VZCZCXRO7020
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4767/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8827
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: KARBALA PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, 
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: Karbala, like nearby Najaf, is home to a 
number of Shi'a religious sites and has become an important 
tourist destination.  Four Shi'a parties control local 
politics. The JAM is increasing in power.  The province 
recently transferred from CF Control to Provincial Iraqi 
Control (PIC), although some local officials feel the 
province was not ready.  A physical PRT presence could 
strengthen relations with provincial officials.  Moderate 
political players could increase their influence in the 
province with U.S. support.  This is one of a series of 
cables by Provincial Reconstruction Teams analyzing the 
governates of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
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POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The four main parties in Karbala are SCIRI, Da,awa, 
Islamic Virtue and Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) have begun 
vying for prominence with regard to reconstruction efforts. 
While the Governor Aqeel Al Khazali (Da,awa) is a force 
within the province and a strong Governor, his power is 
largely due to the largesse of the more powerful Islamist 
parties (SCIRI and OMS).  Karbala province has seen no open 
signs of campaigning or open jockeying for power for new 
provincial elections, if they occur in 2007. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Governor Al Khazali considers himself one of the 
more prominent political figures in the region.  He has been 
somewhat problematic in his dealings with the Coalition.  At 
times he has cancelled or cut short Provincial Reconstruction 
Development Committee (PRDC) meetings at his whim.  This 
sense of importance is likely the result of his feeling that 
he needs to present a strong image of himself and his party. 
It is relatively well known that Da,awa is dwindling in 
power within the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and Al Khazali 
governorship is important in the long term for the health of 
the party. 
 
¶4.  (C) In a recent raid in Najaf a leading Sadrist, Sahib Al 
Amiri, was killed.  It was a joint IA/CF raid.  This occurred 
one week post-Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in the province 
and produced a strong reaction by some local authorities, 
including the deputy governor, who called for an end to CF 
activities in the Province.  Others provincial leaders felt 
that PIC may be coming too early for the province. 
 
¶5.  (C) Karbala continues to deal with the issue of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).  There are approximately 
8000 families on the IDP register.  There are an estimated 
2000 more that have not been documented.  The governor 
considers the 2000 undocumented families to be a strain on 
resources in the province. There has been an effort to 
identify and repatriate these families to their homes either 
in or north of Baghdad. 
 
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ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Karbala economy is based largely on tourism, as 
there a number of Shi'a holy sites in the province.  It is 
very similar to Najaf.  Once Najaf,s opens a regional 
airport, Karbala can count on a surge in religious pilgrims. 
The effort to accommodate the influx of pilgrims is nascent 
at this point, but there are talks underway to provide hotels 
and restaurants for the surge.  As a province, despite the 
somewhat contentious relationship between the governor and 
the PRDC there has been success in the reconstruction arena. 
The governor is eager to exert full control of projects. 
There is de facto provincial control of reconstruction, but 
even minimal CF involvement causes the governor to bristle. 
The new PRT has done a good job of connecting with the 
provincial government and showing how their expertise can 
enhance the effort.  There is a good working relationship. 
 
¶7.  (C) The shortage of fuel in the province is of major 
concern.  This is a problem throughout Iraq, but with the 
large population of IDP,s in the province it puts a 
 
BAGHDAD 00004767  002 OF 003 
 
 
particular strain on resources.  Prices for fuel are high and 
availability, except on the black market is low. Food rations 
are suffering the same fate as fuel.  The ability to feed the 
citizens and IDP,s in the province is under great strain. 
Obviously, undocumented IDP families receive no rations or 
assistance other than that of local family members who are 
citizens of Karbala.  This is an invisible tax on families 
willing to help fellow displaced Shia. 
 
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SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Province has a relatively new IP chief.  Abu Al 
Waleed was chosen by the central government to be the IP 
chief of Karbala.  This has caused some degree of friction 
between his office and the Provincial Council who tend to 
believe that they know best what sort of IP Chief the 
province needs.  Al Waleed arrived with some level of 
notoriety for his work as the commander of the Wolf brigade 
in Al Anbar province.  Some people have seen his tactics as 
heavy handed and others simply consider them effective. 
 
¶9.  (C) Al Waleed has brought in some of his colleagues from 
outside the province and seems intent on fighting crime.  It 
is very early in his tenure and he has not taken on Jaysh Al 
Mahdi (JAM) and it remains to be seen if that is his 
intention.  It must be remembered that much of the 
&security8 that Governor Al Khazali enjoys comes from OMS 
and by extension JAM. 
 
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KEY POLITICAL FIGURES 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Hamid Qunoosh: PC Member Karbala and Deputy head of 
the Integrity Committee.  Qunoosh is a very active member of 
the security committee.  He is considered a radical Sadrist. 
He was allegedly a member of the force that fought CF in 
Najaf in 2004.  He has the grudging respect of PC members and 
the Governor.  (Probably as a result of fear as much as 
anything else.) 
 
¶11.  (C) Akrum Al Zubaidi:  Head of the Integrity Committee. 
Al Zubaidi is anti-CF and someone who used to have a regular 
Friday sermon in one of Karbala,s holy shrines.  He is also 
quite radical and is believed to be involved, at least 
nominally, in Anti-Iraqi forces activity.  His work on the 
Integrity Committee has done little to move the province 
forward. 
 
¶12.  (S) Jawad Al Hasnawi:  Deputy Governor of Karbala.  Al 
Hasnawi enjoys the support of Muqtada Al Sadr and by 
extension is very influential in the province.  While Al 
Khazali is the face of UIA, Hasnawi enjoys a real power to 
affect the province.  There is little question that his 
relationship with Sadr puts him in position to change the 
security and economic situation in Karbala.  Thus far there 
is little evidence that he has utilized his power in this 
fashion. 
 
¶13.  (S) Abdul Al Yaseen Al Yasiri:  PC Chairman Karbala.  Al 
Yasiri is an Islamist, but he is a follower of the Quietist 
Hawza (Lead by Ayatollah Sistani.)  He has backed followers 
of Sistani in elections and will likely do the same in 
upcoming elections.  Though not a moderate by any stretch, 
his relationship to the Marja,aya makes him predictable and 
somewhat reasonable. 
 
-------------------- 
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD 
-------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) There is a real question about Karbala,s readiness 
to go to PIC.  While there are a number of strong 
personalities, the work of the PRT has just begun.  The PRT 
will be able to sort out the actual leadership and players in 
the province.  It is obvious that a Da,awa governor in 
Karbala is more a front than a reflection of political power. 
 That being said, an opportunity exists to bolster more 
moderate forces. 
 
¶15.  (S) If there were a way for members of the PRT to be 
located in the province it would make real a relationship 
that has become somewhat  hit or miss,.  At this stage 
development of a bureaucracy and the tourism industry are 
 
BAGHDAD 00004767  003 OF 003 
 
 
extremely important.  Karbala is capable of being 
self-sustaining with the appropriate tools.  It is not a 
long-term project as it is a strong province, but there are 
still opportunities, with the right access to make a 
difference. 
 
¶16.  (S) The potential for a thriving tourism industry will 
help reduce violence.  Efforts to forge as working 
relationship between the PC and the IP Chief could also 
facilitate improved security, by reducing suspicions between 
the two and -- to the extent possible -- providing political 
support for the IP's efforts against violence. 
SCOBEY