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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4769/01 3640135
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8832
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: TA'MIM PROVINCE AND KIRKUK: THE ISSUES, THE 
LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Kirkuk's most divisive issue in Kirkuk 
remains Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution which dictates 
that normalization, a census and a referendum on Kirkuk,s 
future status occur before December 31, 2007.  The Kurds are 
pushing for the process to go forward in order to tie Kirkuk 
to the Kurdistan Regional Government, Arabs and Turcomen seek 
a delay and a power-sharing arrangement.  Unemployment 
remains high and threatens the stability of the region. 
Attacks along sectarian lines occur on a regular basis, but 
not to the extent as in Baghdad or other provinces.  The U.S. 
should urge a peaceful and constitutional resolution on the 
final status of Kirkuk.  Economic and institutional 
development, as well as key infrastructure improvements, will 
also enhance stability and security.  This is one of a series 
of cables by Regional and Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
analyzing the governates of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Kirkuk is divided between Sunni Arabs, Turcoman and 
Kurds, with a smattering of other ethnic groups, all of whom 
offer arguments that Kirkuk is or was historically 
&theirs.8  The prevalent spoils system of local politics 
makes all but the Kurds, now in political ascendancy, 
reluctant to become involved in any organization that they 
cannot control. 
 
¶3.  (C) The most divisive issue in Kirkuk centers on Article 
140 of the Iraqi Constitution which dictates that 
normalization, a census and a referendum on Kirkuk,s further 
status will occur before December 31, 2007.   Under the 
former regime, Kirkuk underwent an &Arabization8 program 
which included redrawing provincial boundaries, forcing 
people from their homes and moving Arabs into Kirkuk.  The 
normalization process requires rectifying these previous 
actions.   Following normalization, a census is supposed to 
occur, the results of which will determine who votes in the 
future referendum determining Kirkuk,s final status. 
 
¶4.  (C) While many feel it will be impossible to complete 
normalization prior to the constitutionally-mandated December 
2007 date,  the Kurds are pushing for the referendum to go 
forward under the assumption that through population and 
political muscle Kirkuk will vote to join the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG).    As it is related to the 
referendum, Arabs and many Turcoman seek a delay pending a 
power-sharing political agreement.  Some seek a special 
status for Kirkuk similar to Baghdad city and some threaten 
violence to prevent Kirkuk,s absorption into the KRG.  Much 
depends on the GOI,s willingness to move the process along 
and many Kurds are unhappy with what they perceive as the 
Prime Minister,s so far tepid support for normalization and 
the eventual referendum. 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Unemployment remains high and threatens the stability 
of the region.  The largest employers are the Government and 
the Northern Oil Company (NOC).  Like the rest of the 
country, un- and under-employed young men comprise the 
largest demographic group.  Political power is patronage 
power here, and local political participation is directly 
linked to this dynamic.  While Arabs and Turcoman have 
boycotted much of the local political process they have lost 
economic opportunities on which the Kurdish population has 
been quick to capitalize. 
 
¶6.  (C) The management of the Northern Oil Co. (NOC), 
specifically the question of who controls its hiring 
practices, has emerged as a major issue.  NOC employment is a 
flash point between Arabs (seen by Kurds as Saddam-era carpet 
baggers) and Kurds (who have not bothered to justify the 
technical credentials of those it tries to muscle into oil 
jobs).  Kirkuk, like the rest of the nation, is beset by 
severe power shortages and water and sanitation problems to a 
lesser extent.  Power-free days in some neighborhoods and 
city-wide, multi-hour blackouts remain the norm.  Corruption 
is prevalent.  Public infrastructure remains an easy 
 
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terrorist target. 
 
--------------- 
SECURITY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Attacks along sectarian lines occur on a regular 
basis, but not to the extent as in Baghdad or other 
provinces.  Nonetheless, Kirkuk violence is significant and 
has increased in frequency and ferocity since Spring 2006. 
While there have been several examples of mass terror here, 
more often there occur specifically targeted acts, like the 
two recent assassination attempts on the Governor.  Arab 
Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups in Kirkuk include Ansar 
al-Sunna (founded by Sunni Kurds), Jaysh al-Islam and 
Al-Awda. The pro-Baathist Sunni areas of Hawija in the west 
and Riyad in the south are especially dangerous. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Shia JAM militia reportedly maintain as many as 
500-600 armed followers in Kirkuk, but there has not been any 
violence attributed to them in the media or anecdotally among 
our interlocutors.   The Kurdish-dominated quasi-statal 
secret police &Asayesh8 conduct targeted operations but 
 
SIPDIS 
thus far have not really thrown their weight.   In Kirkuk it 
is often difficult to differentiate criminal activity and 
&score settling8 from political violence in the region. 
However, as Kirkuk,s referendum date comes closer, the 
possibility exists for an intense and perhaps bloody surge as 
Kurds, Arabs and Turcomen look to secure the outcome in their 
 favor through violence and intimidation. 
 
--------------------- 
KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S-NF) Asayesh - Some point to the shadowy, 2,500-strong 
security/intelligence police Asayesh as the most influential 
agent in Kirkuk.  There are actually two distinct and 
separate Asayesh networks in Kikruk, organized along PUK/KDP 
party lines.   Kirkuk Asayesh report to the most senior tier 
of Kurdish hierarchy.  The PUK faction answers to Dr. Khasraw 
Gul Mohammed (PUK politburo member and Talabani acolyte), 
while the KDP Asayesh reports to Marour Barzani (KDP 
politburo member, head of KDP intelligence and son of KRG 
President Masud Barzani).  Both groups work closely with MNFI 
in their counter-insurgency role, and both liaise with local 
police through Deputy Director General Torhan Abdul Rahman. 
 
¶10.  (C) Rizgar Ali is Chairman of the Kikruk Provincial 
Council.  Pragmatic and charismatic, he is the quintessential 
Big City Boss, and arguably the most powerful man in Kirkuk 
He has made efforts to reach out to the Sunni Arabs but has 
been disappointed with the response.  His support for PRT 
projects has been solid.  Rizgar Ali is a PUK man through and 
through. 
 
¶11.  (C) ACC (Arab Consultative Council) is dominated by the 
al-Ubaidi tribe, among whose leaders Abdul Rahman Munshid 
al-Assi is seen as one of the key players in Kirkuk Arab 
society.  Boycotting Arab members of the Kirkuk Provincial 
Council are Rakan Saeed and Mohammed Khalil Nasif.  The 
latter, from the Jaburi tribe, maintains close ties to the 
Iraqi Turcoman Front and is on the 140 Committee.  That 
neither of them seem to hold much sway among Sunni parties in 
Baghdad nor engage effectively with locally powerful Kurds in 
Kirkuk makes them forces to work around rather than through. 
Meanwhile, the Shia have been notable by their absence in 
most Arab discussions about the future of Kirkuk, and it has 
been very difficult to find any member of the local community 
who can speak authoritatively on their behalf. 
 
¶12.  (C) Governor Abdul Rahman Mustafa is a moderate Kurd who 
seems to be the compromise candidate between the KDP and PUK, 
and as such he seems to be more a figurehead than an engine 
of Kurdish policy.  Although deeply overshadowed by Rizgar 
Ali, the Governor has recently tried to take a more active 
leadership role and will continue to be a player, especially 
as a liaison and advocate for the region among 
extra-provincial interlocutors. 
 
¶13.  (C) Ali Mahdi is a key member of the Turcoman Ili party 
and a NOC oil executive on sabbatical.   Mehdi is a 
boycotting member of the Kirkuk Provincial Council and one of 
the most vocal opponents of the Kurds and implementation of 
Article 140.  Said to be funded by Ankara, Mahdi often hosts 
 
BAGHDAD 00004769  003 OF 003 
 
 
meetings with Hassan Torhan (said to be a Turcoman Islamist , 
affiliated with the ITF).  Meanwhile, Tahseen Mohamed Ali 
Kahiya of the Turcoman Islamic Union, a Shia, is on the 140 
Committee. 
 
¶14.  (C-NF) General Anwar is a reliable U.S. ally.  He is the 
unrivaled Commander of Iraqi military forces in the Kirkuk 
region.  However, the questions remain as to how influential 
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be over time vis--vis 
non-statal players like the Asayesh and militias, and how 
effective a force ISF will continue to be in a scenario that 
involves the diminution of direct U.S. military involvement. 
 
---------------------- 
POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD 
---------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C-NF) The key to U.S. influence on the primary issue in 
Kirkuk --  namely the final status of the province -- is at 
the national level in Baghdad and the regional level in 
Erbil, to be followed up locally with the Kurdish Brotherhood 
List.  It appears likely that Kirkuk Kurdish leadership and 
their satellites will fall into line with decisions made by 
higherups.  Likewise, our standing with Sunni Arabs and other 
groups here is a product of our national stature, not the 
other way around.  So goes Baghdad and the Shia and Arab 
sense of our fair play, so goes our effectiveness among those 
groups here.  We should assiduously guard our role in Kirkuk 
as an &honest broker.8 
 
¶16.  (C-NF) We should also vocally support the constitution, 
publicly and privately, and support Iraqi efforts to define 
how the constitution should be interpreted and applied.  In 
terms of non-military U.S. staffing and resources at the 
provincial level, our focus must be on developmental inputs 
in areas of fundamental importance in the province: security 
and infrastructure.  U.S. capacity-building efforts in the 
North should focus on core missions like power 
generation/distribution and clean water and sanitary 
services. 
 
¶17.  (C) On security, it is important we continue progress in 
training and helping professionalize the police and security 
forces.  As Iraqi forces undertake more responsibility for 
their own security (and in the Kirkuk context, evidence 
suggests that they are), our forces (as well as our politics) 
could serve as a QRF, cordoning off as much as possible 
against outside interference. 
 
¶18.  (C) &Softer,8 political capacity-building activities, 
including trade shows, job creation schemes, women and 
minority contact groups, political workshops, should be 
designed carefully to include all ethnic groups.  It is also 
important to recognize that Kirkuk, as a multi-ethnic border 
town, will always remain a fault line within Iraq,s 
political life, regardless of its final status. 
SCOBEY