VZCZCXRO7018
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4766/01 3640135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300135Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8825
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004766 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DHI QAR PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, 
POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD 
 
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: Dhi Qar is a largely rural province, where 
tribal loyalties are still very strong. Four Shi'a parties 
largely control provincial politics, with the help of 
affiliated militias. Reccurrent electricity shortages affect 
Dhi Qar particularly hard since farmers need electricity to 
power irrigation pumps.  Security appears to be worsening, 
largely from JAM and rogue JAM elements.  Reconstruction, 
employment, and checks on Iranian influence will be key 
components in restoring stability and security in the 
province.  This is one of a series of analyses by Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams analyzing the governates of Iraq.  End 
summary. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL ISSUES 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The political landscape of Dhi Qar Province is 
dominated by Shi,ite religious parties.  Of the 41 seats on 
the Dhi Qar Provincial Council, 33 are occupied by Shi,ite 
Islamist groups.  The main players are the Islamic Virtue 
Party (Fadila) with 11 seats, the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 11 seats, and the Da,wa Iraq 
Party with 10.  Calculating seats on the PC, the mayorships 
and the governor, who belongs to the SCIRI, are insufficient, 
however, to understand the political landscape of the 
Province.  In addition to the parties that hold seats on the 
PC, there is also a large group of individuals who are loyal 
to the Office of the Martyr Al-Sadr (OMS) in the province. 
 
¶3.  (C) Dhi Qar is a largely rural province, and tribal 
loyalties are still very strong.  These loyalties frequently 
take precedence over political loyalties.  At the same time, 
most of the major political parties have an attendant 
militia, or military wing for protection, and which serves as 
a means to achieve political advantage. These militias are a 
significant political force in Dhi Qar, and serve as a 
political force multiplier for those parties who have them, 
strengthening their political influence beyond what the size 
of their electorates or seats on the PC would tend to 
indicate. 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Dhi Qar,s economy is primarily rural, and 
agriculturally based. The current electricity crisis in Iraq 
is affecting Dhi Qar particularly hard since farmers need 
electricity to power irrigation pumps necessary for 
agriculture in the province.  Some reports indicate that 
farmers in some areas are only able to till about one forth 
of their normally arable land because of this shortage. 
Since the end of the previous regime, the economy of Dhi Qar 
province has been undergoing a gradual transitional process 
from a centralized State controlled economy to decentralized 
market-based economy. This difficult process involves all 
economic sectors. The transitional model followed is the 
Eastern European model which has not given, so far, 
satisfactory results.  There is an active black market in Dhi 
Qar, where everything from gas, cigarettes, videos, medicines 
and food, to sophisticated military electronics, weaponry and 
museum loot are traded.  Some dealers are small-time 
operators - many are just people trying to survive - but 
others are part of highly organized, multi-million dollar 
networks. At present, however, the most lucrative black 
market commodity in Iraq appears to be gasoline and oil. 
Another problem that Dhi Qar faces is widespread corruption, 
which affects life at every level and in every sector.  Most 
of the population lives paycheck to paycheck, relying on 
ration cards or other forms of assistance for their families. 
Through the PDS (Public Distribution System) the Iraqi 
government provides each person monthly with 2500 ID 
(approximately $2.00 US) 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) The security situation in Dhi Qar appears to be 
slowly worsening.  The PRT estimates that at present there 
are about 5,000 members of the Jayesh Al-Mahdi (JAM) militia 
active in the province.  In addition to that, there is a 
 
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strong presence of Badr corps militia.  Badr militia members 
occupy many of the higher level security positions such as 
police chiefs, etc. The PRT routinely cooperates with public 
official who belong to the Badr organization on security 
matters.  Moreover, it assesses that most of the 
anti-Coalition attacks in the Province have come from members 
of the JAM, its attendant rogue militias not under JAM,s 
immediate command and control, and from other assorted 
militias such as the Al-Sharkie group (estimated to have 
around 500 active member in the Province at this time.  The 
current security threats in the province are attacks on 
Coalition Forces from the JAM and other militias, especially 
in light of the threat by Moqtada Al-Sadr to proclaim a Jihad 
against the Coalition if it does not relinquish control of 
security in Iraq over to Iraqi control by January 2007, and 
the potential for violence between the JAM and the Badr 
Organization.  The PRT believes that the Badr organization is 
well armed and well trained, as well as well-financed by 
Iran.  The JAM on the other hand is also well-armed, but not 
as well trained, and not as well financed by Iran. 
Notwithstanding the reports that the JAM receives Iranian 
funding, PRT sources indicate that the JAM,s financial 
resources in Dhi Qar Province are exhausted. 
 
--------------------- 
KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Kadhum Aziz Alwan (SCIRI) The Governor of Dhi Qar 
Province. Strong connections with Iran and Abdul Aziz 
Al-Hakim. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ihsan Talib al-Ta,ee (Fadila) Most senior Fadila 
Party member in Dhi Qar and is Chairman of the Provincial 
Council (PC)  Influenced by Fadila founder and current head 
Yaqobi.  He has been to two training courses in Italy 
sponsored by the MNF-I. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Hassan Wirawish (Fadila) Chairman of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC). 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Ahmed Al-Sheik (Da,wa) Vice-Governor of the 
Province. 
 
-------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Many of the issues that plague Dhi Qar Province 
revolve around the chronic unemployment, and the severely 
underdeveloped economy.  In the short term, we should use 
resources to address immediate needs to address key 
infrastructure problems, including potable water, 
electricity, and basic human needs.  We should also focus on 
continuing to build the agricultural sector. Also in thee 
long run, it will be critical to build a good educational 
system that will facilitate secondary and post-secondary 
education for the residents of Dhi Qar.  While we have no 
accurate figure right now, the non-attendance rate in schools 
is very high. 
 
¶11.  (C) In the medium term, we must focus on local 
governance capacity, such that Iraqis themselves can ensure 
basic needs are met in the province. In the long term, once 
the local government has developed capacity, efforts should 
focus on building private sector capacity, which will offer 
the only long term solution to pervasive unemployment. 
 
¶12.  (S-NF) Coalition efforts to undermine the influence if 
the militias and Iran remain critical, but go hand-in-hand 
with broader economic and capacity building initiatives. The 
PRT's contact with the JAM has also shown that many members 
of that organization are very willing to participate in such 
projects as they will benefit their local tribes and address 
chronic unemployment. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Finally, Dhi Qar province is very ripe for a 
robust public diplomacy regimen.  There are opportunities to 
work local press and develop projects that  present the 
viewpoints and the many good works of the Coalition Forces to 
the general public without these being distilled through the 
prism of a hostile press. 
SCOBEY