National 
Assembly representing the Iraqi Unified Alliance.  He leads 
one of the largest tribes and wields considerable influence. 
A lawyer by training, Sheikh Mansour acted as a tribal judge, 
and his good relations with other tribes in Basrah enhances 
his reputation.  He owns a newspaper, a construction company, 
and an organization that promotes human rights.  A harsh 
critic of the dysfunctional Basrah Provincial Council, he 
founded the Gathering to Save Basrah, an informal council 
that exercises moral authority over the Council. 
 
¶15.  (S) Hassan al-Rashid is the General Secretary of Badr 
and former governor.  He is an astute political operator who 
seeks to turn Badr into a legitimate political party.  He is 
 
BAGHDAD 00004770  003 OF 003 
 
 
the most professional politician in the province and has 
close ties to Iran. 
 
---------------------- 
POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD 
---------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) The keys to reducing violence are promoting economic 
growth and stemming Iranian influence.  We need to create 
jobs as an alternative to the Iranian supported militias that 
foment instability and fire on coalition compounds with near 
impunity.  As the economic hub and port city, Basrah could 
attract FDI if the security situation were stabilized. 
 
¶17.  (S) In order to strengthen democratic institutions, the 
provincial elections laws must be passed and provincial 
elections scheduled.  Otherwise, the limited confidence in 
the central and provincial government will wane further. 
 
¶18.  (S) Improving security will require continued 
cooperation between the Iraqi Army and UK forces.  Operation 
Sinbad expires in January 2007, and the UK plans to cede 
provincial control to the Iraq forces (PIC) and draw down in 
size and mission in spring 2007.  However, we doubt that the 
Iraqi security forces will be ready to assume control by this 
spring and worry that the reduction in UK forces could lead 
to an increase in violence as militias and tribes jockey for 
power. 
 
¶19.  (C) Reconciliation is not a top priority as Basrah does 
not suffer from the high degree of Sunni ) Shi,a violence 
that Baghdad does. 
SCOBEY